Glad that they're safe and sound.

It's worth pointing out that this is the first extremely public, widely acknowledged high risk mission NASA has done in over 50 years. The Shuttle was risky, but it wasn't thought of or acknowledged by NASA as being risky until very late in its lifecycle.

According to NASA's OIG, Artemis acceptable crew mortality rate is 1 in 30. Roughly 3x riskier than the shuttle. There genuinely is a world where they don't make it back home.

I am grateful that they did. And I'm grateful that we're going to go even further. I can't wait to see what Jared's cooking up (for those who don't know, he made his own version of the Gemini program in Polaris and funded it out of pocket).

> Artemis acceptable crew mortality rate is 1 in 30.

This seems insane to me. That X decades later we accept, with all our advancements in tech, a weaker system than ever before. That if we send 30 people we _accept_ that one is possible to die.

That's the starting point? That's what we document as acceptable?

Yes, and the memories of Apollo are made rosy by hagiography. I even wrote an entire thing to explain why, https://1517.substack.com/p/1-in-30-artemis-greatness-and-ri... (yeah, shameless plug, sorry - it's more for the citations than not. You can read the standards and reports I've linked to)

But if I'm allowed to repeat myself from elsewhere in the thread and the meat of the above thing,

It's physically not possible at our current level of technology to make this "safer" due to the distances and energies involved. Even with the Commercial Cargo and Crew Program (C3P), NASA has set the acceptable mortality threshold at 1 in 270 over the entire mission and 1 in 1000 on ascent / descent. If they could set it higher by gaming the math, they would. They can't.

We're a very primitive species, and the forces involved here are genuinely new. And no, Apollo wasn't much better either, at least 10 astronauts were killed in training or burned alive, as well as (far worse, because astronauts sign up for the risk) one member of ground staff.

People love to hate the Shuttle, and it ended up being subpar / fail expectations due to the political constraints NASA was under, but the Shuttle was a genuine advance for its time – a nonsensical, economically insane advance, but still an advance. If you look at the Shuttle alternative proposals / initial proposals as well as stuff like Dynasoar and Star Raker, you'll see NASA iterating through Starship style ideas. But those were rejected due to higher up front capital investment at the time.

The Shuttle is an odd franken-turduckling, because it was designed for one mission and one mission only. And that mission never happened. That cargo bay existed to capture certain Soviet assets and deploy + task certain American space assets and then bring them back to Earth.

And that's the bit that's hard to emphasize. The fact that the Shuttle could put a satellite up there, watch it fail, then go back up, grab it, bring it back, repair it, then launch again was an insane capability.

Was the program a giant fuck up at the end? Yes. But does that mean Artemis will be safer than the Shuttle? No. That's not how the energetics, time from civilization, acceptable risk profiles etc. work out.

That was a great article.

Adding to it - Apollo 13 was a mission where 3 men should have died, but somehow didn't. If it had happened while the LM was on the moon, you would have had the CSM lose power, and then two men on the moon would have had no way to return home.

(And for the shuttle design mission - my understanding is it was likely the ability to do a HEXAGON-style film return mission in a single orbit, before the Soviets knew what was happeneing.)

Thanks!

note - I can't verify any of the following, it's more - for lack of a better term - aerospace nerd fan theory at this point.

Post-collapse, people think that the Buran justification was paranoia. But based on what I've read / seen (though this is getting hard to source, so I might be just good ol' hallucinating here), they weren't entirely wrong. The subtext around that large payload bay had to do with the Soviet pursuit of systems like Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractional_Orbital_Bombardment... that weaponized space.

Again, there's a reason for those ASAT tests. There's a reason for the weird specifications set in the early 1970s for the Shuttle. And I don't think deploying a spy satellite alone is it. But this is speculation. AFAICT, nothing was put on paper.

It would have been an incendiary WW3 starting act to capture a Soviet asset. But I think it is understandable if certain people within the American blob wanted that capability at hand.

I wish I was immortal. I'd drop everything for a decade and try to find people from the time who're still alive (and some still are!) and ask them these questions directly - on the record – for posterity's sake. I suspect, we came much closer to war via space than most people think. And because we didn't, we'll eventually repeat these mistakes.

---

Oh and then there was the documented attempt to capture Salyut-7 https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2554/1

Somehow all the numbers just happened to line right up. :)

>documented attempt to capture Salyut-7 https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2554/1

This isn’t true. The same article even explains that.

From that article: “It takes only some basic fact checking to debunk all the preposterous allegations…”

Yes, you're right. I'm not going to pretend that this is a serious proposition. There isn't a lot of evidence to support it.

For me, it's a fun conspiracy theory to engage with. I'm only doing this for the love of the game as it were. Please don't take it that seriously.

But you have to admit, it is a fun theory. A lot of the claims made by the Russians / Roscosmos are most likely false, but if you notice the article says,

    > The only concrete document referred to is an intelligence memo that Defense Minister Sokolov supposedly received on February 24 about the assignment of the French astronauts. Whether such a memo really landed on his desk that day is questionable (after all, Baudry’s assignment to 51E had been publicly announced by NASA in August 1984), but the idea that the assignment raised some suspicions in Soviet circles about the objectives of the Challenger mission may not be so far-fetched. There had always been a high level of paranoia in the Soviet Union about the military potential of the Space Shuttle. Misconceptions about the military applications of the shuttle, such as the belief that it was capable of diving into the atmosphere to drop bombs over Moscow, had been a key factor in the Soviet decision to develop Buran in 1976. The Buran orbiter was a virtual carbon copy of its US counterpart in shape and dimensions, exactly to counter the perceived military threat of the Shuttle. Furthermore, a couple of developments in the Shuttle program in early 1985 may have fueled the Soviet paranoia. The Shuttle had flown its first dedicated Defense Department mission (STS-51C) in January 1985 and a controversial laser experiment in the framework of SDI was planned for the STS-51G mission in June.
Whether or not said documentation can be trusted, which bits could be taken as true v. what's just insane paranoia is something that would require more work to discount than most would think. Because, as I've said, the numbers do line up from the article,

    > The least one can say is that Salyut-7, which was 13.5 meters long and had a maximum diameter of 4.15 meters, would have fit inside the Shuttle’s cargo bay, whose dimensions were 4.6 by 18 meters. In fact, after the final crewed mission to Salyut-7 in 1986, the Russians significantly raised its orbit in hopes that one day it could be retrieved by Buran, which had the same dimensions as the American shuttle.
The Shuttle was an amazing piece of technology with amazing capabilities. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-41-C and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-49

and this is one of my favorite missions, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-51-A (with my favorite space selfie)

Fun fact, the original deorbit plan for the Hubble was for the Shuttle to bring it back and then put it inside the Smithsonian, https://www.hou.usra.edu/meetings/orbitaldebris2019/orbital2...

(the Smithsonian part is IRL lore, and isn't mentioned online, AFAICT)

The only people who took seriously the idea of a Shuttle FOBS were the Soviets, and frankly not even all of them; as far as I've ever seen credible evidence to substantiate, it never went much past a single position paper from the early 80s. The idea that Buran was meant as a MAD-restoring FOBS has, so far as I know, not even that much support. (If you know of primary sources, in translation or otherwise, please link them.)

