GrapheneOS is a privacy project and heavily improves it with important privacy protections including Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, secure paste and much more. It preserves all of the standard privacy and security of AOSP while greatly improving upon both.
GrapheneOS doesn't connect to Google servers by default and avoids integrating any privileged access for either Google apps or partial replacements for those. The main operating systems integrating microG included always granted privileged access for microG, Google Play executables downloaded by microG (droidguard) which run with the privileged access it's granted and other Google apps including Android Auto.
The operating systems you believe are privacy projects greatly reduce both privacy and security compared to AOSP through not keeping up with standard patches, not providing important standard privacy/security protections and adding problematic services.
Lagging behind the already inadequate standard privacy/security updates by months and even years isn't compatible with providing reasonable protection for user privacy. Only a subset of the issues Google classifies as High or Critical severity are backported to the older releases of Android those are usually based on. Taking many months to move to newer releases is much more problematic than it appears. The backports to those older releases also get applied with a substantial delay. Firmware and drivers are usually not kept properly updated even when those are regularly released such as for Pixels. Many standard privacy and security protections are missing or disabled. An assorted of third party services are added too.
That's very false. GrapheneOS is primarily a privacy OS that also focuses on security to provide strong privacy.
Sandboxed Google Play has no privileged permissions, which means that those apps have the same permissions as any other apps you can install on Android, meaning the same restrictions.
All that plus the fact that Sandboxed Google Play is a better approach because it offers better app compatibility and is more secure. microG doesn't meet the project's standards.
GrapheneOS will have extreme difficulty being taken seriously while they are "you need to buy Google hardware to run this" project. This is why GrapheneOS has a tiny userbase.
GrapheneOS has 500000+ users, and that is with only pixels. Maby more are waiting for the compatible Motorola hardware.
GrapheneOS is not going to compromise on privacy or security, and so far, pixel devices are the only devices meeting the hardware security requirements. People have not had an issue taking that seriously.
Sandboxed Google Play isn't installed by default, so users have a choice if they want to use it or not. Many don't.
GrapheneOS is more deGoogled than alternatives, so if you're thinking privacy = deGoogling, then GrapheneOS is a good option.
But you seem to be under the impression that microG improves privacy. That's not the case when you look at the big picture. Consider why people need microG in the first place. It's basically there to pretend to be Google Play Services for apps that rely on Google Play Services. Which apps are those? Apps with Google libraries in them.
So, pretend apps with Google libraries are an "app & mini Google Play Services", and the breakdown is like this:
---
App & mini Google Play Services = access is restricted, like other regular apps.
App & mini Google Play Services + Sandboxed Google Play (unprivileged) = virtually the same access as above
App & mini Google Play Services + microG (privileged) = Google has the same access as the situations above, but with worse app compatibility, worse security (especially because of privileged access), and worse privacy (leaks).
No, it would not. That would require expanding trust to a 3rd party, and granting privileged access to software that downloads and runs google code. That software has also had issues such as leaking location to apps that dont have location access.
That would be an extreme reduction in privacy, not an improvement.
Sandboxed google play can only send the location to google if google services or playstore were granted the location permission. Accessing location for apps, including google, cannot be sidestepped as MicroG once allowed.
GrapheneOS lets you change aspects of location, including PSDS, SUPL, and network location. GrapheneOS also reroutes googlefusedlocation requests to the OS. If you would rather be able to turn it off entirely, GrapheneOS is is capable of this, not MicroG.
They pointed out privacy issues and you're still claiming that GrapheneOS is security first? Location leaks are a privacy issue, for example.
GrapheneOS doesn't have such a narrow focus. As we keep saying, GrapheneOS prioritizes privacy, security, and Android app compatibility. Given those three things:
Privacy: microG's leaks and failure to implement other checks and there's arguably no real gain in privacy since the Sandboxed Google Play approach means Google Play Services and Store don't have privileged permissions.
Security: microG needs privileged permissions to work properly and can also download Google binaries and runs them in that privileged context, depending on settings
App compatibility: It's an incomplete reimplementation. Even microG's GitHub says as much.
Why would GrapheneOS take so many steps back just because the only real compelling argument in favor of microG is "Google bad"?
"Google bad" is THE compelling argument to flash a custom ROM. Many projects like CalyxOS go privacy first, security second.
I am not worried about a random third worlder hacking my phone. This would only be possible if I allow it by user mistake. I am however worried about Google and its business model. As are many others.
