MicroG is possible to run on GrapheneOS but isn't recommended since GOS has a sandboxing solution for running Google Play apps:
MicroG is possible to run on GrapheneOS but isn't recommended since GOS has a sandboxing solution for running Google Play apps:
Graphene generally seems to feel that running official signed Google adware is more secure than using open source alternatives that might require signature spoofing or having root on your own device.
GrapheneOS's approach is Sandboxed Google Play so the apps don't get special permissions. Without privileged access, Google apps get access to nothing more than what other apps can get access to on Android. So, for example, even if a device has microG installed, an app with a Google library would have virtually the same access as if Sandboxed Google Play was installed. And why would anyone need microG if not to provide compatibility for apps that rely on Play Services, aka apps with Google libraries?
Also, for some reason some people think that microG means deGoogling. That's not at all the case. microG still communicates with Google servers.
microG doesn't meet the project's requirements. If you look at the big picture, microG offers worse app compatibility and is less secure. The cons outweigh the pros by a lot. "Google bad" isn't an argument that works for us. App compatibility is very important.
"Sandboxed" Google Play still gets everything that the other apps in the same profile offer up to it / to Google. I don't understand how you're gaining any privacy as a practical matter. The issue isn't GApps' privileged access to the system, it's that other apps send your data to Google via Google Play Services.
To take some examples, MicroG stubs out the analytics and ads APIs. Your "sandboxed" Play would send that data to the mothership and return with ads.
https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Implementation-Status
https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/blob/32bc8954ff872d0e1a05d...
> I don't understand how you're gaining any privacy as a practical matter.
Exactly.
Being too focused on "Google bad" means you're not seeing the bigger picture. microG is only a thing to provide app compatibility for apps that rely on Google Play Services. Which apps do you think do that? Apps with Google libraries that often have fallback implementations and can operate without Google Play Services.
So, given those facts, if someone has microG installed, Google still effectively has the same access as a device with Sandboxed Google Play, except microG users are stuck with worse app compatibility and because of signature spoofing it's less secure and code runs in that privileged context.
GrapheneOS focuses on privacy, security, and app compatibility. microG fails at security and app compatibility. Also, there are apparently leaks (that I admit I don't know the details of) regarding location that make it worse for privacy too. There could be more leaks that I don't know about.
The apps that use Google analytics/ads don't need Google Services on the device. The libraries are embedded into the app, and have just as much fingerprinting capabilities as sandboxes Google services.
microG still heavily uses closed source Google services and even downloads executables run with the full privileges of microG. It downloads and runs droidguard with the privileges it has, giving that full access to the privileged access granted to microG.
Each app using Google Play still has the closed source Google Play SDK and libraries built into it in practice. It's extraordinarily rare to replace those libraries with the incomplete and buggy reimplementations from microG. Very close to zero otherwise open source apps are using those. The closed source Google Play SDK and libraries are therefore still part of the loop and have access to what the app can access. Many of the code paths in the Google libraries directly use Google services without requiring Play services including the full versions of the Ads and Analytics libraries.
The vast majority of data obtained by Play services is via the OS integration and permissions. Apps using it for push messaging, logging into accounts and many other features will send the same data to Google services regardless of whether you use it via sandboxed Google Play or microG.
GrapheneOS stubs out and reimplements APIs on the client side. That includes providing a complete implementation of the Google Play services location API not using on Google Play. These features are being expanded over time. They'll also be made available without having Google Play.
The GrapheneOS approach avoids giving an additional global service access to sensitive data from the OS and apps. microG has repeatedly had vulnerabilities leaking sensitive data to apps including location data. The approach of having an extra service sitting between apps and the OS which handles sensitive data means having to add all the same privacy and security checks as Play services which microG doesn't do in practice and it has caused severe privacy leaks. The main location leakage was eventually fixed but it persisted for years and there are still holes in the location service causing privacy issues.
