Rent is a function of supply and demand, not a landlord's costs, otherwise we would expect changes in e.g. mortgage interest costs to be passed on to, but in practice we don't see this effect. We also don't see landlords who own their properties outright (and thus don't have mortgage interest costs) charging lower rents than landlords in the neighborhood with identical properties who have mortgages. When landlords' costs drop, do they drop the rent in response?
Taxes can be passed on when the tax induces a change in supply. Conventional property taxes are partially passed through because the component of the tax that falls on the building. Tax buildings, get less buildings.
Taxes on land do not affect the supply of the land, this implies they are not passed on and the research literature largely agrees with this.
Landlord costs affect supply in the long term, so you will see changes, just not necessarily immediately over a one year period, but definitely over a 5-10 year period.
> We also don't see landlords who own their properties outright (and thus don't have mortgage interest costs) charging lower rents than landlords in the neighborhood with identical properties who have mortgages. When landlords' costs drop, do they drop the rent in response?
If costs are uniform for each landlord (they have to pay for), it limits the amount of money they can invest in new capacity, and you will see the effects over a decade. If one landlord has cost advantage over another, then they will of course probably just take the extra money as extra profit.
> Taxes on land do not affect the supply of the land, this implies they are not passed on and the research literature largely agrees with this.
They provide friction with what can be done with the land, because the cost of owning the land has to be paid. If it is just a land tax, however, you can game it by building as much as possible on it so the landowners who can't build as much as you can subsidize your usage (long term, you either have to build as much as you can on your land, or sell the land to someone who can).
> Taxes on land do not affect the supply of the land, this implies they are not passed on and the research literature largely agrees with this.
Taxes may not affect the amount of land that physically exists, but they absolutely can and do affect the amount of land available for rent as opposed to other income-generating use cases.
On top of that, a tax that applies equivalently to all of the land available to the rental market in a given area will simply push prices upwards across the board, which is likely to just be absorbed by renters given the usually low price elasticity of demand for housing.
> On top of that, a tax that applies equivalently to all of the land available to the rental market in a given area will simply push prices upwards across the board
Most research asserts that a land value tax decreases the selling price of land.
Presumably by exactly the value of the tax (over the lifetime of the purchase).
But who's selling the land? If everybody has to pay the tax then all of the property owners can increase rental prices by the same amount.
These are assertions, not arguments. Respond to points in the post you replied to. Be sure you understand them first; your assertions do not hold in the case of LVT.
These are assertions, not arguments. Respond to points in the post you replied to. Be sure you understand them first.
Why would a land value tax shift the allocation of land between uses? The amount of the tax doesn't depend on what the land's being used for. If renting is the highest-value use without the tax, it will still be the highest-value use with the tax.
If I own £100K worth of land, and the government announces a 1% annual land tax, it's likely the value of my land will fall by about ~25-33% overnight.
If you think that's morally unobjectionable, fine, but I'd love to know what happens when all the landowners who own rural land that doesn't have a profitable development path attached to it can't pay their tax bills. Have the state seize it all?
Or do they just claim it's of negligible value and avoid the tax?
> all the landowners who own rural land that doesn't have a profitable development path attached to it
If it doesn't have a profitable development path attached, the price(and therefore "value") will go down, as will the tax burden.
You would sell the development for as much as you can get, regardless of tax. The people buying from you aren't going to pay you more just because the government raised your taxes.
A land tax would effect every single landlord though. Every single landlord would put up rent.
The market will bare it because people have no choice. The choice is homelessness or paying the higher rent.
It's principally the same when mortgage rates rise. Landlords with mortgages put up rent. Only it would be worse, since not all landlords have mortgages.
> Or do they just claim it's of negligible value and avoid the tax?
Property is already taxed based on its assessed value in California.
> We also don't see landlords who own their properties outright (and thus don't have mortgage interest costs) charging lower rents than landlords in the neighborhood with identical properties who have mortgages.
Why would they as long as they find a renter? The market always charges the marginal cost.
I do acknowledge that rent is a function of supply and demand in the big picture, at least. I don't think the whole foundation of economics is wrong.
Demand for apartments will be constant. Supply of apartments will be constant.
