> NAT is not a firewall,
I've only read that on HN, I've never heard this anywhere else. Since it's been a good 20+ years since my CCNA (and haven't needed to renew it since), could you please offer a real-world example where NAT is not a firewall w/ practical examples relating to 99.9% of cases of home use? I just can't get why people say this a lot here.
NAT works and passes the grandma test. If grandma buys a crappy vulnerable 40$ printer and plugs it in, even if it accepts unauthenticated stuff on every local port, you will not be able to connect to it behind NAT. So what's the difference? The only way I could think this can apply is if the ISP is compromised or criminally mismanaged, in which case you probably already have bigger problems.
> I've only read that on HN, I've never heard this anywhere else.
Well-regarded networking architect, author, and instructor:
* https://blog.ipspace.net/2011/12/is-nat-security-feature/
> NAT works and passes the grandma test.
So does my Asus with a default deny IPv6 rule on incoming connections.
You're more likely to click on a link that installs malware that attacks your network from the inside, and that attack works regardless of IPv4 or IPv6.
Treating a firewall as some impenetrable moat has not been network security practice for a decade(+), and waving around RFC 1918 address space like systems with a 10.8 or 192.168/16 can't get infected is lazy thinking. It leads to complacency: I'm behind NAT, I'm safe.
Grandma’s ISP can send RFC 1918 traffic to her router and likely be able to directly connect to every internal host. You should have learned in your CCNA training that NAT makes it harder to send inbound traffic to a system, but doesn’t by itself provide the filtering that a firewall does.
Right, I get that. I can see the ISP angle. But my question was specifically for outside attacks. Tangible, real-world threats in existing ISPs, reachable from the outside.
NAT was not designed as a security boundary. Sure, it may block some kinds of incoming traffic accidentally and as a side-effect disrupt some attacks.
But why would you rather have an always-broken network that might block attackers instead of a deliberate "deny incoming" rule that does exactly what you want -- and that you can punch holes in if desired?
Instead we have apps circumventing this accidental barrier with STUN, uPNP, etc with little/no oversight and we also regularly encounter brokenness.