It's open-source, so just build it yourself with the tiny change. Something this trivial could be done with a 30 second prompt at this point, so there's not even an excuse of "too much effort".
I will note that the XKCD password scheme being proposed there is, in fact, completely insecure. A modern consumer GPU can crack "four random English words" in a day. You can argue that it's the user's choice to be allowed to use insecure passwords, but arguing that that scheme is actually secure is just wrong.
> A modern consumer GPU can crack "four random English words" in a day. [...] but arguing that that scheme is actually secure is just wrong.
Let me do just that!
This is a networked service. You send your password (or a hashed form) to it, and it validates it. You don't have the local hash to bruteforce it offline.
Even if we only consider the top 10k english words, it's 10000^4. It's going to take years to bruteforce this over a network because you'll go through so many rate-limits, cooldown periods, and outright bans that it's questionable whether it's even possible.
Virtually any password other than "password123" is fine if you're rate limited to a few guesses per day by a networked service. Passwords should be secure against the inevitable data breach when the service you're using loses their hashed password database, which happens on a routine basis.
> This is a networked service. You send your password (or a hashed form) to it
Hopefully neither. But given everybody involved in VNC seems to be the same batch of clueless morons who built all those PHP web forums twenty years ago with MD5 as the password hash, who knows what they cobbled together. Maybe an expert can chime in about what actually happens here?
The "joy of the XKCD technique" is that it prescribes a specific format millions of people will use, and it's so trivial to break that you can throw in similar variations of it into your cracking algorithm at virtually no cost.
If you were willing to use a bespoke, more secure variation of it, you could include a capital letter and a number rather than filing an issue on a repo insisting that you be allowed to use exactly the insecure variation.
I think you are both greatly overestimating the number of people who remember what xkcd is and their willingness to do what a webcomic prescribes uncritically. What you describe as "bespoke" is likely the normal way someone might use it: with their chosen format.
For instance, I have multiple separator characters, multiple beginning and end characters, and numbers places at specific places, and arbitrary casing. That may be overkill but it's still essentially the xkcd format.
> I think you are both greatly overestimating the number of people who remember what xkcd is and their willingness to do what a webcomic prescribes uncritically
XKCD's youtube videos get millions of views each. It is a very popular comic, and that particular password advice has spread beyond it.
> What you describe as "bespoke" is likely the normal way someone might use it.
And yet the issue in question is about someone who refuses to adapt it.
The user in question might have their own personal format that doesn't meet the RustDesk constraints. E.g. they may not use capitals, but use `word1$word2&word3@word4`.
Tayloring your format to the requirements of each site is a step towards defeating the utility of the system; now the user needs to remember some arbitrary hard-to-remember details for each password.
Although having a standard format for your passphrases across sites removes some of the advantages over just using the exact xkdc format (when one of your passwords is compromised and attackers can guess your custom format elsewhere now)...
It's open-source, so just build it yourself with the tiny change. Something this trivial could be done with a 30 second prompt at this point, so there's not even an excuse of "too much effort".
I will note that the XKCD password scheme being proposed there is, in fact, completely insecure. A modern consumer GPU can crack "four random English words" in a day. You can argue that it's the user's choice to be allowed to use insecure passwords, but arguing that that scheme is actually secure is just wrong.
> A modern consumer GPU can crack "four random English words" in a day. [...] but arguing that that scheme is actually secure is just wrong.
Let me do just that!
This is a networked service. You send your password (or a hashed form) to it, and it validates it. You don't have the local hash to bruteforce it offline.
Even if we only consider the top 10k english words, it's 10000^4. It's going to take years to bruteforce this over a network because you'll go through so many rate-limits, cooldown periods, and outright bans that it's questionable whether it's even possible.
Virtually any password other than "password123" is fine if you're rate limited to a few guesses per day by a networked service. Passwords should be secure against the inevitable data breach when the service you're using loses their hashed password database, which happens on a routine basis.
Seems like the only real issue here is that rustdesk uses SHA256 instead of argon2.
> This is a networked service. You send your password (or a hashed form) to it
Hopefully neither. But given everybody involved in VNC seems to be the same batch of clueless morons who built all those PHP web forums twenty years ago with MD5 as the password hash, who knows what they cobbled together. Maybe an expert can chime in about what actually happens here?
Yes, for a sensible scheme this can't work.
> A modern consumer GPU can crack "four random English words" in a day.
Sure, if you can rely on users using a specific format. The joy of the xkcd technique is you don't need to tell other people what yours is.
But, people just aren't going to remember strings of gibberish. Expecting users to do this is just silly.
The "joy of the XKCD technique" is that it prescribes a specific format millions of people will use, and it's so trivial to break that you can throw in similar variations of it into your cracking algorithm at virtually no cost.
If you were willing to use a bespoke, more secure variation of it, you could include a capital letter and a number rather than filing an issue on a repo insisting that you be allowed to use exactly the insecure variation.
I think you are both greatly overestimating the number of people who remember what xkcd is and their willingness to do what a webcomic prescribes uncritically. What you describe as "bespoke" is likely the normal way someone might use it: with their chosen format.
For instance, I have multiple separator characters, multiple beginning and end characters, and numbers places at specific places, and arbitrary casing. That may be overkill but it's still essentially the xkcd format.
> I think you are both greatly overestimating the number of people who remember what xkcd is and their willingness to do what a webcomic prescribes uncritically
XKCD's youtube videos get millions of views each. It is a very popular comic, and that particular password advice has spread beyond it.
> What you describe as "bespoke" is likely the normal way someone might use it.
And yet the issue in question is about someone who refuses to adapt it.
The user in question might have their own personal format that doesn't meet the RustDesk constraints. E.g. they may not use capitals, but use `word1$word2&word3@word4`.
Tayloring your format to the requirements of each site is a step towards defeating the utility of the system; now the user needs to remember some arbitrary hard-to-remember details for each password.
Although having a standard format for your passphrases across sites removes some of the advantages over just using the exact xkdc format (when one of your passwords is compromised and attackers can guess your custom format elsewhere now)...
This is a non-issue with a password manager
> And yet the issue in question is about someone who refuses to adapt it.
Does this person exist?