MicroG is great because it limits Google's tracking as much as possible. It's lication services can be routed to a more trustworthy party, and you can actually select which APIs microG forwards to Google. Sandboxed Play Services don't allow any of this, and it's bloated and battery hungry in comparison.
CalyxOS doesn't preserve the standard privacy of the Android Open Source Project. It certainly doesn't greatly improve it as GrapheneOS does. CalyxOS consistently goes many months without shipping standard Android privacy and security patches. It doesn't provide highly important improvements to privacy such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, secure paste, fixes for Android's VPN leaks and many other privacy patches/protections provided by GrapheneOS. Lagging far behind on standard privacy patches and protections is a major issue and it's even more of an issue when the very poor security is considered. Privacy depends on security, not only privacy patches, privacy protections and which services are used.
Unlike GrapheneOS, CalyxOS comes with a bunch of connections to Google services and privileged integration of those services into the OS. It automatically grants highly privileged access and data to multiple Google apps when installed including Android Auto. It also has a bunch of other problematic third party connections. GrapheneOS avoids bundling third party apps and services not meeting our privacy standards.
microG and sandboxed Google Play don't compare the way you claim when it comes to privacy or battery life at all. GrapheneOS also does replace Google Play APIs including the location API with our location rerouting feature. Unlike the microG implementation, it avoids introducing major privacy issues including microG having a history of leaking location data to apps which aren't granted access to it.
GrapheneOS also doesn't come with sandboxed Google Play included and works very well without it. We implement network location, geocoding and other features without tying those to compatibility with Google APIs. We'll also continue to expand compatibility with apps depending on Google APIs without sandboxed Google Play as part of improving the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. It isn't only for running Google apps as regular sandboxed apps. It's also for replacing parts of the Google APIs for apps using the Google Play libraries.
GrapheneOS is a privacy project and heavily improves it with important privacy protections including Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, secure paste and much more. It preserves all of the standard privacy and security of AOSP while greatly improving upon both.
GrapheneOS doesn't connect to Google servers by default and avoids integrating any privileged access for either Google apps or partial replacements for those. The main operating systems integrating microG included always granted privileged access for microG, Google Play executables downloaded by microG (droidguard) which run with the privileged access it's granted and other Google apps including Android Auto.
The operating systems you believe are privacy projects greatly reduce both privacy and security compared to AOSP through not keeping up with standard patches, not providing important standard privacy/security protections and adding problematic services.
Lagging behind the already inadequate standard privacy/security updates by months and even years isn't compatible with providing reasonable protection for user privacy. Only a subset of the issues Google classifies as High or Critical severity are backported to the older releases of Android those are usually based on. Taking many months to move to newer releases is much more problematic than it appears. The backports to those older releases also get applied with a substantial delay. Firmware and drivers are usually not kept properly updated even when those are regularly released such as for Pixels. Many standard privacy and security protections are missing or disabled. An assorted of third party services are added too.
That's very false. GrapheneOS is primarily a privacy OS that also focuses on security to provide strong privacy.
Sandboxed Google Play has no privileged permissions, which means that those apps have the same permissions as any other apps you can install on Android, meaning the same restrictions.
All that plus the fact that Sandboxed Google Play is a better approach because it offers better app compatibility and is more secure. microG doesn't meet the project's standards.
GrapheneOS will have extreme difficulty being taken seriously while they are "you need to buy Google hardware to run this" project. This is why GrapheneOS has a tiny userbase.
We are partnered with Motorola, so people will have that option in the near future.
Also, GrapheneOS has plenty of users, and we're growing fast. People appreciate quality.
GrapheneOS has 500000+ users, and that is with only pixels. Maby more are waiting for the compatible Motorola hardware.
GrapheneOS is not going to compromise on privacy or security, and so far, pixel devices are the only devices meeting the hardware security requirements. People have not had an issue taking that seriously.
Motorola is launching a GrapheneOS phone direct to consumers next year. Getting picked up by a major OEM is about as taken seriously as you can get.
GrapheneOS is and always has been a privacy first project.
If it was privacy first it would ship with microG by default.
Sandboxed Google Play isn't installed by default, so users have a choice if they want to use it or not. Many don't.
GrapheneOS is more deGoogled than alternatives, so if you're thinking privacy = deGoogling, then GrapheneOS is a good option.
