> Network traffic between nodes is not encrypted and not authenticated.
Oh.
After all of the work they put into using cryptographic identities and decentralization tricks, how did they forget to do anything about the network traffic?
Was this a case of thinking they'd handle it later, but then it fell off the TODO list?
Reading the blog, it sounds more like they were depending on libraries (both by Cyphernet, interestingly) and implicitly trusting them, instead of verifying.
Which I can understand to an extent with large, high-traffic dependencies but these were really low traffic projects with like 10 stars on github and barely any development... Well, hindsight is 20/20.
It's unfortunate that write-up is AI generated ("Here's the catch... And this is the part that honestly surprised me" tipped me off, and Pangram cites it as 100% AI too), because it's hard to understand what's happening.
It looks like the Noise API can be confusing. They tried to implement it, got the handshake and key exchange right, but then used Noise API calls intended for sending raw data directly to the wire without the encryption they set up? So keys were exchanged, then never used?
I think the core problem isn't that the Noise "API" is confusing, it's that Noise is a framework for building reasonably-secure protocols. If you don't know how to build or evaluate cryptosystems, you shouldn't assume that just dropping in a library will somehow make your novel network protocol secure.
"Don't roll your own crypto" gets a lot of lip service (and a fair number of eye rolls) but it's really, truly something worth considering because it isn't just the algorithms or libraries you choose: it's about the whole package, including things like wire serialization, internal handshakes/security, etc. Just grabbing a Noise tutorial and building your own implementation is a Bad. Idea.
And this is only getting worse now that people can prompt their way through building a "secure" system only to realize they really didn't understand what that means. No amount of Markdown saying, "don't introduce a cryptographic vulnerability in this code" is going to save you if you don't know what to do in the first place.
But also: the vulnerability was literally visible using basic Wireshark/pcap traffic sniffing. I'm sorry, but if you don't even bother (or know how) to do that kind of basic security analysis you should stop and look for someone who does to check your system in the real world before you tell people to depend on it for serious work.
(That being said, if someone had just typed 'find me a vulnerability in this protocol' in a code agent backed by Fable or Astra with any kind of access to network traffic dumps it probably would have taken about 15 minutes to discover this issue. Might even be significant part of how the above author found it, given the other LLM-ish fingerprints in the writeup.)
>This was reported to us by Konstantinos Maninakis on 2026-06-24.
announcement 3 months later is not super great, considering that the current advice is "Stop using private repositories (over the network) until the security update is released."
The fact that this was reported three months ago and the "workaround" is to stop using private repos and assume they are all pwnd is quite something. How do you not notice that cross-node traffic is not encrypted when building something like this?
Just use mTLS via QUIC, it’s standardized, secure, future proof and has implementations in tons of languages and supports proper certificate checks and that whole ecosystem around it which they apparently tried to reinvent. It’s such a great protocol for these use cases, I don’t get why it’s not used more.
I don't think the consumer ecosystem is mature yet.
Adding a cert to my Android phone was a huge pain in the ass. Most homelab apps like Jellyfin don't support it. The homelab space is so buck broken it assumes i don't have a public IP address to just expose things without going through the convoluted VPN setup.
This whole project reads like amateur hour. Still using curl pipe to shell install and everything. Plus this lax security disclosure with just an outstandingly foolish security flaw. Gross.
It's a team of 3. It's not like they have a security team, dedicated testers. They were for very long releasing beta software. That in fact already worked.
Oh, so when they advertise “Your Data, Forever and Secure”[1] in big bold letters on their homepage with total disregard for the truth of that statement they are just committing fraud. Got it.
Radicle has been one of those projects that had seemed interesting, but something always bothered me about it. (I think it was very highly tied to the cryptocurrency movement for a while? And the Cyphernet GitHub org seems to have rebranded from a DAO?)
This, unfortunately, kinda seals the deal on never using this thing, at least not for anything I intend to keep private. This isn't about proficiency in some protocol which has XYZ footgun: they never checked that payloads were encrypted. Ridiculous.
> The network protocol used by Radicle does not give the confidentiality it was expected to give. Anyone who can observe the network path between two nodes can read the data they exchange as the data is sent in plain text.
Is this a... design choice? This feels like too egregious of an omission to be a regular vulnerability here.
My main wish is if radicle had a way to make issues online, without installing the software. Runing a piece of software is a high barrier of entry to make a bug report, which the entire reason I use codeberg instead.
That's a downside of all decentralised software, isn't it? If there's a convenient access point, that access point is also a point of centralisation. To be distributed, you have to be running the software yourself. The big problem is that the software always ends up being inconvenient. People have no problem using bittorrent because the software is actually usable.
My main wish is a way to search the repositories on a node. Or a way to have tags. The whole network is like a blackbox of projects unless you can get an outside link.
