That's a false concern, because the names the CAs are certifying are still DNS names. If your TLD reasssigns your DNS name out from under you, or even if your TLD starts returning false data on only selected queries, the CAs will be happy to issue a cert to the new holder.
It would be great to have a widely-recognizable pseudodomain out there where the names were key hashes. It would actually graft really easily into DNSSEC. The zone format doesn't have to change at all; you just declare that if the KSK hash matches the domain label under this specific TLD, you don't need to check upstream of that. Then you add a P2P protocol for getting the actual data, and start slowly pushing that protocol down the resolver tree to incrementally decentralize everything.
That's a false concern, because the names the CAs are certifying are still DNS names. If your TLD reasssigns your DNS name out from under you, or even if your TLD starts returning false data on only selected queries, the CAs will be happy to issue a cert to the new holder.
It would be great to have a widely-recognizable pseudodomain out there where the names were key hashes. It would actually graft really easily into DNSSEC. The zone format doesn't have to change at all; you just declare that if the KSK hash matches the domain label under this specific TLD, you don't need to check upstream of that. Then you add a P2P protocol for getting the actual data, and start slowly pushing that protocol down the resolver tree to incrementally decentralize everything.