Read Payne Harrison's 1989 novel Storming Intrepid, followed by NASA publication SP-4221, "The Space Shuttle Decision," from 1999. [1] The first is a pretty good depiction of what you're imagining, and the second explains why the imagination of a technothriller author is where that idea went to die. Then maybe give your head a shake. If Reagan had violated the Outer Space Treaty - via NASA of all agencies! - how do you imagine it'd have stayed secret over these forty years just past?

[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20241229052235/https://ntrs.nasa...

> If Reagan had violated the Outer Space Treaty - via NASA of all agencies! - how do you imagine it'd have stayed secret over these forty years just past?

While I have no reason to believe this particular escapade, I do expect that there are a thousand such wild stories that have remained secret. Watergate seems obvious and explosive to moderns, but at the time it could easily have gone undiscovered or unremarked. How many other similar scale plots, domestic and international, succeeded or failed without ever being surfaced into the history books? A few? Dozens? Hundreds? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Thousands? Millions? Trillions? Hectoseptisquintillions? "Ignorance is not a datum." Teach that as catechism from 1975 and we might have been spared the "rationalist" scourge altogether.

That would have been absolutely horrible

Nice article, although I'm not so sure about this part:

> There’s a reason why there wasn’t an Apollo 18, or 19 and 20. Even though funding had been secured, an executive decision was made to kill the program early, because LoC was inevitable.

Was funding really secure? I believe that was the main sticking point; a quick search [0] seems to confirm this, and the John Young quote below backs it up: "Even if they’d had the money..." Not to say the risk wasn't a factor too of course, but it doesn't look like funding was otherwise guaranteed.

Anyway, I think what sets the risk of the Shuttle apart from Apollo is summed up nicely in one of the quotes (in reference to the Apollo program): "The awareness of risk led to intense focus on reducing risk." In the Apollo program, there was a pattern of rigorously hunting down and eliminating any possible known risks, leaving unknowns as the primary source of risk; on the other hand, the Shuttle program let known risks accumulate continuously until crews paid the price for a bad draw.

When debris hit Atlantis on STS-27 [1] and the shuttle only survived on a one in a million stroke of luck -- the completely broken tile happened to be over an aluminum mounting plate -- it should have been taken as a free lesson on one more known source of risk to eliminate. Instead, it led to seven people dying completely preventable and unnecessary deaths a few years later.

Spaceflight is inherently risky, it's true. That's why things like the Orion heat shield are so worrisome; because it is physically possible at our current level of technology to make it safer, and yet for political / funding / etc. reasons we're not doing the best we can.

[0] https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/why-did-we-stop...

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-27

    > Was funding really secure?
It's worth breaking down what the "funding" means over here. As this is a depressing topic for me, I'm going to be a bit playful. :)

The Saturn V's existed. Saturn V serial numbers were designated as S-5## where # is an increment from 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturn_V#Launch_history <--- see the Saturn V numbering scheme here.

SA-513 was repurposed from Apollo 18 to Skylab. SA-514 was meant for Apollo 19. They put it on display. SA-515 was also chopped up and put on display. Some parts were used in Skylab. https://www.space.com/nasa-extra-apollo-moon-saturn-v-rocket...

So there were 3 Saturn V already assembled and in existence.

Did the CSMs and LEMs exist? CSMs had a similar serial number scheme. And they designated "Block 1" and "Block 2" (iterations of the spacecraft design based on testing) CSM-0## and CSM-1##

The CSM used in Apollo 17 was CSM-114. On wikipedia it says that CSM-115 and CSM-115a were never fully assembled and cancelled, but if you look past that, you can also see that Skylab used, CSM-116, CSM-117 and CSM-118. These were Apollo CSMs, fresh off the same assembly line. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_command_and_service_mod...

So there were 3 CSMs.

What about LEM? Similar number scheme, LM-## which is incremented with each one made. So first one was LM-1 and the last one used on Apollo 17 was LM-12. LM-13 is on display in a museum. LM-14 was on the production line (along with LM-15??) and a "stop work" order was issued and they were scrapped. Yes, they were literally broken down and turned into scrap. https://www.businessinsider.com/nasa-lunar-modules-lm14-lm15...

So NASA had 1 LEM and 2 were on the way. I think, we can charitably say that there were 3 LEMs available at the time. I think it's fair to say that...

There were 3 LEMs.

Did they have 3 crews? Funnily enough, they did have 3 crews already assigned! What a coincidence. https://web.archive.org/web/20181224161154/https://nssdc.gsf... :)

So the Saturn Vs existed and had been paid for. The CSMs existed and had been paid for. The LMs existed / were on the line and had been paid for. The crews existed (and had been partially paid for).

So what is the "funding shortfall" that caused America to stop going to the moon?

The "funding shortfall" here is the money required to pay for the ground crews and personnel for carrying out the mission. And that amount was $42.1 million out of $956 million for Apollo. The total NASA budget was, $3.27 billion that year.

   > NASA was canceling Apollo missions 15 and 19 because of congressional cuts in FY 1971 NASA appropriations, Administrator Thomas O. Paine announced in a Washington news conference. Remaining missions would be designated Apollo 14 through 17. The Apollo budget would be reduced by $42.1 million, to $914.4 million - within total NASA $3.27 billion.
$42.1 million. NASA admin just couldn't find $42.1 million of ground staff salaries etc out of the remaining $2.3 Billion budget.

It's probably a coincidence that this happened right after Apollo 13. The decision was announced on September 2nd, 1970. Apollo 13 happened in April, 1970.

----

So yes, the funding was there. I suspect the "funding cut" argument was an attempt to save face; after the US Government (and I mean the Government, it's clear both the White House and Congress were involved) decided to cut the cord post-Apollo 13.

I also suspect this is one of the many "open secrets" lost to time. It might have been known by "everyone" in the know at the time, but those who knew died off, and history crystallized around the written page.

Thank you for the in depth reply! You make a very good point, and the timing of Apollo 13 with the budget decision is pretty damning, I'm convinced.

I will point out however that the budget was congressionally-mandated, and no funds were allocated for moon landings as they were in previous years; it would have been illegal to use funds dedicated to other areas for moon landings. Maybe I'm being overly pedantic here, but to say the 'funding was secured' as in the article implies the decision to cancel the remaining programs lay with NASA leadership; it would be more accurate to say that funding for the remaining programs, though possible, was not secured, most likely as an attempt to save face by congress/govt.

No, that's a great point. Let me rephrase it, they couldn't go to congress in 1970 and say, "hey, we've got $2.3B in other parts of NASA, here's what we're happy to cut so that we can keep Apollo."

Apollo 18, 19 and 20 were cancelled in 1970. 3+ years ahead of Apollo 18. Apollo 17 didn't happen until December 1972.

The US couldn't plug this funding "shortfall" in 3+ years out of the many, many parts of NASA?

It's pretty clear that the decision to kill Apollo had been made. The money is just how they chose to do it so that the POTUS didn't have to go on record cancelling Apollo. There was no room for negotiation. POTUS and Congress had decided that Apollo needed to die and so it died. How it died was relevant only so far as to serve as a mechanism to save face.

    > the 'funding was secured' as in the article implies the decision to cancel the remaining programs lay with NASA leadership
Yes, you're right. I just don't know how else to put it. The capital outlays for the components of the missions had already been committed to ahead of time. The physical capital was present; the main cost of the missions; those assets existed / were in place. I don't know what the right language is over here.

> one more known source of risk to eliminate.

How could they have eliminated that risk?

