It suppose I can see "executive power should be part of the executive branch" as a facile argument because it does seem basic and a bit tautological, but it is still quite a strong point. It needs to be addressed rather than just identified and dismissed.
It is, and I've admitted as much in a subsequent response (<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48517524>). It was however poorly articulated and muddied by some irrelevant distractions.
I'm working on a top-level comment on that point as I write this, given that this particular subthread is dead and thus invisible to most visitors to HN. My response highlights what seem to me salient points about other instances of violation of separation of powers, and of the history of the copyright office.
I suppose in that case you are wholly opposed to the regulatory system as legislative power should be part of the legislative branch?
Even people who believe the administrative state is constitutional rest that conclusion on the premise that "rulemaking" is merely the formalization of the exercise of enforcement discretion. But that means that rulemaking must be performed by the executive branch, because that is the branch charged with enforcement of the law.
DMCA rulemaking is actually an example of something that would probably be constitutional if the executive did it--even if administrative agencies in general are unconstitutional. The DMCA creates civil and criminal penalties, and calls for rulemaking to define exceptions to those penalties. Defining exceptions to civil and criminal liability falls squarely within executive enforcement discretion.
I don’t think it does. Discretion is fundamentally case by case. Drawing categorical lines is legislative.
It’s akin to the distinction between law and equity courts at common law.
Stepping back, both doctrines (non delegation, unitary executive) are fundamentally about the courts overstepping. If both houses of Congress pass a law creating an agency with a director that can only be fired for cause and the president signs it, the Supreme Court should stay out of it.
Enacting legislation is very difficult, the presumption of constitutionality should be taken more seriously.
> Drawing categorical lines is legislative.
That’s even worse. If that’s the case, Congress must adopt those exemptions by law. It can’t delegate lawmaking powers to its employees.
> Stepping back, both doctrines (non delegation, unitary executive) are fundamentally about the courts overstepping
Unless you toss out the concept of judicial review altogether, policing the structural rules of the constitution is exactly what the courts should be doing. The courts have no say about the merits of Congressional acts. But they should review whether Congress has allocated powers to various entities in a way that’s consistent with separation of powers.
That’s too high a level of generality. Sure police situations where the branches are at direct loggerheads.
But in this case we have a law passed by congress and signed by the president. There’s no need to step in, the ordinary political processes are more than sufficient. If the new President and congress doesn’t like what the last ones did they have the exact same tools at their disposal to undo it.
Let them play!
Well, probably in theory. I don't rate that on my top 50 issues I care about and haven't given the idea much thought. But having the legislative branch be responsible for the regulatory system does sound proper.
The US executive branch has very limited decision making bandwidth and it should really be reserved for matters of war and peace.
Except that's a bad summary of a bad argument. "Rulemaking" is what Congress is supposed to do.
The Constitution doesn't say that Congress can have its employees (which is what the Copyright Office is) make legally binding rules. Congress can make laws, but only through a specific process involving votes in the House and Senate and the signature of the President.
As much as I'm inclined to disagree with your views on principle, that is actually a cogent and relevant point.
Your initial comment would have been far stronger if it had dropped the irrelevant ad hom I called out previously, and had clearly stated your concern with Congress both legislating and regulating copyright, through the Library of Congress.
This also makes the question of how the Library of Congress came to be empowered with executing and* regulating copyright of interest. You've failed to explore this history. I'm somewhat familiar with both copyright law and the history of the Library, though not as a lawyer, and not specifically on the history of copyright and the Library both being effectively an executive function of the Legislative.
That also makes me wonder what other cross-branch functional contradictions exist. One that comes to mind immediately are ALJs (administrative law judges), which operate under the Executive rather than Judiciary, with one notable area being immigration law. The Senate and House each have Seargents of Arms, a nominally executive law-enforcement role under the legislative.
And of course there's the question of the present Administration's view that not only is it a unitary executive, but apparently a unitary Legislative and Judiciary as well.