https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sound_Dues
I think this is a fun historical example. Ships passing through Denmark needed to pay a tax of 1-2% of the value of their cargo. They self-assessed that value.
The twist that makes it interesting was that the King could choose to purchase any cargo immediately at the reported value. If a ship underreported, they might save on tax, but they risked taking a hefty loss.
I have no idea how effective this was, but it's compelling. I wonder whether great self-regulation might need clever design like that example.
That's literally the opposite of self-regulation.
Not quite the opposite, it still outsourced the administrative burden. They avoided the hassle of boarding every ship and inspecting the cargo with a random threat. One could even call it "properly incentivized self-regulation".
Amateur motorsports has a similar concept - often called a "claim rule" or similar - in an attempt to control costs.
Basically, for $x amount, a competitor can buy the winning car (or its engine, or similar). Where $x is the amount the group decides should be a reasonable amount to spend on building a car.
A racer is free to spend more, but if they win too much, somebody will write a check and buy the car.
In theory. In reality, plenty of people have the money to spend $x^2 and risk the loss.
Interesting variation on the "I cut you choose" game mechanic!
We're in the "exceptio probat regulam" zone with this example.
Nitpicking, I have the feeling that's self-declaration, not self-regulation.
I love solutions like that. Like if you are splitting food, one person cuts and the other chooses.
sounds like Bernie Sander's modern day "lets just buy 50% of AI companies"