We can look at what NASA did after the Columbia disaster; namely, redesign the external tank, employ stricter quality control of the foam across the board, better monitoring of the heat shield integrity, and adding contingencies for being stuck in space with a damaged shuttle.

- They replaced the specific foam insulation that struck Columbia with external heaters, and redesigned other areas where foam was necessary to ensure greater structural stability + minimize damage to the shuttle in case of breakage. They also began more thorough inspection of any heat shield panels that would be reused between missions

- They added various cameras, both on the shuttle and on the ground, to monitor the heat shield throughout launch, plus accelerometers and temperature sensors. Also, the heat shield was checked manually on every mission once in orbit for damage, both with an extension to the Canadarm, and with ISS cameras when possible (a funky maneuver [0] where they would do a backflip to flash the shuttle's belly at the ISS for it to take high res pictures)

- Every mission from then on had a backup plan in case the shuttle wasn't in a state to return to Earth (this wasn't really the case before then, which is kinda wild). Another shuttle was always ready to launch, with a new configuration of seats to allow for sufficient crew space

- They sent up equipment and materials for repairs in space with every launch, though admittedly the usefulness of that was dubious and the repair kits were never used

Perhaps 'eliminate' was too strong a word, but there's no reason these precautions couldn't or shouldn't have been taken before it resulted in deaths and the loss of a spacecraft. (well, other than the aforementioned funding/politics/organizational failure)

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rendezvous_pitch_maneuver

>Every mission from then on had a backup plan in case the shuttle wasn't in a state to return to Earth (this wasn't really the case before then, which is kinda wild). Another shuttle was always ready to launch, with a new configuration of seats to allow for sufficient crew space

Actually the backup plan almost every time was to just stay on the ISS until another Shuttle could be prepared. They only had another Shuttle on standby a couple times, during missions where they weren’t going to the ISS.

>They sent up equipment and materials for repairs in space with every launch, though admittedly the usefulness of that was dubious and the repair kits were never used

Yeah it wasn’t even useful for a situation like Columbia. It didn’t lose a few tiles or something, it had a giant hole punched into its wing.

There’s no fixing that in space. So I personally think they focused on situations they could theoretically fix, even though those situations weren’t what happened to Columbia.

Worth mentioning, this is all particularly fresh in my mind because of a recently released video by the excellent Classic Aerospace History channel on YT, "A Brief History of the Space Shuttle". It's two hours long and provides a reasonably detailed overview of the program, would recommend if you're into that sort of thing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtmOVxcga-Y

The risk couldn't have been entirely eliminated, but most likely the external tank insulation could have been modified to at least reduce the risk of chunks breaking loose and damaging the thermal tiles during launch.

Im not really convinced SLS and Artemis are best effort projects; we improve through refinement, and the only way to get there is cadence. More launches with the same general mission requirements.

One launch a year is not even close to what we can manage with our current technology, to the point where the scope is too small to be legitimately worth doing.

Its not solely a matter of energy; its about opportunity for learning. The current scale is too small to be worth doing at all.

If it was a program of something like >50 payloads over a decade, that gives enough opportunity for refinement, in cost, safety, and scale manufacture methods to actually see something new.

The value of a mission like this isn't only in the narrow technical data it returns. Its value is also institutional. Once you have an actual crewed mission orbiting the Moon, the program becomes concrete rather than aspirational. That creates momentum inside NASA and among contractors, strengthens the credibility of follow-on lunar missions, and accelerates work on the many parallel systems a sustained lunar program actually requires.

I agree entirely that it's much easier to imagine a successful moon program built around repeatable missions at high cadence, so I'm not disagreeing on that point. I would just push back on the idea that this has little or no value.

Thanks for sharing your article - very well written.

I am stunned to see that LoC risk assessment.

I kept wondering to myself over the past week, “will this be the last USA-supported human space travel if these astronauts don’t survive?”

I’d have a hard time imagining the general public would support any future missions if they hadn’t survived.

These astronauts are some elite humans. My respect for them is even greater now that I’ve seen the risk quantified.

This happened twice already with U.S. manned missions, and with 7 person crews.

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Artemis certainly seems safer at least in launch. It has an escape system that could be triggered throughout launch. In comparison shuttle could not abort at all until srb separation and after that could have needed risk aerodynamic manoeuvres.

Wouldn’t the soviets or any other adversary prepare against letting NASA capture their satellites? You need a very small amount of C4 in the satellite to destroy the shuttle in the event of capture. Tampering with other entity‘s satellites can best be done with satellites. That also frees resources needed for bringing life support systems to orbit.

But at that point if you're building in a self-destruct for a weapon that can be so dangerous it's worth sending a shuttle to take it away from you, surely it's better to adversarially trigger the self-destruct and not bother sending the shuttle. So the C4 option might simply be a bad idea: make it more difficult and costly to remove your weapon, rather than triggering your own self-destruct.

There are easier cheaper ways of destroying a satellite than sending a space shuttle. We would have only sent a space shuttle to capture it for intelligence purposes.

If I may be allowed one nitpick. Without fully understanding the FAA doc you link to in the article, I think it would be better to say something like loss of a plane is a 1 in a billion event for commercial airplanes. Many types of parts used in airplanes and jet engines break at much higher rates though, they just don't necessarily cause a plane loss when they do.

> It's physically not possible at our current level of technology to make this "safer" due to the distances and energies involved.

That's not true at all.

It is entirely within current technical and fiscal means to launch a much more robust and powerful craft that is capable of goign to the moon and returning with lower velocity by sending it up in pieces with Falcon 9 (Heavy) and assembling it in LEO before launching to the moon.

This mission architecture is intrinsically compromised by social constraints in the form of pork barrel spending dsfunctional decision making process.

Given current levels of technology, this would require docking with a series of space tugs. Not impossible, but Blue Origin is the only organisation working on this at a meaningful scale.

There was also Nautilus-X which never made it beyond the concept stage.

Mir and the ISS were built this way and the Space shuttle, Dragon, and Soyuz have/had no problem docking with the ISS.

If you feel constrained by the size of the Falcon Heavy fairing the now defunct Bigelow Aerospace launched several prototype inflatable habitats that apparently tested well in LEO.

Combine this with a lunar cycler[0] orbit and you could keep reusing the same craft over and over and expanding to it if you want to ferry the astronauts to the moon.

You'll note that everything I'm describing requires existing technology and very proven techniques (except maybe the inflatable stuff) but the thing it doesn't require is a giant rocket like SLS or Starship. I'm not saying that we shouldn't build machines like that, it's just that they really aren't needed for a mission like this and I question why something like SLS was built in the first place.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lunar_cycler

The Smithsonian article on John Young that you linked to is a good one. The only John Young quote they didn't include that I wish they had was his response to the proposal to make STS-1 an on purpose RTLS abort: "Let's not practice Russian roulette."

Also "RTLS requires continuous miracles interspersed with acts of God to be successful."[1]

[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20171208090538/http://www.tested...

Well said.

> We're a very primitive species, and the forces involved here are genuinely new.

It's absolutely wild to me that we went from inventing flying machines to putting people on the freaking moon in the span of a human lifetime. What we've accomplished with technology in the last 500 years, let alone in the last century, is nothing short of remarkable.

But, yes, in the grand scheme of things, we're still highly primitive. What's holding us back isn't our ingenuity, but our primitive instincts and propensity towards tribalism and violence. In many ways, we're not ready for the technology we invent, which should really concern us all. At the very least our leaders should have the insight to understand this, and guide humanity on a more conservative and safe path of interacting with technology. And yet we're not collectively smart enough to put those people in charge. Bonkers.