Honestly issues like this crop up pretty commonly. JWT alg:none for example. Or even older people forcing SSL to downgrade to encryption null.
In any system that provides security it should only be designed to run if the security is in use, and to fail immediately with no further action if the security is not used.
I was very surprised when I realized what defaults postgres uses when it comes to SSL. I can see how people consider it a pragmatic choice - but still...
> Peer authentication in the connection handshake is broken and allows impersonation. An attacker can connect to your node and present a Node ID that is not its own. Private repositories are shared only with allow-listed Node IDs. An attacker who fakes an allow-listed Node ID can fetch a private repository directly, without being on the network path. This was reported to us by cryptocode on 2026-08-12. We proposed a fix upstream, see this pull request.
They are trying to sweet write it as much as possible. But basically there is neither encryption nor authentication. The person who made the protocol/program simply didn't care.
I find this to be very telling about what kind of people they are. If you make a mistake this big you need to own up to it. BS all you want, maybe you think that works for you.. but people see through it.
Is there a risk that other projects that may be using the same cyphernet-labs/netservices.rs code, like Nym & Farcaster, have also been expecting authentication & encryption where it hasn't been happening?
> What is the issue?
> Network traffic between nodes is not encrypted and not authenticated.
Oh.
After all of the work they put into using cryptographic identities and decentralization tricks, how did they forget to do anything about the network traffic?
Was this a case of thinking they'd handle it later, but then it fell off the TODO list?
Reading the blog, it sounds more like they were depending on libraries (both by Cyphernet, interestingly) and implicitly trusting them, instead of verifying.
Which I can understand to an extent with large, high-traffic dependencies but these were really low traffic projects with like 10 stars on github and barely any development... Well, hindsight is 20/20.
Do you mean this blog post? https://maninak.com/blog/radicle-cleartext-transport-vulnera...
It's unfortunate that write-up is AI generated ("Here's the catch... And this is the part that honestly surprised me" tipped me off, and Pangram cites it as 100% AI too), because it's hard to understand what's happening.
It looks like the Noise API can be confusing. They tried to implement it, got the handshake and key exchange right, but then used Noise API calls intended for sending raw data directly to the wire without the encryption they set up? So keys were exchanged, then never used?
I think the core problem isn't that the Noise "API" is confusing, it's that Noise is a framework for building reasonably-secure protocols. If you don't know how to build or evaluate cryptosystems, you shouldn't assume that just dropping in a library will somehow make your novel network protocol secure.
"Don't roll your own crypto" gets a lot of lip service (and a fair number of eye rolls) but it's really, truly something worth considering because it isn't just the algorithms or libraries you choose: it's about the whole package, including things like wire serialization, internal handshakes/security, etc. Just grabbing a Noise tutorial and building your own implementation is a Bad. Idea.
And this is only getting worse now that people can prompt their way through building a "secure" system only to realize they really didn't understand what that means. No amount of Markdown saying, "don't introduce a cryptographic vulnerability in this code" is going to save you if you don't know what to do in the first place.
But also: the vulnerability was literally visible using basic Wireshark/pcap traffic sniffing. I'm sorry, but if you don't even bother (or know how) to do that kind of basic security analysis you should stop and look for someone who does to check your system in the real world before you tell people to depend on it for serious work.
(That being said, if someone had just typed 'find me a vulnerability in this protocol' in a code agent backed by Fable or Astra with any kind of access to network traffic dumps it probably would have taken about 15 minutes to discover this issue. Might even be significant part of how the above author found it, given the other LLM-ish fingerprints in the writeup.)
That is the article of the reporter.
I believe the blog post being referred to here is the one linked to in the title (i.e. https://radicle.dev/2026/09/23/disclosure-of-vulnerability-i...)
Correct, I was referring to the original linked article/disclosure.
>This was reported to us by Konstantinos Maninakis on 2026-06-24.
announcement 3 months later is not super great, considering that the current advice is "Stop using private repositories (over the network) until the security update is released."
Also: user guide still mentions supporting private repositories [0]
FAQ still says that "Radicle supports private repositories [...] completely invisible to the rest of the network" [1]
[0] https://radicle.dev/guides/user#initializing-a-private-repos...
[1] https://radicle.dev/faq
Thank you for noticing. We need to fix that.
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I was floored that they emailed me about it for the first time today saying "of course you already know all the details from the blog post".
Me: "No!"
For the record, that is not what the Zulip announcement wrote. Please don't kick us when we're down.
The fact that this was reported three months ago and the "workaround" is to stop using private repos and assume they are all pwnd is quite something. How do you not notice that cross-node traffic is not encrypted when building something like this?
Just use mTLS via QUIC, it’s standardized, secure, future proof and has implementations in tons of languages and supports proper certificate checks and that whole ecosystem around it which they apparently tried to reinvent. It’s such a great protocol for these use cases, I don’t get why it’s not used more.
