Do you think that human directing the agent owns copyright for any legal reason?
The case Community for Creative Non Violence Vs Reid (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_for_Creative_Non-Vio...) solidifies a supreme court opinion that someone contracting a work and directing an author does not grant authorship to the commissioner of the work, it grants authorship to the person actually doing the work.
The author can grant authorship and copyright to the commissioner with a contract, but the monkey picture (and others) have solidified that only humans can be granted copyright. Since LLMs aren't human they can't hold copyright, and if the LLM doesn't have legal copyright then they don't have legal rights to assign copyright to you.
It depends on what level of creative control you had over the code.
Code is protected by copyright as a literary work. The method is not protected by copyright, that would be the domain of patents. What's protected are the words.
If you say "Claude, build me a website about X" then you do not have any creative control over the literary work Claude is producing. You just told a machine to write it for you. Nor, like a compiler, is it derivative of any other work that you wrote.
If, on the other hand, you are working jointly with Claude to make specific changes to the code on a line-by-line basis, then you will have no problem claiming copyright over the code. Claude in this case is acting as a tool, but there's still a human making decisions about the code.
In the case where you wrote a bunch of markdown and then told Claude to generate the corresponding code but didn't have any involvement in writing the code itself, you could perhaps claim that the code is a derivative work of the markdown, a court would have to handle that case-by-case basis and evaluate how much control you exerted over the work.
> only humans can be granted copyright.
No, a copyright application can be filed with a corporation listed as the author. Watch for the copyright notice at the end of the next major movie you see.
However, until very recently the creative product must have been created by someone so there is an implicitly created copyright over the product in the first place. With AI output, that might not continue to be true, we don't really know how it'll work out yet.
In any case, the corporation did not create the product, people created it and their contractual relationship with the corporation defined how the ownership of that work was managed. So, I don't find it too unusual that this element of personhood is available to corporations.
Interesting, though, that ownership of the code can still be transferred to the employer. So it's in the public domain (because not human authored) but owned by the employer (because the human and/or LLM was employed by the employer)? I don't really understand how this works.
Copyright works on derivative rules - is the component of the work unmistakenly derived from another copyrighted work.
Under at least EU AI Act, any work done by AI is not granted copyright. But it does not mean copyright does not apply, it means the amount of work credited to AI is set at 0% (simplification). A human working off another's work unless it's perfect copy will have "credit" for changes that are judged creative/transformative, meaning a human plagiarizing something still can claim to have some degree of authorship. An AI won't.
In a sense, the copyright status of final work is a sort of "sum with dilution" were each work involved adds to claims, but AI's output is set at 0 - the prompt or further rework by human is not.
As for employer, details vary but generally "work for hire" rules and contracts do reassignment of material rights (in EU and some other places you can not reassign moral rights which are a different thing).
Note: IANAL
I think what this means is that the employee may not be the copyright owner for multiple reasons, which are possibly applicable simultaneously. It does not imply that the employer owns copyright over the work that is in public domain, which would be a contradiction.