NASA certainly took many risks back then. People remember Apollo 11 for the landing, but for example on Apollo 8, with a fire roughly 2 years earlier that killed 3 astronauts, they had one manned mission (Apollo 7) and then immediately sent Apollo 8 around the moon with ONE rocket nozzle that had to work (and no LM to escape into, as the Apollo 13 astronauts had to do), basing their faith in trajectory mechanics which hadn't been tested that far out

The ejection seats on Gemini were a joke, and there's an anecdote Gene Kranz tells in his book about Gemini 9 where he thought it was too risky for them to cut away the shroud on the thing they were going to dock with (the Agena having blown up on launch) but NASA was this close to overriding him and doing it anyway (they were saved by the astronauts vetoing it, which was good because the EVA, separately, that Gene Cernan did was incredibly harrowing. he was sweating, way overworked, could barely see)

> We're a very primitive species,

compared to what? We're the most advanced species we know of.

It might even hold true over the entire universe. All species might top out at where we are. We don't know.

What a sad view of the universe. To hold that humanity in the year 2026 is the best the universe can do.

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I don't think it's sad to admit that we may never know the answer. I'd like to be surprised, but the laws of physics make it pretty unlikely. Besides, maybe the other species are worse than us.

>It's physically not possible at our current level of technology to make this "safer"

Absolutely it is, if NASA was not constrained by congress to use shuttle components to build the spacecraft, they could have had double the payload mass capability at least (the Saturn V was almost twice as capable, we should be able to do a little better now). This would provide tons of extra margin for safety, and allow a shorter and thus safer route to the moon as well.

Shuttle was awesome and the people who love to hate it can personally fight me.

I often think about the shuttle program in relation to all these crazy complicated, wildly expensive, and incredibly fragile space telescopes we're sending to LEO or the Earth-Sun L2. Would be damn useful to be able to repair/upgrade these things like with Hubble.

Obviously I realise the shuttle program was pretty far away from being able to head out to the Earth-Sun L2(AB, and wasn't even working towards it. But man, it would be nice to have that ability.

Really? Seems like it would be cheaper to build extra telescopes (economy of scale). When one of them breaks, just launch another.

"As of 1 April 2026, there have been five incidents in which a spacecraft in flight suffered crew fatalities, killing a total of 15 astronauts and 4 cosmonauts.[2][how?] Of these, two had reached the internationally recognized edge of space (100 km or 62mi above sea level) when or before the incident occurred, one had reached the U.S. definition of space at 266,000 ft, and one was planned to do so. In each of these accidents, the entire crew was killed. As of April 2026, a total of 791 people have flown into space and 19 of them have died in related incidents. This sets the current statistical fatality rate at 2.4 percent."

[wiki link](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_ac...).-,During%20spaceflight,fatality%20rate%20at%202.4%20percent.)

2.4% is not bad given how new this still is and how extreme the speeds and energies are.

Note that all the fatalities have been launch or landing related, not in space itself. Clawing out of this gravity well is tough. Make Earth a bit larger and you’d never get off it without something like NERVA or nuclear pulse Orion.

I wonder sometimes if that’s another thing to toss in the Fermi paradox bucket. Many rocky planets might be much more massive than Earth. On one with 3X our gravity a space program might never get going.

NERVA as envisioned had terrible thrust to weight ratio, not really usable to launch from a Super Earth. Nuclear lightbulb, orion or heck NSWR would likely work though. And bonus points for not having to think about landing systems for the return trip. ;-)

In that case aliens from a super Earth would be unable to get off it unless they decided to salt their biosphere with fissile waste. NERVA is at least contained if it works properly.

So no space program from a super Earth until they figure out not just fusion but compact high density fusion that could fly. You’d need stuff like in The Expanse, or at least in that rough ballpark.

Using fission is something they probably wouldn’t do unless they faced an existential reason forcing them to go to space, like deflecting an asteroid.

I think a launch loop would still work, even on a Super Earth:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_loop

Or potentially beamed power for launch, so you don't kug a power source. But in any case, indeed much harder. :)

Yeah.

I’m a little obsessed with Orion though. The fact that the math works on that lunacy. The good old devil’s pogo stick.

If you could make pure fusion bombs it would be maybe politically viable, especially if you also use superconducting magnets to make it less just brute force. You’d still induce a little radioactivity from neutrons but it would be short lived and not even close to fissile fallout bad.

To see that thing launch. From somewhere very remote though, probably Antarctica. And from many miles away, and probably with welders glass. But damn. That would be epic.

The lack of plate tectonics is a much bigger obstacle on Super-Earths, then g.

Yeah the more I learn the more I buy the rare Earth explanation.

Life may not be that unusual but it might be mostly just goo: little extremophile type bacteria and maybe very tiny creepy crawlies living in deep seas, underground, in liquid mantles in ice moons, etc.

But to get stuff even as sophisticated as frogs and bunnies, let alone something that can try space flight, requires a place that is all of: big, stable, with abundant energy, with high enough metallicity, and in an environment well shielded from flares and impacts.

There may not be a lot of places like this.

> I wonder sometimes if that’s another thing to toss in the Fermi paradox bucket

Here we are, half a century after the first moon landing, doing a flyby of the moon in preparation for landing and supposedly for establishing a base there that makes no sense. We’re not even close to being able to send humans to the nearest planets, and even if we did send people to Mars, in one of the most pointlessly dangerous and expensive missions in history, it’d be extremely unlikely to lead even to a base, let alone a settlement.

Yet with all that, people still talk about the Fermi paradox as though it’s a mystery.

It makes me think we’re really dealing with a kind of religious belief. Religion backfills reality with comforting fantasies, like life after death. In this case, the fantasy that there are much more advanced, interstellar spacefaring civilizations than ours elsewhere in the galaxy. This implies that humans too could one day become an interstellar species (with enough grit and determination and pulling back on the control stick and yelling, I suppose!) But somehow, mysterious effects prevent us from ever observing any evidence of this belief.

It’s a logical extrapolation if you think life is a natural phenomenon. It would be exceedingly weird to see no evidence for it, but of course we have not been looking long or far.

And yes, space flight is brutally hard. Look up the history of sailing. Look up the Polynesian indigenous peoples and how long that took, through multiple waves of exploration, or the people who walked across a land bridge to North America during the ice age. Space flight is easier and safer than some of those feats, given the tech they did it with at the time.

If there is a fantasy it’s the idea that we’d have bases on the Moon and Mars by now. What we are doing today is the equivalent of early Polynesians hollowing out some logs and going fishing.

I suspect that it is NOT a weaker system than before, it is more accurate about the mortality rate. In other words, there are fewer "unknown unknowns" than there were in the 60s and 80s, partially because of explosions that took out previous astronauts.

(Some would snidely say as long as they don't put seven people on the rocket they'll be fine.)

1 out of the 12 crewed Apollo missions resulted in the death of the crew, so a 1 in 12 effective mortality rate.

Apollo 13 was a very close call. If that had ended in failure the mortality rate would have been 1 in 6.

So 1 in 30 would be a pretty clear improvement from Apollo, and we are a lot better and more thorough at modeling those risks and testing systems than we were during the Apollo program.

