I mean what's the big deal? I use --dangeorusly-skip-permissions on every single interaction in the last 6 months. Worst case it deletes my files that are all on git? It fucks up my local DB? Cool.
I save way more time not babying it than the occasional fuck up I have to salvage.
Worst case it gets access to gmail. And Github. And the Internet. I'm increasingly appreciating the importance of a physical finger-press on Yubikey to trigger the FIDO2 + OIDC Auth. I don't think there is an easy way for it to hack a new session.
How is it going to get access to gmail or github? In any case, whats the probability of it going to so completely off the rails that it does something horrendous with gmail/github? Whats it going to do? Email my coworkers nudes on my computer? Make my github profile public?
I am most worried about something gaining access to my email and then using the password reset flow to steal hundred hundreds of other accounts.
2FA makes me a little less nervous than I used to be, but not everything has good 2FA.
Claude typically recommends .env files for storing secrets. You use one to store a refresh token for the Gmail API or IMAP connection details. Your agent uses an MCP server you configured during a session, but the MCP server has been compromised and directs the agent to do nasty stuff with env dotfiles.
> How is it going to get access to gmail or github?
Did you even read the article? Claude was opening he browser and iterating through the tabs.
I presume you are logged in to your github account? Your gmail?
> Whats it going to do? Email my coworkers nudes on my computer? Make my github profile public?
Reset access to services using your email? MITM your 2FA?
Or perhaps you have 1Password/Bitwarden running with a generous unlock policy?
> Did you even read the article? Claude was opening he browser and iterating through the tabs.
It would have been somewhat ironic if it had been hit by a prompt injection attack via one of all those open random websites ...
This is one of the things I found so interesting: it was using my system browsers but it wasn't exposing itself to any content from them.
Even when it iterated through all visible windows to find the one it wanted to screenshot it was searching for titles in Python code and returning only the integer window ID.
The sites it opened and screenshotted were sites under its own control - either test pages it had created or development servers it was running.
When it did run code that analyzed an open web page (by injecting JavaScript into a template it controlled before loading that in a browser window) that code only returned JSON with measurements from the page.
It's making me wonder if Fable has been trained to take additional steps to avoid accidental exposure to untrusted content.
It should run as a separate user account with its own home directory. Not with access to your personal browser profile.
What does setting this up look like? Qemu vm and run there? How do you interface with version control and deployment?
What happens if it gets manipulated into npm installing a malicious package, which compromises your machine and any systems it has access to or becomes part of a botnet?