Circumventing encryption with client side scanning is on par with requiring encryption backdoors, and goes against the purpose of having end to end encryption.
Banks are probably the most Orwellian surveillance apparatus of all. Almost every time I read an arrest warrant there is a whole section where banking records are used to damn someone. The equivalent level of banking privacy to graphene is roughly walking in to the teller to withdraw a few thousand cash once a month and then paying literally everything with that (or an anonymized crypto).
Circumventing encryption with client side scanning is on par with requiring encryption backdoors, and goes against the purpose of having end to end encryption.
> on par with requiring encryption backdoors
There is no back door if nothing leaves your device
> goes against the purpose of having end to end encryption
Most people would consider the "purpose" is to avoid 3rd parties listening in
If nothing leaves the device so why to scan it at all? This is what proves your statement about compatibility of scanning and e2ee to be wrong.
Owning your device (instead of the manufacturer, a set of unlisted governments, big software corporations, etc.) means no scanning.
It also means no banking app will work
Banks are probably the most Orwellian surveillance apparatus of all. Almost every time I read an arrest warrant there is a whole section where banking records are used to damn someone. The equivalent level of banking privacy to graphene is roughly walking in to the teller to withdraw a few thousand cash once a month and then paying literally everything with that (or an anonymized crypto).
I don't think you understand banking
https://www.ncontracts.com/nsight-blog/risk-management-strat...