WhatsApp is end-to-end encrypted, so I'm not trusting Meta with much, and it's the only way I can reach quite a lot of people. A lot of people I know trust them begrudgingly (primarily with Instagram, because all of their friends are on it as well).
People don't need to love a company to use its products. The perceived benefit merely needs to be bigger than the perceived cost.
WhatsApp is E2EE, but Meta controls both ends. Instead of reading your plaintext on the server, they read it on the client. Not that tricky.
I presume the hardest part would be avoiding detection via decompilation and other reverse engineering techniques. Not familiar with that space (can anyone here shed some light?), but it seems likely that an entity with Meta’s resources would be able to figure that out.
E2EE probably protects well against bulk data collection (traffic analysis would sniff out sending 2x volume of data pretty quickly). But something more subtle and targeted, smuggled out in various fields of various protocols, would be hard to detect.
They only need to get caught doing it once to have a gigantic lawsuit on their hands. They could possibly pull it off very selectively, but doing it in a dragnet fashion seems incredibly risky.
What grounds would the lawsuit be based on? I can’t imagine that slurping any kind of data would be inconsistent with their EULA.
The only risk would be the reputational damage. And as far as their bottom line is concerned, the impact of that would be negligible—how many of WhatsApp’s billion(?) users know that it’s supposed to be E2EE, let alone are under the illusion that Meta doesn’t have access to their data?
Publicly stating to not have access to message contents yet doing otherwise, i.e. outright deception, doesn't seem like something you can EULA your way out of in most jurisdictions.
Beyond that, the GDPR and similar laws also impose limits as to what you can EULA away even without being deceptive about it.
At best, it would come down to the details of what their marketing materials have claimed wrt to keeping contents secret. Do you have anything concrete they've promised? I don't remember anything, but maybe that's just my bad memory.
Anything specific from the GDPR you'd apply here?
My suspicion is that things like URL previews, or when the app calls a handler to open a link (YouTube, browser), are still monitored.
So e.g. opening a link to an Amazon product that a friend sent makes you a target for ads in that category.
It's a suspicion, they'd probably argue their EULA allows this. The typical "we have to monitor links for dangerous content" is always the standard bullshit.
This is indeed a common vector of privacy leaks on either the recipient side (to the sender, in this case, if they operate the target of the link for which a preview is being rendered) or to the platform provider (if the preview is rendered server-side). But last time I checked, in WhatsApp, URL previews are rendered exclusively on the sender side and then sent as (E2E encrypted) media to the recipient.
This assumes completely techo-rational actors that continuously monitor cost-benefit analysis, other alternatives and switch products when one outweights the others.
This is even further away from the reality where people have breakdowns because their app icon moved location and is not in the usual spot.
The average person is optimizing towards energy use minimization by default because life is already hard enough with plans, kids, etc.
Use incentives and we will arrive at closer truths than by claims and expressions.
People have breakdowns because they are left without mobile reception for a few hours. Indeed this IS happening and I would expect people soon to have breakdowns, because they lack access to AI.
Slightly different lens, same outcome: It's there, it lets people do what they want to do with acceptable effort/other negative consequences, so they use it.
> WhatsApp is end-to-end encrypted,
- Meta data of your messages is not encrypted so meta can make a graph of who you talk to and when
- backups are not encrypted by default so plaintext of your private chats can be obtained
- even if you enable encryption for backups all it takes is for the other person in your private convo (or a person in a group chat) to not enable it for your messages to be available in plaintext
> - backups are not encrypted by default so plaintext of your private chats can be obtained
Yes, but importantly not by Meta themselves.
> - Meta data of your messages is not encrypted so meta can make a graph of who you talk to and when
Fair enough and worth mentioning. I'm personally fine with it.
> - even if you enable encryption for backups all it takes is for the other person in your private convo (or a person in a group chat) to not enable it for your messages to be available in plaintext
Yes, but how would you prevent that even in principle? I can't control what the people I'm messaging do with their copy of my messages. As long as there isn't unnecessary non-repudiation (e.g. by the sender cryptographically signing all outbound messages, which the Signal protocol intentionally avoids), I think this is fair as well.
I do agree that e.g. vanishing chats with a short timeout/"view only once" images should probably not be included in backups, though; last time I checked, I think they were.
> Yes, but importantly not by Meta themselves.
Don’t they save backups to Meta? Even if not, they can read whatever’s (unencrypted) on your phone if they really want to.
They currently go on iCloud on iOS and Google Drive on Android. There are rumors about a first-party backup service, which would obviously change that calculus, but nothing concrete yet.
I've read that if you give FB/IG/WA access to all files/photos, and you have GPS metadata for photos (I do, hey it's useful to know where I took a pic), it can trawl that data to see where you've been and when...
So now Android strips location info when sharing an image to an app. A filter layer between filesystem and app, to add complexity to the whole system...
WhatsApp / Meta is also on both sides of the E2EE.
Sure, but so is every security researcher in the world if they want to be, and they only need to get caught shipping exfiltration logic once.
> so is every security researcher in the world if they want to be
Most security researchers lack Meta's history:
- Testing emotional manipulation features on thousands of users non-consensually
- Adding spyware on underage users
- Intercept a rival app's traffic
- Allowing harm to teen mental health
And most importantly, most security researchers lack the money and power to fend off the legal consequences of these acts.
> Most security researchers lack Meta's history: [...]
Why would you assume that security researchers don't know about these? If anything, wouldn't all the bad press and scandals make WhatsApp a more likely target of scrutiny?
> And most importantly, most security researchers lack the money and power to fend off the legal consequences of these acts.
Yes, security research is generally expensive, but do you have any evidence for Meta taking legal steps against it and making it actively harder? I remember e.g. the controversy around WhatsApp re-encrypting unconfirmed outbound messages to a new key; this was revealed by security researchers and widely discussed. (Not that they're making it easier by providing source code for WhatsApp's cryptography or a debug interface to validate what's actually going on in the client, but neither does e.g. iMessage.)
In fact, there's a relatively absurd lawsuit against Meta on WhatsApp encryption going on right now, and these claims are widely being repeated all over social media.
I meant to say that most researchers have engaged in the unethical actions that Meta has.
It's not that Meta is making it harder to report them but the fact that reporting them does not meaningfully disincentivise Meta from carrying on with their unethical behaviour (i.e. it is not an effective deterrent).
Being unethical is, for better or worse, not automatically illegal. Saying that your product provides end-to-end encryption and you can't access message content and then intentionally shipping a backdoor (for your own benefit and not, say, that of a government that compels you to do this) would very likely be.
someone's questioning that claim legally: https://www.pcmag.com/news/lawsuit-alleges-that-whatsapp-has...
And has a verdict been reached? Otherwise, people are pursuing all kinds of outlandish claims legally.
I work there. The claims made in this article are just blatantly false, and so obviously so to any employee I'm not sure how this hasn't been thrown out.
I agree, it should be rediculously easy to demo it's real e2e capabilities. to everyones benefit