But you seem to be under the impression that microG improves privacy. That's not the case when you look at the big picture. Consider why people need microG in the first place. It's basically there to pretend to be Google Play Services for apps that rely on Google Play Services. Which apps are those? Apps with Google libraries in them.
So, pretend apps with Google libraries are an "app & mini Google Play Services", and the breakdown is like this:
---
App & mini Google Play Services = access is restricted, like other regular apps.
App & mini Google Play Services + Sandboxed Google Play (unprivileged) = virtually the same access as above
App & mini Google Play Services + microG (privileged) = Google has the same access as the situations above, but with worse app compatibility, worse security (especially because of privileged access), and worse privacy (leaks).
No, it would not. That would require expanding trust to a 3rd party, and granting privileged access to software that downloads and runs google code. That software has also had issues such as leaking location to apps that dont have location access.
That would be an extreme reduction in privacy, not an improvement.
How do you even write this comment without seeing the irony? You made my point for me: GrapheneOS is security first, privacy second
Because it is not ironic? You dont see how expanding trust and leaking location data are privacy issues?
Leaking it to google is fine then? I'd rather have control who to use for my location API and be able to turn it off entirely.
Sandboxed google play can only send the location to google if google services or playstore were granted the location permission. Accessing location for apps, including google, cannot be sidestepped as MicroG once allowed.
GrapheneOS lets you change aspects of location, including PSDS, SUPL, and network location. GrapheneOS also reroutes googlefusedlocation requests to the OS. If you would rather be able to turn it off entirely, GrapheneOS is is capable of this, not MicroG.
They pointed out privacy issues and you're still claiming that GrapheneOS is security first? Location leaks are a privacy issue, for example.
GrapheneOS doesn't have such a narrow focus. As we keep saying, GrapheneOS prioritizes privacy, security, and Android app compatibility. Given those three things:
Privacy: microG's leaks and failure to implement other checks and there's arguably no real gain in privacy since the Sandboxed Google Play approach means Google Play Services and Store don't have privileged permissions.
Security: microG needs privileged permissions to work properly and can also download Google binaries and runs them in that privileged context, depending on settings
App compatibility: It's an incomplete reimplementation. Even microG's GitHub says as much.
Why would GrapheneOS take so many steps back just because the only real compelling argument in favor of microG is "Google bad"?
"Google bad" is THE compelling argument to flash a custom ROM. Many projects like CalyxOS go privacy first, security second.
I am not worried about a random third worlder hacking my phone. This would only be possible if I allow it by user mistake. I am however worried about Google and its business model. As are many others.
MicroG is great because it limits Google's tracking as much as possible. It's lication services can be routed to a more trustworthy party, and you can actually select which APIs microG forwards to Google. Sandboxed Play Services don't allow any of this, and it's bloated and battery hungry in comparison.
Case closed.
CalyxOS doesn't preserve the standard privacy of the Android Open Source Project. It certainly doesn't greatly improve it as GrapheneOS does. CalyxOS consistently goes many months without shipping standard Android privacy and security patches. It doesn't provide highly important improvements to privacy such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, secure paste, fixes for Android's VPN leaks and many other privacy patches/protections provided by GrapheneOS. Lagging far behind on standard privacy patches and protections is a major issue and it's even more of an issue when the very poor security is considered. Privacy depends on security, not only privacy patches, privacy protections and which services are used.
Unlike GrapheneOS, CalyxOS comes with a bunch of connections to Google services and privileged integration of those services into the OS. It automatically grants highly privileged access and data to multiple Google apps when installed including Android Auto. It also has a bunch of other problematic third party connections. GrapheneOS avoids bundling third party apps and services not meeting our privacy standards.
microG and sandboxed Google Play don't compare the way you claim when it comes to privacy or battery life at all. GrapheneOS also does replace Google Play APIs including the location API with our location rerouting feature. Unlike the microG implementation, it avoids introducing major privacy issues including microG having a history of leaking location data to apps which aren't granted access to it.
GrapheneOS also doesn't come with sandboxed Google Play included and works very well without it. We implement network location, geocoding and other features without tying those to compatibility with Google APIs. We'll also continue to expand compatibility with apps depending on Google APIs without sandboxed Google Play as part of improving the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. It isn't only for running Google apps as regular sandboxed apps. It's also for replacing parts of the Google APIs for apps using the Google Play libraries.