Unlike microG, sandboxed Google Play doesn't get privileged access. That includes the executables (droidguard) downloaded by microG not getting privileged access. GrapheneOS also doesn't give privileged access to other apps such as Android Auto when those are installed as all the main operating systems using microG are doing. That privileged access gives access to highly sensitive data and doesn't require apps explicitly sending data to Google services, which will nearly all still go to Google services with a partial replacement of the middleware on the device.
> GrapheneOS stubs out and reimplements APIs on the client side...They'll also be made available without having Google Play.
That sounds like you are exactly rebuilding microG. To me, this is an endorsement of their approach not a rejection of it. If you don't like their implementations, it would be more public spirited to contribute patches, but it's your project.
We're rebuilding the Google Mobile Services functionality with a far different design and much higher standards for privacy, security, robustness and correctness. Our approach enables people to use Google apps as regular sandboxed apps while also working towards replacing those. It provides much broader app compatibility and it has major advantages for privacy and security which you're disregarding.
One of the main companies behind microG providing most of their funding (Murena) has repeatedly falsely claimed GrapheneOS is mainly used by criminals and heavily pushed talking points claiming more private/secure devices mainly benefit criminals and pedophiles. These are 2 of many examples and are the tip of the iceberg:
https://www.clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-intervie...
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116353973732143171
It's very strange to claim we aren't being community minded when considering the context of their years of effort to mislead people about GrapheneOS and harm our team. The microG project and several of the organizations backing it have spent years misleading people about GrapheneOS by falsely claiming it isn't a privacy project and misrepresenting what we provide. Many of their supporters do the same, including throughout posts on this site.
Those operating systems and phone products heavily mislead users about what they provide in their products and get people using devices with atrocious privacy and security due to lack of bare minimum privacy/security patches and protections. We see that as directly opposed to our efforts of improving mobile privacy and security. They're directing people away from reasonably private and secure devices such as an to devices not even getting the increasingly inadequate standard Android privacy/security patches for months or even years at a time.
I don't think Murena should be throwing shade on your project (although the personal hostility seems to go both ways) I would much rather see free/open mobile operating systems collaborating to offer a better experience for users.
Leaving aside the emotional folderol, "rebuilding the Google Mobile Services functionality" is exactly what MicroG does. You are both offering stub reimplementations of GmsCore as system apps. AFAIK, microG is essentially a one-man project initially funded by a grant from the German government[0] and it predates /e/OS by several years.
[0] https://www.prototypefund.de/en/projects/microg
The hostility is one-sided. I went back through old posts and found that while people on the GrapheneOS side (before my time) were sharing _objective facts_, and Murena's started responding with personal attacks.
GrapheneOS's approach is far different from microG's. It's not about rebuilding everything from scratch, it's about making Google Play Services behave as a non-privileged app.
Murena has spent years overly attacking the GrapheneOS project and our team. They've repeatedly falsely claimed that it's not a privacy project, isn't useful to regular people, is primarily used by criminals, is mainly only used by criminals/pedophiles and much more. They've spread massive amount of misinformation about the features, app compatibility and other aspects of what it provides to promote the products they sell. They've made it very clear they're talking about GrapheneOS in most of the posts talking about criminals. We gave clear 2 examples where their claims are much broader due to not specifically naming GrapheneOS because it's harder to dismiss the authoritarian anti-privacy talking points they're pushing when it's an attack on all serious privacy projects. There are more cases where they mention GrapheneOS than where they push those anti-privacy talking points without mentioning it.
microG isn't a one person project and has been largely funded by Murena, Calyx and FUTO. The government funding they get is mainly through Murena. The one person you're talking about working on microG has directly participated in attacks on GrapheneOS with false claims about it and our team, but most of it has come from the organizations funding it and paying people to work on it. Each of those 3 listed organizations has engaged in a massive amount of attacks on the GrapheneOS project including harassment. We haven't ever engaged in that towards any of them. You can see numerous cases throughout this thread of unprovoked personal attacks on our team and lies about us as individuals. It is not something both sides are doing as we haven't done it.
MicroG is a good compromise between deGoogling and having things work. GrapheneOS is not.
At the end of the day, I need a functional smartphone that can run the apps needed for daily life. MicroG offers that while reducing my exposure to Google.
