I commented it last time the post about Claude watermarking went viral and I'm going to say the same thing again:

"I've been working in the media and model IP space for quite many years. What this article misses a bit is the threat model for watermarking in general. Watermarking and fingerprinting have inherently weak security guarantees -- they rely a lot on security through obscurity, weak assumed adversaries to deliver. There are clear trade offs between true positives, false positives and maintaining the quality of the media. It's true for audio-visual media, models and their outputs alike. As much as I like to take shots at poor technical choices by corps and govs, this one is unjustified. Sure, inserting glyphs is bad but biased sampling is as good as it gets in 2026."

Since the announcement, there have been many people who don't seem to fully understand what a security guarantee is, what trade offs it might involve, or how popular the type of technological solution is in general (media watermarking is ubiquitous).

And naturally, there are challenges with how you will make sense of the score in your org, e.g. you wrote an email, and it's flagged as LLM-generated because you copied two generated/edited paragraphs.

Yeah, the article might disagree with watermarking as a matter of principle, comparing it to censorship. But the methodological arguments that I have read so far have been thin in these articles.