"Sandboxed" Google Play still gets everything that the other apps in the same profile offer up to it / to Google. I don't understand how you're gaining any privacy as a practical matter. The issue isn't GApps' privileged access to the system, it's that other apps send your data to Google via Google Play Services.
To take some examples, MicroG stubs out the analytics and ads APIs. Your "sandboxed" Play would send that data to the mothership and return with ads.
https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Implementation-Status
https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/blob/32bc8954ff872d0e1a05d...
> I don't understand how you're gaining any privacy as a practical matter.
Exactly.
Being too focused on "Google bad" means you're not seeing the bigger picture. microG is only a thing to provide app compatibility for apps that rely on Google Play Services. Which apps do you think do that? Apps with Google libraries that often have fallback implementations and can operate without Google Play Services.
So, given those facts, if someone has microG installed, Google still effectively has the same access as a device with Sandboxed Google Play, except microG users are stuck with worse app compatibility and because of signature spoofing it's less secure and code runs in that privileged context.
GrapheneOS focuses on privacy, security, and app compatibility. microG fails at security and app compatibility. Also, there are apparently leaks (that I admit I don't know the details of) regarding location that make it worse for privacy too. There could be more leaks that I don't know about.
The apps that use Google analytics/ads don't need Google Services on the device. The libraries are embedded into the app, and have just as much fingerprinting capabilities as sandboxes Google services.
microG still heavily uses closed source Google services and even downloads executables run with the full privileges of microG. It downloads and runs droidguard with the privileges it has, giving that full access to the privileged access granted to microG.
Each app using Google Play still has the closed source Google Play SDK and libraries built into it in practice. It's extraordinarily rare to replace those libraries with the incomplete and buggy reimplementations from microG. Very close to zero otherwise open source apps are using those. The closed source Google Play SDK and libraries are therefore still part of the loop and have access to what the app can access. Many of the code paths in the Google libraries directly use Google services without requiring Play services including the full versions of the Ads and Analytics libraries.
The vast majority of data obtained by Play services is via the OS integration and permissions. Apps using it for push messaging, logging into accounts and many other features will send the same data to Google services regardless of whether you use it via sandboxed Google Play or microG.
GrapheneOS stubs out and reimplements APIs on the client side. That includes providing a complete implementation of the Google Play services location API not using on Google Play. These features are being expanded over time. They'll also be made available without having Google Play.
The GrapheneOS approach avoids giving an additional global service access to sensitive data from the OS and apps. microG has repeatedly had vulnerabilities leaking sensitive data to apps including location data. The approach of having an extra service sitting between apps and the OS which handles sensitive data means having to add all the same privacy and security checks as Play services which microG doesn't do in practice and it has caused severe privacy leaks. The main location leakage was eventually fixed but it persisted for years and there are still holes in the location service causing privacy issues.
Unlike microG, sandboxed Google Play doesn't get privileged access. That includes the executables (droidguard) downloaded by microG not getting privileged access. GrapheneOS also doesn't give privileged access to other apps such as Android Auto when those are installed as all the main operating systems using microG are doing. That privileged access gives access to highly sensitive data and doesn't require apps explicitly sending data to Google services, which will nearly all still go to Google services with a partial replacement of the middleware on the device.
> GrapheneOS stubs out and reimplements APIs on the client side...They'll also be made available without having Google Play.
That sounds like you are exactly rebuilding microG. To me, this is an endorsement of their approach not a rejection of it. If you don't like their implementations, it would be more public spirited to contribute patches, but it's your project.
We're rebuilding the Google Mobile Services functionality with a far different design and much higher standards for privacy, security, robustness and correctness. Our approach enables people to use Google apps as regular sandboxed apps while also working towards replacing those. It provides much broader app compatibility and it has major advantages for privacy and security which you're disregarding.
One of the main companies behind microG providing most of their funding (Murena) has repeatedly falsely claimed GrapheneOS is mainly used by criminals and heavily pushed talking points claiming more private/secure devices mainly benefit criminals and pedophiles. These are 2 of many examples and are the tip of the iceberg:
https://www.clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-intervie...
https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116353973732143171
It's very strange to claim we aren't being community minded when considering the context of their years of effort to mislead people about GrapheneOS and harm our team. The microG project and several of the organizations backing it have spent years misleading people about GrapheneOS by falsely claiming it isn't a privacy project and misrepresenting what we provide. Many of their supporters do the same, including throughout posts on this site.
Those operating systems and phone products heavily mislead users about what they provide in their products and get people using devices with atrocious privacy and security due to lack of bare minimum privacy/security patches and protections. We see that as directly opposed to our efforts of improving mobile privacy and security. They're directing people away from reasonably private and secure devices such as an to devices not even getting the increasingly inadequate standard Android privacy/security patches for months or even years at a time.
I don't think Murena should be throwing shade on your project (although the personal hostility seems to go both ways) I would much rather see free/open mobile operating systems collaborating to offer a better experience for users.
Leaving aside the emotional folderol, "rebuilding the Google Mobile Services functionality" is exactly what MicroG does. You are both offering stub reimplementations of GmsCore as system apps. AFAIK, microG is essentially a one-man project initially funded by a grant from the German government[0] and it predates /e/OS by several years.
[0] https://www.prototypefund.de/en/projects/microg
The hostility is one-sided. I went back through old posts and found that while people on the GrapheneOS side (before my time) were sharing _objective facts_, and Murena's started responding with personal attacks.
GrapheneOS's approach is far different from microG's. It's not about rebuilding everything from scratch, it's about making Google Play Services behave as a non-privileged app.
Murena has spent years overly attacking the GrapheneOS project and our team. They've repeatedly falsely claimed that it's not a privacy project, isn't useful to regular people, is primarily used by criminals, is mainly only used by criminals/pedophiles and much more. They've spread massive amount of misinformation about the features, app compatibility and other aspects of what it provides to promote the products they sell. They've made it very clear they're talking about GrapheneOS in most of the posts talking about criminals. We gave clear 2 examples where their claims are much broader due to not specifically naming GrapheneOS because it's harder to dismiss the authoritarian anti-privacy talking points they're pushing when it's an attack on all serious privacy projects. There are more cases where they mention GrapheneOS than where they push those anti-privacy talking points without mentioning it.
microG isn't a one person project and has been largely funded by Murena, Calyx and FUTO. The government funding they get is mainly through Murena. The one person you're talking about working on microG has directly participated in attacks on GrapheneOS with false claims about it and our team, but most of it has come from the organizations funding it and paying people to work on it. Each of those 3 listed organizations has engaged in a massive amount of attacks on the GrapheneOS project including harassment. We haven't ever engaged in that towards any of them. You can see numerous cases throughout this thread of unprovoked personal attacks on our team and lies about us as individuals. It is not something both sides are doing as we haven't done it.