MicroG is a sloppy and ineffective reimplementation of google services that does not meet GrapheneOSs privacy, security, and usability requirements. MicroG does not make you degoogled and is not a compromise between being degoogled and making apps work. GrapheneOS, with or without google services, has far better app compatibility.
If you need a functional smartphone that runs the apps you need while reducing exposure to google, GrapheneOS is the best option for that by far.
That's very false. GrapheneOS is a better choice for deGoogling than alternatives.
Sandboxed Google Play isn't installed by default, so our users don't have to use it if they don't want to.
Sandboxed Google Play doesn't have privileged permissions and has no more permissions than other user-installed apps. This means that they have the same restrictions as other user-installed apps.
> This means that they have the same restrictions as other user-installed apps.
This isn't meaningful when the other user-installed apps are calling Google Play Services in the same sandbox.
You're not seeing the big picture. Imagine every app with a Google library is basically the app & mini Google Play Services.
---
App & mini Google Play Services = access is restricted, like other regular apps.
App & mini Google Play Services + Sandboxed Google Play (unprivileged) = virtually the same access as above
App & mini Google Play Services + microG (privileged) = Google has the same access as the situations above, but with worse app compatibility, worse security (especially because of privileged access), and worse privacy (leaks).
---
You're worried about apps without special permissions to anything sharing usage data that they have access to anyway while ignoring the huge problems with microG just because "Google bad". That's hardly a sane approach to privacy.
Those apps still contain the closed source Google Play SDK and libraries with microG including libraries which connect to Google directly. microG still uses most of the same Google services and even downloads closed source Google executables which it runs with all of the permissions and privileged access granted to it. That code runs with access to Location and invasive privileged access to the OS with microG as integrated in the main operating systems using it while on GrapheneOS it doesn't have any of that at all.
GrapheneOS gives drastically less access to closed source Google Play code including the SDK, libraries and droidguard than the microG approach on /e/. It's strictly less, not more in any way. GrapheneOS does not allow it to access anything not already accessible to the SDK and libraries in the apps using those.
This Google service functionality also doesn't come as part of GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS has network location, geocoding and other functionality included in the OS via standalone implementations not tied to Google service compatibility as they are with microG.
GrapheneOS does reimplement the Google Play location service, but it does so inside of apps using it as a library to avoid needing a new service with location access and other privileges. It uses the OS network location when enabled but the OS network location is entirely independent from it.
That is the meaning. The point of sandboxed google play is to reduce google services to the same unprivileged access all other apps get on android. Normally, google play is incredibly privileged.
microG still heavily uses closed source Google services and even downloads executables run with the full privileges of microG. It downloads and runs droidguard with the privileges it has, giving that full access to the privileged access granted to microG.
Each app using Google Play still has the closed source Google Play SDK and libraries built into it in practice. It's extraordinarily rare to replace those libraries with the incomplete and buggy reimplementations from microG. Very close to zero otherwise open source apps are using those. The closed source Google Play SDK and libraries are therefore still part of the loop and have access to what the app can access. Many of the code paths in the Google libraries directly use Google services without requiring Play services including the full versions of the Ads and Analytics libraries.
The vast majority of data obtained by Play services is via the OS integration and permissions. Apps using it for push messaging, logging into accounts and many other features will send the same data to Google services regardless of whether you use it via sandboxed Google Play or microG.
GrapheneOS stubs out and reimplements APIs on the client side. That includes providing a complete implementation of the Google Play services location API not using on Google Play. These features are being expanded over time. They'll also be made available without having Google Play.
The GrapheneOS approach avoids giving an additional global service access to sensitive data from the OS and apps. microG has repeatedly had vulnerabilities leaking sensitive data to apps including location data. The approach of having an extra service sitting between apps and the OS which handles sensitive data means having to add all the same privacy and security checks as Play services which microG doesn't do in practice and it has caused severe privacy leaks. The main location leakage was eventually fixed but it persisted for years and there are still holes in the location service causing privacy issues.