I don't think the consumer ecosystem is mature yet.
Adding a cert to my Android phone was a huge pain in the ass. Most homelab apps like Jellyfin don't support it. The homelab space is so buck broken it assumes i don't have a public IP address to just expose things without going through the convoluted VPN setup.
This whole project reads like amateur hour. Still using curl pipe to shell install and everything. Plus this lax security disclosure with just an outstandingly foolish security flaw. Gross.
It's a team of 3. It's not like they have a security team, dedicated testers. They were for very long releasing beta software. That in fact already worked.
If a core feature of your software requires security guarantees you can't just say they don't have a "security team" .
Oh, so when they advertise “Your Data, Forever and Secure”[1] in big bold letters on their homepage with total disregard for the truth of that statement they are just committing fraud. Got it.
[1] https://radicle.dev/
To be fair even the largest companies are still using curl piped to sh in their Linux install instructions. And they are all fucking imbeciles.
Radicle has been one of those projects that had seemed interesting, but something always bothered me about it. (I think it was very highly tied to the cryptocurrency movement for a while? And the Cyphernet GitHub org seems to have rebranded from a DAO?)
This, unfortunately, kinda seals the deal on never using this thing, at least not for anything I intend to keep private. This isn't about proficiency in some protocol which has XYZ footgun: they never checked that payloads were encrypted. Ridiculous.
Glad to hear they are moving to iroh instead of a custom protocol. This is the problem with rolling your own stuff.
As a bonus, this should help camouflage the traffic. (Iroh is becoming more common.)
>this should help camouflage the traffic
How? QUIC is easy to fingerprint and flow classificate:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-12.1
Speaking of bold claims, Iroh, just like Radicle, are overselling themselves:
>iroh's QUIC multipath implementation automatically switches between Wi-Fi, cellular, ethernet, LAN, LoRa, HaLow, Tor, Bluetooth—or bring your own transport.
The thing is, QUIC multipath isn't standardized.
> The network protocol used by Radicle does not give the confidentiality it was expected to give. Anyone who can observe the network path between two nodes can read the data they exchange as the data is sent in plain text.
Is this a... design choice? This feels like too egregious of an omission to be a regular vulnerability here.
My main wish is if radicle had a way to make issues online, without installing the software. Runing a piece of software is a high barrier of entry to make a bug report, which the entire reason I use codeberg instead.
That's a downside of all decentralised software, isn't it? If there's a convenient access point, that access point is also a point of centralisation. To be distributed, you have to be running the software yourself. The big problem is that the software always ends up being inconvenient. People have no problem using bittorrent because the software is actually usable.
They have public repositories on GitHub.
https://github.com/radicle-dev
Like onion/ipfs/many others, I'd expect gateways to pop up if it grows relatively popular. If LLM scrapers don't destroy them immediately, at least.
My main wish is a way to search the repositories on a node. Or a way to have tags. The whole network is like a blackbox of projects unless you can get an outside link.
If the node runs an HTTP API (radicle-httpd) backed by an indexer (radicle-search), you can.
Try https://radicle.network/explore and set index.radicle.garden as your search seed.
https://stats.radicle.at/repos
Thanks this is exactly what I was needing.
I honestly thought there would be some elaborate chain there, not "we forgot to use encryption"...
Honestly issues like this crop up pretty commonly. JWT alg:none for example. Or even older people forcing SSL to downgrade to encryption null.
In any system that provides security it should only be designed to run if the security is in use, and to fail immediately with no further action if the security is not used.
I was very surprised when I realized what defaults postgres uses when it comes to SSL. I can see how people consider it a pragmatic choice - but still...
And not using authentication.
> Peer authentication in the connection handshake is broken and allows impersonation. An attacker can connect to your node and present a Node ID that is not its own. Private repositories are shared only with allow-listed Node IDs. An attacker who fakes an allow-listed Node ID can fetch a private repository directly, without being on the network path. This was reported to us by cryptocode on 2026-08-12. We proposed a fix upstream, see this pull request.
They are trying to sweet write it as much as possible. But basically there is neither encryption nor authentication. The person who made the protocol/program simply didn't care.
I find this to be very telling about what kind of people they are. If you make a mistake this big you need to own up to it. BS all you want, maybe you think that works for you.. but people see through it.
They probably forgot to tell Claude to make no mistakes.
But seriously, the fact that this started as Crypto-adjacent should have immediately disqualified them for serious use.
exactly!
Is there a risk that other projects that may be using the same cyphernet-labs/netservices.rs code, like Nym & Farcaster, have also been expecting authentication & encryption where it hasn't been happening?
thankfully (for me), this is about the git forge and not the oss calendar and contact synchronization software by the same name
https://radicale.org/v3.html
it's not the same name
you're right! i can't believe i only noticed that just now, thanks!
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