> Seeing as no one besides blackhats want frontier cybercrime capability to be open source
Sure. The problem is that there is no practical difference between "cybercrime capability" and "cybercrime defense capability."
All of my PRs go through an adversarial security review by GLM-5.3, because it's the only smart-enough model with a good understanding of cybersecurity issues that won't regularly refuse the job. Removing that ability from frontier models helps nobody except cyber criminals.
I'm not sure I follow. Let's say that GLM remains the frontier of open source cyber capabilities because Kimi is nerfed. Your situation, and the situation of your attackers, remain exactly the same. You run GLM to audit your code, they do the same looking for exploits.
Let us say that un-nerfed Kimi was released, and it turns out to be at the absolute frontier of cyber capabilities, Mythos 5.5 level, a step ahead of anything else. What now? Well now your situation is exactly the same as before, just that auditing and hacking got more expensive. You run a Kimi security audit, they do the same to try to pwn you. However, now the cabal of Linux kernel defenders with secret access to Mythos 5.5 all of a sudden have no advantage, where before they used to have one. And even worse now they are in a literal race to be the first ones to find every bug that Kimi is capable of finding, and patching it yesterday.
So for you, this makes no difference in practice, your capabilities are not elevated, and neither are those of the attackers. The only result of the other scenario is an overall defender disadvantage.
What your argument is missing is that I'll ship security issues that would have been caught otherwise.
You're assuming that these won't matter because attackers might not have better models than I do, but that doesn't make sense. The assumption that attackers can't find the issues because I didn't find them at release is wrong. Even if they never get better models (which they will), current models might find flaws I missed, and they also have other means of finding flaws in my software.
The best defense is to make software as secure as possible regardless of assumed attacker capabilities at the point of release.
It’s highly likely that everyone has software or firmware made by Chinese engineer running in their house.
These defenders aren’t supposed to have access to the “defender models”.