Unlike microG, sandboxed Google Play doesn't get privileged access. That includes the executables (droidguard) downloaded by microG not getting privileged access. GrapheneOS also doesn't give privileged access to other apps such as Android Auto when those are installed as all the main operating systems using microG are doing. That privileged access gives access to highly sensitive data and doesn't require apps explicitly sending data to Google services, which will nearly all still go to Google services with a partial replacement of the middleware on the device.
How many times are you going to copy and paste the same message?
We get it. Your behavior makes reading the posts hard for no reason.
This is not Facebook, people take time to read here.
Running google code sandboxed is far more secure than running google code with privileged access. MicroG downloads and runs google code in a privileged context and has had many privacy and security issues like leaking location to apps that dont have the location permission.
> MicroG downloads and runs google code in a privileged context
> many privacy and security issues
> leaking location to apps that dont have the location permission.
Could you share some details on these three points?
I started to try to answer your question, but I found that the GrapheneOS account gave an answer. Here are quotes:
> microG still heavily uses closed source Google services and even downloads executables run with the full privileges of microG. It downloads and runs droidguard with the privileges it has, giving that full access to the privileged access granted to microG.
> microG has repeatedly had vulnerabilities leaking sensitive data to apps including location data. The approach of having an extra service sitting between apps and the OS which handles sensitive data means having to add all the same privacy and security checks as Play services which microG doesn't do in practice and it has caused severe privacy leaks. The main location leakage was eventually fixed but it persisted for years and there are still holes in the location service causing privacy issues.
I also regularly try to explain to people why microG doesn't make sense. It's more of a big picture thing so it's hard to explain briefly. Consider why people would even install microG. It's only helpful for people who have apps that rely on Google Play Services. Those libraries can have fallback implementations and run even without Google Play Services or microG
Sandboxed Google Play is installed as a regular app. It has the same restrictions as other user-installed apps. If apps have Google libraries that don't need Google Play Services or microG are installed with regular apps, they effectively have the same access as Sandboxed Google Play. If those same apps are installed on a device with microG, Google effectively has the same access, big picture.
GrapheneOS's priorities are privacy, security, and app compatibility. There are issues with microG as far as privacy goes, as already noted. It requires privileged permissions to even work properly, and even microG admits that its reimplementations of Google Play Services features are incomplete, so it's worse in terms of app compatibility too.
> It downloads and runs droidguard with the privileges it has, giving that full access to the privileged access granted to microG.
Wow, no kidding! I checked the source code and sure enough, it downloads the DroidGuard APK from Google[0], and loads a class from it[1], (seemingly?) without any kind of sandboxing or separation. I believe I'm safe because I don't have the Play Integrity API enabled, but I really wish the UI was more explicit about this, because the info text only says
> microG GmsCore contains a free implementation of SafetyNet, but the official server requires SafetyNet requests to be signed using the proprietary DroidGuard system.
[0]: https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/blob/32bc8954ff872d0e1a05d...
[1]: https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/blob/32bc8954ff872d0e1a05d...
It runs the Google Play executable code it downloads with the full permissions and privileges available to microG. Since microG is normally integrated with the Location permission along with a bunch of privileged access unavailable to regular apps, that can be accessed by the code it's running. The executable it's downloading is highly obfuscated and regularly changed because it exists to try to detect and defeat tampering via obfuscation and anti-tampering techniques. It heavily uses the privileged access available to it. This is enabled by default on /e/ in addition to the many other Google connections it adds by default both via microG which are not present in AOSP.
They'll just flag you for asking.
Here's the actual response:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50171175
By "they" I assume you mean GrapheneOS supporters? I can only speak for myself, but I only flag things when they clearly deserve to be flagged. Fair discussions are important. They help us grow as people and even in our case, GrapheneOS, but we encounter a crazy amount of misinformation here. Some members of our team are also targets for endless harassment. It's so unfortunate that people behave that way. There are also clear sockpuppets attacking GrapheneOS while promoting others. There was a brand new account participating in this thread that was clearly doing that.
Misinformation, harassment, and people who are using unfair methods to win arguments and damage the reputation of others is unacceptable. That's the kind of thing that I flag. What other people do with their permissions is up to them, but I would say that I wouldn't condone people flagging just because they disagree. I'd consider flagging genuine questions to be awful behavior as well.