Is 12 enough of a sample size to make a statistical judgement? What if there were 20 more which didn’t have a loss of life? Is it then 1/30? What if there were 20 more?

The risk factor is calculated _per mission_ from what I understand. You can have three accidents in a row and nothing for decades but the risk itself can still be 1 in 30.

Your point is fair and and important distinction. I think when estimating a risk factor though, this empirical data, while a low sample size, is a valuable statistic because it's empirical, and not that small of a sample size. Maybe going forward, we have 3 risk levels:

  - Historical. Low N as you say. (Even though each mission and spacecraft is different and they're spread out over time, there's value in this)
  - Bureaucrat number; absurdly low, but looks good to politicians etc
  - Engineering estimate

Yes. It provides a prior for Bayesian analysis if nothing else.

So the risk factor for Apollo could have actually been 1/1000 but they were just really unlucky?

Yes, actually. This is similar to having a 100 year flood five years in a row. It doesn’t mean that the flood occurs only once in 100 years. _On average_ it’s 1/100 probability of occurring in any given year.

But then, Apollo 1 was after all the first mission on the Saturn V. I think we should assess even its pre-launch risk much higher than the rest of them. Similarly Artemis II has a much higher risk than the subsequent ones will have.

But we’re talking about the risk of a defined set of events that have concluded, not a prediction of the future.

Of course Apollo would have likely had a better average if it had continued, but the risk of the Apollo program, as executed, included things like the first flight of the Saturn V.

If the final empirical mortality result of the Artemis program is 1/30 or less, it will be better than Apollo in that statistic.

A comparison of acceptable mortality is where this discussion began. If Apollo was acceptable at 1/12 (We did it, it was apparently acceptable as the program was not cancelled due to mortality rate) then an acceptable mortality of 1/30 is stronger than Apollo, not weaker.

If I toss a coin four times and it comes up heads three and tails once, it doesn’t mean that there’s a 75% chance that this coin lands heads up. Be careful about conflating risk factor and mortality rate.

> If I toss a coin four times and it comes up heads three and tails once, it doesn’t mean that there’s a 75% chance that this coin lands heads up.

No, but it means that to ensure that I do better on my next set of coin tosses I need to beat 3 in 4, not 1 in 2.

But you doing better is independent of the risk involved. The chances of you getting 3/4 heads or better is around 31%, so theres ~69% chance you’ll do worse next time round. Doesn’t change the fact that each coin toss is still 50/50.

> Doesn’t change the fact that each coin toss is still 50/50.

That assumes a fair coin. The fact is you don't know what the odds were of getting heads or tails for that particular coin, all you know is that you got 3/4 heads. And in this analogy, a few hundred coins have every been made, in maybe a dozen styles, none of which have been fair, so you have no good reason to believe that this particular coin should have 50/50 odds of landing heads up.

Space is hard. If we didn’t accept these parameters we wouldn’t go to space. Apollo lost one entire crew and almost two, the Space Shuttle lost two missions where the whole crew died. The risks are real.

It honestly says something about how absurdly risk averse our society has become that an 1/30 chance of death is considered too high for a literal moonshot. You can advertise a 1/3 rate of slowly choking in vacuum and I bet you will still get a five mile long queue of people signing up for the mission.

If you want a historical comparison, over 200 men left with Magellan on his voyage around the globe and only 40 returned.

Or the extreme casualty rates experienced by the (mostly very young) East India Company clerks in Calcutta. From Dalrymple's The Anarchy:

"Death, from disease or excess, was a commonplace, and two-thirds of the Company servants who came out never made it back – fewer still in the Company’s army, where 25 per cent of European soldiers died each year."

It's worth noting that Magellan lived in a time of extremely high infant and childhood mortality. Approximately 30% of newborns would die in infancy, and the odds of reaching 16 were only about 50%. This wasn't just skewed by people in poor circumstances, even the wealthy elite in society with the best access to resources and medicine of the time faced grim odds. Everyone went through their formative years with the understanding that their survival was unlikely, they watched their siblings and friends of the same age die, they were raised by parents who knew damn well that half their children likely wouldn't make it,and their society was structured around the assumption of an heir and a spare. Under such circumstances, the value of human life, and thus the reward necessary to justify risk, would logically have been much lower.

Indeed, it's rather amazing to think about just how recently things changed. The generation that first went to the moon had a much lower infant mortality rate than in the 1500s, but it was still about 20 times higher than today, and critically they were all raised by parents and lead by people who had grown up around normalized high infant mortality rates. Boomers are the first generation where infant mortality was continually below 5%, and millennials are the first generation to be raised by parents who considered their children's survival to adulthood a given. And of course that's for the developed world; global infant mortality only fell below 5% in 2010. Right now is the first time in human history that you can say with 95% confidence that a random human newborn will survive to adulthood. We should be much more risk averse than our ancestors, we are on average anteing up many more happy, healthy years than they were.

Agreed, but people were often forced into those conditions. Or were forced to make an impossible survival decision.

Were Magellan’s men volunteers? For example, in the incident with The Wager, 1,980 men left on 6 ships, and only 188 survived. Men of the original men were press-ganged (kidnapped to crew these ships), and a lot of them were even taken from an infirmary and not in great health. And, of course, conditions were pretty terrible.

So yeah, we’re more risk adverse… and also a lot better at keeping people alive. I think most people would not have signed up for some of these really risky endeavors if they knew the true risk.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wager_Mutiny

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghaiing

Maybe we should be glad that afawct none of the people exposed to the risks of artemis ii mission were force on it against their will. I'd bet the even in The Wager you would have have some clear headed people who knew the risk and still chose it

Crazy indeed, glad that someone else has already mentioned Magellan, because that’s whom I also had in mind. Not sure there’s a solution for this because at this point the risk scare has been institutionalized among most if Western (and not only) society.

You're acting like if it fails they can just say "Well we said it was 1/3!" and then just get on with it. "Oops we lost a zillion taxpayer dollars and no one will mind and maybe they'll give us more money this time around!" That's just not how the world works.

Actual death rate for astronauts so far is 19/791, or 1 in 40.

It's unclear if the shuttle was actually safer or if NASA is just more honest about the odds of catastrophic failure.

There are reasons to think Artemis is safer. It has a launch abort system that the shuttle lacked. Reentry should also be much safer under Artemis; the capsule is a much simpler object to protect.

We stopped going to the moon because it's a vanity project. It's expensive, risky, and there isn't much more science to do or that can't be done by robots.

Hopefully this time we can keep going for what we can do for engineering instead of what we can do for science.

You are comparing orbiting earth in a shuttle to a lunar flyby in a pod. Very different risk profiles.

First couple of crews to orbit the earth at 0’ AGL had mortality rate of 9 in 10.

I’d say we’re doing better!

Crossing the Atlantic and the discovery of the Americas? How many deaths were acceptable during that initial period of exploration? That’s where we still are with space.

And the atmospheric entry is still the same as 1969. Physics doesn’t change.

> That X decades later we accept, with all our advancements in tech, a weaker system than ever before

how do you keep past performance while stop performing it for XY decades?

A lot of advancement is multipurpose. CNCs are more accurate than machinists, computers are faster. And we have a lot of the technical knowledge written down.

Machinist never stopped working even after advanced CNCs proliferated. Humans had records of how things were made and yet new generations had to relearn it - and fail in the process.

This mission is not about sending stuff out to deep space. Its about sending out new generation of humans to deep space.