But I think what's going on here is that we are way off the equilibrium point. The supply of good places to rent is far outpaced by demand for them, at most price points, and especially so where all the value is (on the coast). So, this means if you're a landlord and you know you'll owe another $1200 tax to Sacramento this year, you should be very confident that if you raise rent by $100 a month, even if an individual tenant would rather move than pay it, someone who can afford $100 more exists and will almost certainly fill that vacancy promptly. It may represent a slight step down in what their buying power would buy. Like, they may have rented a $3000 apartment before, and they'll now rent what used to be a $2900 apartment from you for $3000.
A transaction can occur if the price is >= the seller's cost, and <= the value to the buyer. If it's at the minimum, the seller must pass on the tax or not trade, at the maximum (down to the max minus the tax) , the seller can't pass on (all of) the tax and still trade. We observe that landlords make profit, so we are not at the minimum. Are we at the maximum?
I think there are cases where we are in between for significant periods of time. Consider a positive shock to wages. Can landlords put up prices overnight? I don't think so, unless the landlords all co-ordinate to do so, prices will be sticky as there are always some properties in the market, so it's difficult to be the first to increase rent. Unlike a purchase, a landlord who waits for a buyer at the right price is forgoing income during the void. So the market price can be a Schelling Point.
A tax increase, however, happens at the same time to all landlords. All of them would prefer to pass it on, and they know that so they can assume all other landlords will try to pass it on. If the rent is currently below the maximum possible, they will succeed.
How long it takes prices to adjust I don't know. It is an empirical question, but I don't know what data would answer it. But it seems like it took decades for landlords to capture the two-income surplus after it became common for women to have a career.
> Rent is a function of supply and demand, not a landlord's costs,
Do you really believe that landlords will subsidize tenants for a long time?
More to the point, if landlords are losing money, why would anyone build rental housing? Instead, why wouldn't they take housing off the market?
> otherwise we would expect changes in e.g. mortgage interest costs to be passed on
These aren't a universal cost. When rates change, some landlords' costs go up. But some don't. That lets the latter set the marginal price.
If everyone's costs go up the same amount, it's collusion without communication. In an inelastic market like San Francisco's, you'd expect prices to rise.
> Rent is a function of supply and demand
Is there really a market dynamic in rent pricing anymore? I thought that algorithmic collusion had eliminated the need for landlords to compete on price.
Most mortgages are fixed interest. So it makes since that today's rate change doesn't impact a renter cost in the near future. Probably not until the next time the property is sold.
Landlord costs drives supply at a given price point so your initial premise is flawed.
This is a prime example of short term thinking, often espoused by politicians.
Profitability of renting effects supply. Reducing the profitability of renting reduces supply which, as you noted, increases price.
Landlord costs impact supply.
If mortgage expenses go down and property tax expenses go up, it's basically a wash.
But for that to happen, land values need to go down. Landlords need to bid less.
LVT would push up the supply of rental properties by ensuring that property owners who don't rent out their properties or who don't make efficient use of land lose money.
Thats an incentive to rent out the property or sell up to somebody who will.
It would apply harsh market discipline on landlords - a demographic that has usually been rather coddled.
> property owners who don't rent out their properties
The existence of property tax (which on a single house in some areas of the state is upwards of $15,000 a year already) already makes it absolutely ruinous to just sit on an extra house you don't need and not rent it out.
> or who don't make efficient use of land
A little more convincing. Though I suspect most empty land in places where anyone would be willing to live in California, is empty because our insane zoning laws don't allow what would otherwise make sense there (I don't care that it's like what most areas have -- it's insane to have laws that would make it illegal to build a place like San Francisco, Brooklyn, or Boston).
The funny thing about those zoning laws though is that they're held up by a rare case of bipartisanship:
- The MAGA Boomer set who doesn't want any more development near them because "it'll bring traffic" or noise or crime
- And most of the "progressives" who don't want any more development anywhere because "we hate greedy developers" and "Not enough of this proposed development is low-income housing for the government to dole out in lotteries to a few lucky families."
A property loses ~30% of its value when rented out and maintenance cost and insurance cost goes up significantly. Plenty of landlords rather have their property be empty and just collect on the equity gains over the years without putting in any effort.
Of housing, but not of land.
> we would expect changes in e.g. mortgage interest costs to be passed on to
This absolutely happens in the UK where variable interest rates affect more people.
> When landlords' costs drop, do they drop the rent in response?
The price of everything is pretty much a ratchet. They never go down again absent some kind of competitive pressure.