I ask a lot of questions in the GrapheneOS community, I oppose a lot of opinions that are held there, but I have never been "flagged" for questioning or for debating something. The only time somebody is going to be flagged is if they are being outright disrespectful spreading misinformation or just being a general asshole.
In the GrapheneOS community, "being outright disrespectful spreading misinformation" is pretty much anything that brings solid counter-arguments to Daniel Micay's personal points of view. You probably haven't tried debating some advanced security and privacy topics with them.
As a member of the GrapheneOS team, I can say you're very incorrect.
Within the project, there's a lot of discussion and collaboration. Daniel is the most famous of all of us because he started the project, but we all work together and value each other's opinions. You can see the same in the issue tracker and other places as well. All of us, Daniel included, are happy to consider other ideas or approaches.
Instead of making some broad accusation about someone, you should be more specific. I hope that your bitterness isn't because one of us rejected a feature request or explained why our team implemented something in a specific way that you disagree with.
As a community member I can also attest to this. After I gave Other8026 more details about my app and background I shared on the forum, they restored my thread.
As someone outside of GrapheneOS community and preferring an alternative phone to GOS, I do see flagging and downvoting of my posts on HN. I even stated clearly more than once that I am happy about the GOS development but just prefer something else that you can't get from it.
Nevertheless my (and others') comments are often considered as attacks. Examples of flagged comments:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49565142
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49542065
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49536149
Other people have noticed that GOS community attacks almost every other alternative, instead of joining forces against Google and co.: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49564756
The GrapheneOS crowd is constantly accusing everyone in attacks and spreading misinformation about their phones (including in this discussion). Simple replies to misunderstandings and links to earlier reply would be much more polite. At the same time, I also see FUD and misinformation about alternative phones from GOS supporters on HN, e.g., https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47855369
You do realize that people use the flag feature all the time, right? People have abused the feature to remove our comments in the past too. It's beyond unacceptable to accuse us, without basis, that we're flagging all of your comments.
You are accusing us of "attacking" other groups when we're repeatedly pulled into conversations and we give objective answers and respond to misinformation about GrapheneOS. We have every right to correct misinformation about GrapheneOS. We have every right to defend ourselves against harassment.
Objective facts aren't "attacks." Why are you misrepresenting what we say? Isn't it better if people can make informed decisions?
> It's beyond unacceptable to accuse us, without basis, that we're flagging all of your comments.
You are right that I have no evidence that this group flagged the comments. I just say that I see such pattern in GOS-related discussion. I did not accuse anyone about "all my comments" though. This would indeed be beyond unacceptable.
I am happy to receive objective answers to the misunderstandings. I do have a lot of misunderstandings, too. Replies from the GOS supporters are often helpful. However they often lack some respect to the alternatives. Words like "atrocious security" do not bring us closer.
You very actively seek out discussions about GrapheneOS where you make inaccurate claims about both GrapheneOS and our team. You frequently use it as an opportunity to heavily promote products which are the direct opposite of privacy and security hardened devices. Those products are heavily promoted by those companies with false marketing and misinformation.
Immense harm has been caused through the misconceptions the companies behind those products have propagated to make money. It harms actual privacy, security and open hardware efforts. We aren't on the same side as those companies and aren't working towards the same things. We aren't going to agree on that unless you eventually end up moving on to promoting different products without those issues.
We're on the same side as several legitimate projects you promote including QubesOS. However, you promote those as part of attacking GrapheneOS and usually group it together with phony privacy products.
This is a false narrative. You're engaging in personal attacks based on fabrications. It's a demonstration of why you would have had moderation intervention in the GrapheneOS community.
Okay, so lemme break this down real simple
(Correction from prior statement)
GmsCompat is a layer that runs the official google play services and store in the app sandbox which also strips it of all privileges and teaches it to function with only the bare minimum.