Even if you could guarantee that these new humans have exact same experience of past humans, can we guarantee that past decades simulations or theoretical knowledge acquired - while NOT actually doing something - will effectively reduce the chances of mortality?

overall construction in the US had a measured death rate of 1 in 1000 people in 2023. i think we can accept far higher rate for space travel.

This was the farthest humans ever travelled from earth, even farther than apollo 13. Intuitively the farther you go the higher the risks are

Landing on the moon is enormously riskier than simply going further out.

I'm answering the claim about Artemis being more dangerous than the space shuttle. Obviously landing on the moon is a lot riskier.

They could go twice the same distance, the risk would be roughly the same at that point. It's mostly the complexity and changes that make it more risky once the initial trajectory is in place.

You need a lot more impulse and more fuel to go twice as far. Probably more correction burns. A longer final burn before entering the atmosphere. So the risk of loosing the engine is much higher and probably increasing more than linear with burn time/change of impulse.

That's the starting point? That's what we document as acceptable?

Better to document risk, than lie to brave volunteers. And they knew the risk, and wanted to go. So I see zero issues here.

You cannot really determine what the risks are before trying something new.

Turns out riding on top of controlled explosions is a risky engagement.

That was the fair estimate for the Shuttle program. NASA caught hell in public, justifiably, for pretending otherwise. But astronaut memoirs such as Mullane's excellent Riding Rockets paint a much more nuanced picture.

I waited until splashdown to permit my emotions to get involved, and I'm glad I did. It was really something earlier, to hear my whole neighborhood bar set up a cheer for an American mission to the Moon.

Come on! No one is forced to get on the rocket. If you don’t think it’s worth it, don’t go!

From a social perspective, I would recommend to think of the average death per capita of an effort, which is effectively nil for Artemis (very few astronauts vs us population) compared to generating electricity with coal, which kills many annually.

If we got to a point where going to the Moon was significantly safer than that, we’d better start trying things even more ambitious and risky or we’ll stagnate as a species. The fatality rates for circumnavigating the globe or settling in North America or attempting to invent a working flying machine were much, much higher than that.

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The shuttle didn’t accomplish that much and didn’t get us as far as Artemis just did, the risks are well worth it. Nobody is forcing the astronauts to do their astronaut thing, imo they’re aware of the risks they’re taking, and kudos to them for that.

Wai how is it weaker, like genuinely?

Eh yeah? This is frontier, pioneer stuff. We should have a greater appetite for risk as long as it’s completely transparent and the astronauts know what they’re getting into. Realistically though, there is essentially a rocket a day going up and they rarely fail anymore, so the true risk is probably much lower than 1 in 30.

There are over 8 billion people on earth.

Insane to you? why don't you tell us what you have contributed to the world to improve this outcome even if by .01%

Astronauts are, as a group, extremely risk loving. Every single person who signs up to go into space knows what they’re signing up for - they’ve spent their entire life working for the opportunity to be put in a tin can and shot into orbit atop a million pounds of explosives. There’s a very valid critique that NASA has become far too risk averse - we owe it to the astronauts to give them the best possible chance to complete the mission and make it back safely, but every single person who signs up for a space mission wants to take that risk, and we don’t do anyone any favors by pretending that space can be safe, that accidents are avoidable, or that the astronauts themselves don’t know what they’re signing up for. A mission that fails should not be considered a failure unless it fails because we didn’t try hard enough.

My father, who flew combat missions for the Navy in Vietnam and then became a test pilot, told me after the loss of Columbia that if he had had a chance to make that flight and spend 7 days in Earth orbit, even knowing that he'd burn up on reentry, he'd have done it.

One way to see it:

  1) Eventually you will die, no matter what. It can be the most mundane thing. Slipping on a ketchup splatter can cause great damage for example.

  2) It's a profession where you intentionally kill people, so, that changes the calculation for your own risk.

  3) It's a unique opportunity.
(and potentially)

  4) Gives a sense of living / be in history books for his family.
So you have a possibility of a guaranteed exciting life for a death that you anyway will have, but doing something you love, it's not too bad.

> It's a profession where you intentionally kill people

Not being an astronaut (or being a test pilot, for that matter). That's the context in which he was speaking.

Your father is a better man than I am.

Highly recommend The Right Stuff by Tom Wolfe about the Gemini astronauts. They mostly were test pilots prior.

The movie was good too. I haven't seen it in years, but from memory:

Gordo! Who's the best pilot you ever saw? -- You're lookin' at him!

Loan me a stick of Beemans.

Light this candle!

It just blew!

No bucks, no Buck Rogers.

> Artemis acceptable crew mortality rate is 1 in 30. Roughly 3x riskier than the shuttle

Do you have a link? I’m asking because it is very easy to make mistakes when comparing risks. For example https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47725961 translates that into “That if we send 30 people we _accept_ that one is possible to die.” If that interpretation is correct, given Artemis has a crew of four, that looks more like a 1:120 chance of a mortality of 4. I think that would make it an improvement over the space shuttle.

I'm pretty sure that the chances that one dies in a mission is nearly the same as the chance that they all die. Very high correlation approaching 1.

That’s precisely my point. The question is what a crew mortality rate of 1 in 30 means.

If it means that, on average, a team member dies every 30 flights, with a crew of four, it’s likely there are fatalities in ‘only’ one in every 120 flights.

For space shuttle, that number was about one in every 60 flights. So, with that interpretation, Artemis would be about twice as safe as the Space Shuttle.

If, on the other hand, it means that, if you step aboard Artemis, your chance of dying during the flight is about one in 30, the Space Shuttle would be about twice as safe as Artemis.

> Artemis acceptable crew mortality rate is 1 in 30.

How did they arrive at that number?

(Eg. Did they arbitrily establish the target at the outset? Or did it evolve by gauging the projected failure rate of their core mechanical etc. systems as those began to take shape, then establishing a universal minimum in line with that, to achieve some level of uniformity and avoid drastically under/over-engineering subsequent systems?)

For context, Jared is NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman. I didn't know, so I think it could be useful for others.

> but it wasn't thought of or acknowledged by NASA as being risky until very late in its lifecycle.

They understood it to be extremely risky immediately. They understood the ice issue early on as evidenced by the fact that they completely changed the coating on the external fuel tank to try to compensate for it. They also added ice bridges and other features to the launch pad to try to diminish the risk. They also planned for in orbit heat shield tile repair. They specifically chose the glue to be compatible with total vacuum conditions so they could actually detach and rebond a whole tile if necessary. They developed a complicated and, unfortunately wrong, computer model to estimate the damage potential of ice strikes to the heat shield tiles. What they _finally_ came to understand was that you just have to swing the arm out on orbit and take high resolution pictures of the vehicle to properly assess it's condition.

NASA was and always is very bad at calculating systemic risk. They have the right people developing risk profiles for individual components but they've never had the understanding at the management level of how to assess them as a complete vehicle in the context of any given mission.

> Roughly 3x riskier than the shuttle.

The huge advantage they now have is a capable launch escape system which can possibly jettison them away from the rocket should any issues arise during ascent. That was the one thing the shuttle could not possibly integrate.

On the other hand they could take a far larger crew to orbit and maintain them comfortably for several weeks during the mission. The "space bus" generated a healthy 21kW from it's fuel cells and created so much water that you had to periodically dump it overboard. This was a blessing for the ISS because you could bag up all that excess water and transfer it for long term use.

