Major os vendors will publish pages with the fixed versions:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-31431
Also, disabling algif_aead is suggested as mitigation
Major os vendors will publish pages with the fixed versions:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-31431
Also, disabling algif_aead is suggested as mitigation
Where are you seeing the disabling algif_aead mitigation?
In TFA: https://copy.fail/#mitigation
> Before you can patch: disable the algif_aead module.
> echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf
> rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true
Edit: and I can confirm that on my system with kernel 6.19.8 the above fixes the exploit.
Weirdly, the mitigation does not seem to work under WSL2 (at least in Ubuntu 24.04).
`modprobe algif_aead` errors out, but if I run the POC, it succeeds.Outside of WSL2, the mitigation does appear to work though.
It's possible that the WSL kernel has that code compiled-in rather than as a loadable module. If they ship the kernel config somewhere, you could verify with
It should show =m if it's a loadable module, and =y if it's compiled in.It's a loadable module:
Using bpftrace to watch calls to module_request, openat, etc., it looks like when the kernel calls modprobe, it doesn't even look at the disable-algif.conf file: Restart WSL2, run the bpftrace, and try `sudo modprobe algif-aead`, and that shows it looking at (or I guess opening) other files in /etc/modprobe.d, including the new one.The mystery is why.
In wsl, each distro you have runs in a container (with lot of permissions), you'd need to apply the modprobe change inside wsl "hypervisor" rootfs