The app itself is sandboxed
But it is taught to run without the app panicking
The app sandbox is an OS feature: https://source.android.com/docs/security/app-sandbox.
de-Googleling is unfortunately not a priority for GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS doesn't include Google Play (Services) on fresh install, user's explicitly can opt-in. It seems to be the only AOSP based OS that doesn't make any connections to Google by default [1], and is therefore the only true de-googled AOSP OS.
1: https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
It's not a priority but GrapheneOS does better at deGoogling than other OSes, including adding features to the OS so people have fewer reasons to install Sandboxed Google Play. One big example is Network Location, so now users don't have to grant Google Play Services location permissions.
Sandboxed Google Play is never preinstalled, so people who wish to deGoogle can do so. And I'm sure GrapheneOS users who don't want to use Google devices will be happy to get a supported Motorola in the future.
Right. They prefer to spend their time and energy proactively reacting to and debating every comment that mentions GrapheneOS on socials instead of focusing on real issues.
The point of GrapheneOS is privacy, period, not something as narrow as simply deGoogling.
GrapheneOS isn't a single person. One or two of us responding to misinformation on socials doesn't mean work isn't getting done. Unfortunately there are people who spend a lot of their own time making new accounts and attacking GrapheneOS instead of doing something more productive with their own time.
GrapheneOS is incredibly focused on security. Privacy is clearly a second thought to them.
GrapheneOS is a privacy project and heavily improves it with important privacy protections including Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, secure paste and much more. It preserves all of the standard privacy and security of AOSP while greatly improving upon both.
GrapheneOS doesn't connect to Google servers by default and avoids integrating any privileged access for either Google apps or partial replacements for those. The main operating systems integrating microG included always granted privileged access for microG, Google Play executables downloaded by microG (droidguard) which run with the privileged access it's granted and other Google apps including Android Auto.
The operating systems you believe are privacy projects greatly reduce both privacy and security compared to AOSP through not keeping up with standard patches, not providing important standard privacy/security protections and adding problematic services.
Lagging behind the already inadequate standard privacy/security updates by months and even years isn't compatible with providing reasonable protection for user privacy. Only a subset of the issues Google classifies as High or Critical severity are backported to the older releases of Android those are usually based on. Taking many months to move to newer releases is much more problematic than it appears. The backports to those older releases also get applied with a substantial delay. Firmware and drivers are usually not kept properly updated even when those are regularly released such as for Pixels. Many standard privacy and security protections are missing or disabled. An assorted of third party services are added too.
That's very false. GrapheneOS is primarily a privacy OS that also focuses on security to provide strong privacy.
Sandboxed Google Play has no privileged permissions, which means that those apps have the same permissions as any other apps you can install on Android, meaning the same restrictions.
All that plus the fact that Sandboxed Google Play is a better approach because it offers better app compatibility and is more secure. microG doesn't meet the project's standards.
GrapheneOS will have extreme difficulty being taken seriously while they are "you need to buy Google hardware to run this" project. This is why GrapheneOS has a tiny userbase.
We are partnered with Motorola, so people will have that option in the near future.
Also, GrapheneOS has plenty of users, and we're growing fast. People appreciate quality.
GrapheneOS has 500000+ users, and that is with only pixels. Maby more are waiting for the compatible Motorola hardware.
GrapheneOS is not going to compromise on privacy or security, and so far, pixel devices are the only devices meeting the hardware security requirements. People have not had an issue taking that seriously.
Motorola is launching a GrapheneOS phone direct to consumers next year. Getting picked up by a major OEM is about as taken seriously as you can get.
GrapheneOS is and always has been a privacy first project.
If it was privacy first it would ship with microG by default.
Sandboxed Google Play isn't installed by default, so users have a choice if they want to use it or not. Many don't.
GrapheneOS is more deGoogled than alternatives, so if you're thinking privacy = deGoogling, then GrapheneOS is a good option.
But you seem to be under the impression that microG improves privacy. That's not the case when you look at the big picture. Consider why people need microG in the first place. It's basically there to pretend to be Google Play Services for apps that rely on Google Play Services. Which apps are those? Apps with Google libraries in them.