Anyways.. as you can tell.. I just really loved the shuttle. It was a great vehicle that was ultimately too exceedingly tricky to manage safely.

An error in any of the orbital math may have seen them flung out into space with no chance of recovery.

Orbits do not work that way

The craft has aerodynamics and speed. It might be figuratively true "unrecoverable" but if it takes e.g. 2 weeks to complete a return, their oxygen and food and batteries ran out. Alternatively if it enters too fast they return ... in pieces.

I think you're being a pedant, if your point is a grazing entry causing rebound skip ultimately returns to some orbital path downward.

You seem to intentionally be ignoring the original quote that any error may have caused them to be flung into space. This is patently false unless the one math error is pumping in hundreds of pounds more propellant and burning far longer than the scheduled burns. NASA would need to make a significant series of mistakes beyond orbital math for the "flung out into space" statement to be true.

They certainly could've gotten the return wrong but with a perigee of 119 miles they arent even in a stable orbit and likely could deorbit themselves using only rcs thrusters at apogee, or by just waiting a few orbits.

This is underselling the risks. On top of the many trajectories which push them into unrecoverable situations, leaving them stranded in orbit, there can be trajectories where the moon gives a gravity assist strong enough to fling the spacecraft into escape velocity, fulfilling the OP.

In fact, the trajectory they chose for this mission exploited the opposite effect to yield a free return without propellant expense.

In the modern day, the chance of a math error being the root cause behind this failure mode are vanishingly small, but minor burn execution mistakes that do not require hundreds of extra pounds of propellant are definitely plausible. They were extremely common in the early days of spaceflight and plagued most of the very first moon exploration attempts. Again, with modern RCS this is unlikely. But reentry is still incredibly tight and dangerous. Apollo famously had a +-1° safe entry corridor, and Orion is way heavier and coming in even faster. If their perigee was off they could’ve easily burned up or doubled their mission time, which they may not have been able to survive.

The amount of things that would have to go wrong for the craft to get an accidental gravity boost and be ejected would be significant.

I feel like the original claim paints the whole thing as on a knife edge and barely achieved by virtue of not making a single mistake. In today's age with so many moon landing deniers and worse I feel like we should be specific about where the actual dangers challenges and unknowns there were here. In reality, the orbital mechanics are one of the simplest parts of the entire problem, at least when we're talking about a moon flyby

Yes, this is a fair point. I agree that orbital mechanics is trivially easy compared to everything else. The chances of a math mistake in particular are null, these trajectories have all been calculated years in advance.

The lumpiness of the moon's gravity is not well mapped out.

It is now better mapped after the GRAIL mission: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_Recovery_and_Interior_...

The moon's gravity turns out to be "lumpy" because its density is not constant. This was detected by the Apollo missions and caused them to make errors in orbit calculations. This source of error could have influenced the flyby.

Anyone who has had hit period key once too many during Munar free-return in KSP knows it's exactly how orbits work...

Hilarious the the intellectual forum downvoted you for being absolutely right.

Artemis II never escaped Earth’s pull.

That video that NASA put out where the craft did a sling shop around the moon is extremely deceptive. The pull of the moon had very little effect.

If they had missed, they would have eventually crashed back to earth in the worst case, and best case just re-adjusted and returned a little bummed.

> The pull of the moon had very little effect.

No, it had a very significant effect: it's what made possible the free return trajectory while observing the far side of the moon.

Ok, but no not really. This is incorrect, the “free return” would have happened if they launched entirely in the wrong direction.

Like I said, the gif you saw makes it look that way.

Here is a link that explains it very well. https://youtu.be/MF8IbYbVIA0?t=269

I’ll agree, it seems crazy that it left earth, made it to the moon, and never really left earth orbit at all. That the furthest we’ve been away is still destined to return on its own.

> the gif you saw makes it look that way.

Makes it look what way?

Watch the NASA video carefully. It's clear that, even before the "loop" begins, Artemis is slowed down and is soon going to reverse direction relative to Earth. Which of course it would anyway, as you say--because, as the video you linked to points out, it doesn't have Earth escape velocity. The TLI burn gave it just enough velocity to reach the Moon's orbit with a little extra speed left over to get it about 4000 miles further.

But what would not happen without the Moon there is the "backwards" part of the loop--the part that took Artemis around the far side of the Moon. The Moon's gravity is what did that. In the Moon-centered frame in the video, yes, it looks like just a slight deflection--because that frame is moving with the Moon, whereas Artemis was moving backwards--in the opposite direction from the Moon in the Earth-centered frame.

Without the Moon there, Artemis would never have moved backwards, relative to the Moon's orbit, at all. Its trajectory in the Earth centered frame would have been a simple ellipse, with a maximum altitude from Earth a little higher than what it actually achieved (since the Moon's gravity did pull it back a little bit).

> This is incorrect

No, it's not. You aren't responding to what I actually said. See below.

> the “free return” would have happened if they launched entirely in the wrong direction.

But it would not have been a free return that let them see the far side of the moon, which is what I said. The Moon's gravity is what made that possible. And that was very significant.

I’m sorry that you feel so strongly about a position that is incorrect. I provided a source to help explain it to you.

Glad that you are glad that they are safe and sound

> Artemis acceptable crew mortality rate is 1 in 30.

So with 4 crew members, chance of one dying was 13%! Very lucky they all survived.

That is not how statistical calculations of risk are made. If the crew has 1/30 crew mortality rate, and there were 30 crew members, that does not mean there is a 100% chance that one dies. While there is negligible chances that only a portion of the crew were to return, the outcomes are closer to black and white of nearly 29/30 full crew return and 1/30 no crew return.

>The Shuttle was risky, but it wasn't thought of or acknowledged by NASA as being risky until very late in its lifecycle.

The whole idea of the shuttle program was to make space travel routine and less-risky. Like air travel.

It obviously failed at that goal.

> The Shuttle was risky, but it wasn't thought of or acknowledged by NASA as being risky until very late in its lifecycle.

I think they did think of it as risky and acknowledge that it was risky, they just had a different tolerance for risk.

The Artemis mission is "more difficult" - you're firing folk way out into space and hoping you hit a fairly narrow channel where they swing around the Moon back towards you, and not just keep going straight on out beyond any hope of rescue, or biff it in hard becoming a new lunar crater. You've got to carry a lot more fuel, and a lot more technology. You're going to have them up there in a much smaller space than the Shuttle for a lot longer.

The Shuttle by contrast was kind of "proven technology" by the end of its life, and we really should have developed some new stuff off it. Columbia first flew in 1981 but "the keel was laid" as it were in 1975! Think about the massive shifts in technology between 1975 and 1981, and then maybe 1981 and 1987.

I remember someone saying in 1981 that their new car had more computer power controlling the engine than took man to the Moon (the first time round!), and my late 90s car has more computer power than took man to the Moon in the instrument cluster. Your car is probably a lot newer, and has about as much computer power as NASA had on the ground for the Apollo missions just to operate the buttons on the steering wheel that turn the radio up and down, in a chip the size of your fingernail, that costs the price of a not very good coffee.

The main failure modes of space travel have always been "we can't get the astronauts back down", "we can't get the astronauts back down at less than several times the speed of sound", or "the astronauts are now a rapidly expanding cloud of hot fried mince". What's changed is the extent to which we accept that, I guess.

