We found deSEC to be the only affordable DNS supplier in the EU that complies with state of the art secure DNSSEC. Highly recommended.
We found deSEC to be the only affordable DNS supplier in the EU that complies with state of the art secure DNSSEC. Highly recommended.
> We found deSEC to be the only affordable DNS supplier in the EU that complies with state of the art secure DNSSEC.
I mean, if your definition of "affordable" is free, then sure.
But for the record there are other affordable EU suppliers who do DNSSEC:
[0] https://bunny.net/dns/ [1] https://www.rcodezero.at/solutions/enterprise [2] https://www.netnod.se/dns/find-a-partnerI happen to run an affordable EU supplier who does DNSSEC, and also AXFR (incoming and outgoing). I offer a free plan from time to time, but not at the moment to preserve resources for paying customer.
https://www.ptrdns.net/
Are you aware that the child zone A(AAAA) records for danube.ns.ptrdns.net differs from the parent zone A(AAA) glue records for danube.ns.ptrdns.net?
Looks like it's the glue records that point to the actual server?
We have a support ticket at Bunny that has been open for months precisely because they don’t provide state-of-the-art DNSSEC. We had to move to another provider, as we have a deadline to comply with at the end of this month. I don’t know what the issue is off the top of my head.
Netnod.se uses a DNSKEY that is too small on their main domain.
Rcodezero.at might indeed be something. Thanks.
We donate to deSEC, so it’s not free for us.
> Netnod.se uses a DNSKEY that is too small on their main domain.
Interesting, could you expand on that ?
I ran netnod.se through the Verisign[1] and internet.nl[2] and it passes DNSSEC tests ?
[1] https://dnssec-analyzer.verisignlabs.com/netnod.se [2] https://internet.nl/site/netnod.se
Sure: zonemaster[1] is the tool we use [2]. It checks for keylengths and other things and allows policies to be defined on them. It comes with a fairly well defined / modern policy but in our Dutch .foundation article you can read that one should be a bit stricter. However, the default policy of zonemaster warns about the keylength of netnod.se [3]
Internet.nl does not look at DNSSEC that extensively, allowing poorer quality configurations to pass. You can see what they check in the explanations of both DNSSEC metrics [4]. See [5] for discussions about keylength.
Verisign does check for key validity but not for key strength / length as seen in your link.
[1] https://zonemaster.se [2] https://internetcleanup.foundation/2026/04/bijgewerkte-dnsse... [3] https://zonemaster.se/en/result/cf3ef2fc83f27eb6/ [4] https://internet.nl/site/internet.nl/4280424/#control-panel-... [5] https://github.com/internetstandards/Internet.nl/issues/1176
One who doesn't is frustratingly Hetzner.
DNSSEC support is an anti-feature, it is dead/dying and the faster we can unburden ourselves from it the faster we can move on to better solutions.
https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/
Rebuttal: <https://easydns.com/blog/2015/08/06/for-dnssec/>
That rebuttal held water 10 years ago, but fortunately we have made a lot of advancements since then.
DNSSEC was a solution trying to solve the problem of DNS security while still maintaining transparency for DNS operators to spy on queries. At the time, passive DNS was one of the tent poles of tracking malware and responding to security incidents.
We have since committed entirely to transport security in the form of DoH and friends. It solves the vast majority of problems we actually have.
Such as? And do those solve the same thing? The post lists 8 headlines why it should be abolished.
So DNS should be open to MITM attackers?
Even with DNSSEC, it still is. Example: https://blog.cloudflare.com/de-tld-outage-dnssec/
Did you read the article? It's saying that DNSSEC as an implementation to prevent MITM is flawed; other solutions that protect against MITM are proposed.