So, pretend apps with Google libraries are an "app & mini Google Play Services", and the breakdown is like this:
---
App & mini Google Play Services = access is restricted, like other regular apps.
App & mini Google Play Services + Sandboxed Google Play (unprivileged) = virtually the same access as above
App & mini Google Play Services + microG (privileged) = Google has the same access as the situations above, but with worse app compatibility, worse security (especially because of privileged access), and worse privacy (leaks).
No, it would not. That would require expanding trust to a 3rd party, and granting privileged access to software that downloads and runs google code. That software has also had issues such as leaking location to apps that dont have location access.
That would be an extreme reduction in privacy, not an improvement.
How do you even write this comment without seeing the irony? You made my point for me: GrapheneOS is security first, privacy second
Because it is not ironic? You dont see how expanding trust and leaking location data are privacy issues?
Leaking it to google is fine then? I'd rather have control who to use for my location API and be able to turn it off entirely.
Sandboxed google play can only send the location to google if google services or playstore were granted the location permission. Accessing location for apps, including google, cannot be sidestepped as MicroG once allowed.
GrapheneOS lets you change aspects of location, including PSDS, SUPL, and network location. GrapheneOS also reroutes googlefusedlocation requests to the OS. If you would rather be able to turn it off entirely, GrapheneOS is is capable of this, not MicroG.
They pointed out privacy issues and you're still claiming that GrapheneOS is security first? Location leaks are a privacy issue, for example.
GrapheneOS doesn't have such a narrow focus. As we keep saying, GrapheneOS prioritizes privacy, security, and Android app compatibility. Given those three things:
Privacy: microG's leaks and failure to implement other checks and there's arguably no real gain in privacy since the Sandboxed Google Play approach means Google Play Services and Store don't have privileged permissions.
Security: microG needs privileged permissions to work properly and can also download Google binaries and runs them in that privileged context, depending on settings
App compatibility: It's an incomplete reimplementation. Even microG's GitHub says as much.
Why would GrapheneOS take so many steps back just because the only real compelling argument in favor of microG is "Google bad"?
"Google bad" is THE compelling argument to flash a custom ROM. Many projects like CalyxOS go privacy first, security second.
I am not worried about a random third worlder hacking my phone. This would only be possible if I allow it by user mistake. I am however worried about Google and its business model. As are many others.
MicroG is great because it limits Google's tracking as much as possible. It's lication services can be routed to a more trustworthy party, and you can actually select which APIs microG forwards to Google. Sandboxed Play Services don't allow any of this, and it's bloated and battery hungry in comparison.
Case closed.
CalyxOS doesn't preserve the standard privacy of the Android Open Source Project. It certainly doesn't greatly improve it as GrapheneOS does. CalyxOS consistently goes many months without shipping standard Android privacy and security patches. It doesn't provide highly important improvements to privacy such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, secure paste, fixes for Android's VPN leaks and many other privacy patches/protections provided by GrapheneOS. Lagging far behind on standard privacy patches and protections is a major issue and it's even more of an issue when the very poor security is considered. Privacy depends on security, not only privacy patches, privacy protections and which services are used.
Unlike GrapheneOS, CalyxOS comes with a bunch of connections to Google services and privileged integration of those services into the OS. It automatically grants highly privileged access and data to multiple Google apps when installed including Android Auto. It also has a bunch of other problematic third party connections. GrapheneOS avoids bundling third party apps and services not meeting our privacy standards.
microG and sandboxed Google Play don't compare the way you claim when it comes to privacy or battery life at all. GrapheneOS also does replace Google Play APIs including the location API with our location rerouting feature. Unlike the microG implementation, it avoids introducing major privacy issues including microG having a history of leaking location data to apps which aren't granted access to it.
GrapheneOS also doesn't come with sandboxed Google Play included and works very well without it. We implement network location, geocoding and other features without tying those to compatibility with Google APIs. We'll also continue to expand compatibility with apps depending on Google APIs without sandboxed Google Play as part of improving the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. It isn't only for running Google apps as regular sandboxed apps. It's also for replacing parts of the Google APIs for apps using the Google Play libraries.