I’d bet a million dollars that Orion will win every safety metric compared to the shuttle once it is retired. NASA deluded itself in thinking the Shuttle was safe. The reality is that the Shuttle was the most dangerous spaceship anyone ever built.

That's physically not possible due to the distances and energies involved. Even with the Commercial Cargo and Crew Program (C3P), NASA has set the acceptable mortality threshold at 1 in 270 over the entire mission and 1 in 1000 on ascent / descent. If they could set it higher by gaming the math, they would. They can't.

We're a very primitive species, and the forces involved here are genuinely new. And no, Apollo wasn't much better either, at least 10 astronauts were killed in training or burned alive (8 NASA, 2 sister MIL programs), as well as (far worse, because astronauts sign up for the risk) one member of ground staff.

People love to hate the Shuttle, and it ended up being subpar / fail expectations due to the political constraints NASA was under, but the Shuttle was a genuine advance for its time – a nonsensical, economically insane advance, but still an advance. If you look at the Shuttle alternative proposals / initial proposals as well as stuff like Dynasoar and Star Raker, you'll see NASA iterating through Starship style ideas. But those were rejected due to higher up front capital investment at the time.

The Shuttle is an odd franken-turduckling, because it was designed for one mission and one mission only. And that mission never happened. That cargo bay existed to capture certain Soviet assets and deploy + task certain American space assets and then bring them back to Earth.

And that's the bit that's hard to emphasize. The fact that the Shuttle could put a satellite up there, watch it fail, then go back up, grab it, bring it back, repair it, then launch again was an insane capability.

Was the program a giant fuck up at the end? Yes. But does that mean Artemis will be safer than the Shuttle? No. That's not how the energetics, time from civilization, acceptable risk profiles etc. work out.

Shameless plug, wrote a bit about the Apollo hagiography, Artemis and risk here – https://1517.substack.com/p/1-in-30-artemis-greatness-and-ri...

It’s statistically unsound to compare results of low probability events like this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_sharpshooter_fallacy

How could a comparison between such dissimilar programs ever be meaningful? NASA flew 135 Shuttle missions over the course of 30 years; Orion will be doing well to approach a tenth of that number.

Space flight safety is a function of culture and I don’t have any confidence that the culture has improved.

I think we are a long way along from digging out Dr Feynman to look into why a shuttle exploded.

Unless you happen to have some deep links into NASA, in which case please elucidate us all, then why not celebrate a happy and safe return from a sodding dangerous mission that involved things like >25,000 mph relative velocity and some remarkable navigation.

When you depart earth (close quarters gravity, air resistance, things in the way), everything moves really fast, really fast and any acceleration becomes an issue really ... fast!

The moon moves, the earth moves: both famously in some sort of weird dance around each other and both orbit around the sun. Obviously the moon affects the earth way less than vice versa but it still complicates things.

I think that NASA did a remarkable job of making Artemis II look almost routine and I don't think that was down to behaving as they did in the past.

> I think that NASA did a remarkable job of making Artemis II look almost routine and I don't think that was down to behaving as they did in the past.

I have been excited for Artemis--yes it's big and expensive and late, but look how it has brought out the best of what humans can be--but, despite all that, the heat shield situation was textbook "normalization of deviance." Just as the O-rings were not designed to have any damage but they retroactively justified it was okay, just as there was not supposed to be any foam or tile damage but they retroactively justified it was okay, so too was the Artemis I heat shield not supposed to come back with damage, but they...

I'm not trying to be negative, and risks are inevitable, but the resemblance to me was uncanny. The lesson with normalization of deviance is that a successful result does not inherently mean a safe decision. After all, most of the time that you play Russian Roulette you will escape unharmed.

There will always be issues on something a mad as putting some people on a firework and shooting them at a moving target 100,000 miles away from a moving platform.

The heat shield failure was a test and the result was a working heat shield, when it counted. That's the point of tests. NASA already had several working heat shields from the old missions but the new one needed testing - for the shape of the craft etc. They already had a lot of data from the old efforts (that worked).

I think that exit and re-entry are almost routine now, provided your rocket doesn't explode. The tricky bit is out there in space and trying to make the moon a resource of some sort.

The new one failed in ways it was not designed to fail. In C-compiler terms it was "undefined behavior." In Donald Rumsfeld terms it was an "unknown unknown."

The mere fact that the outcome was successful does not inherently indicate that the decision-making was safe: the O-rings "worked" for 24 missions and the foam/tiles "worked" for 111. Nevertheless there were ample warnings and close calls.

Reentry from the Moon is not routine. Re-entry speed was about 40% faster than from low earth orbit, and kinetic energy goes up by the square, so about double.

Artemis rides on extended versions of the same SRBs that made the Shuttle ascent so dangerous.

Yes, and the four RS-25 main engines on the SLS rocket (Space Launch System) are literally SSME's harvested from the shuttles (Space Shuttle Main Engine). Of course that means they are re-usable. So sad to see them plummet to the ocean floor. Perversely Rocketdyne is building cheaper non-reusable versions of the RS-25 for future missions.

It has a launch escape system, unlike the shuttle.

Was any shuttle lost to the SRBs?

Yes, Challenger - although program management knew they were violating a launch constraint (temperature), and it was the low temperature that produced the conditions necessary for SRB failure.

As with any aerospace mishap, it's a chain of events, not just one cause.

Yes, challenger. The O-ring failed, creating a gas exhaust that almost instantly destroyed the main propellant tank.

I believe what it destroyed was the strut holding the booster to the tank. When the strut burned through the assembly came apart and aerodynamic forces did the remainder of the destruction.

Yes, 50% of shuttle losses were due to SRB failures (Challenger)

That's exactly how Challenger was lost.

The Artemis SRBs incorporate design changes to address the causes of the Challenger failure. Specifically they changed the joint design, added another o-ring, and they have electric joint heaters to keep the seals warm.

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Jared? Sounds familiar, is it a friend of yours? If yes should you not disclose it? The casual first name use basis is a tell. You wouldn't say "glad Bill is cooking something up" about Gates. This kind of parasocial familiarity with billionaires is how PR becomes indistinguishable from fan fiction.

Isaacman is a space tourist, not an astronaut. He is the CEO of Shift4 Payments, which processes payments for SpaceX. Musk, who spent hundreds of millions on Trump's campaign, got him installed as NASA administrator. That's not meritocracy, it's transactional politics. If you or I had billions, we could also buy seats on rockets.

"His own version of Gemini" is wild spin. Polaris was Isaacman paying SpaceX to fly him on SpaceX hardware. He had no engineering role, no mission design input. Calling it "his Gemini program" is like calling a chartered yacht trip "your naval program." Naming something after a historic NASA program doesn't make it one.

The risk decision process was theater. Isaacman reportedly had already decided Artemis II would proceed, then invited Dr. Charlie Camarda and others to a "transparent review" that was anything but.

When the conclusion is predetermined and dissenting experts are brought in for optics, that's not risk management, it's liability laundering.

On the 1-in-30 mortality figure, framing astronauts making it home as something to be "grateful" for, rather than questioning why we're accepting odds 3x worse than the Shuttle (which killed 14 people), is a strange way to celebrate progress...

We should be glad the crew is safe. We should also be honest that the person running NASA got there through financial entanglements with SpaceX, not aerospace credentials

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I mean it's the first space crew on an anti-science mission, right?

The point of them being there isn't discovery, it's to try to discourage anyone who wants try to understand and protect the planet that we all rely on for life