I was having a discussion closely related to this recently because of my background in philosophy of language. Languages are functional, but not rigid. The rules and referents of "blue" become kind of pointless around the edges, and narrow words like cyan or turquoise -- even words borrowed from other languages -- are more functional. This is exaggerated further when the functionality becomes very important, which is where technical jargon starts to come into play. Languages should useful to the speaker; they do not define the constraints of the speaker. "Blue" is useful for the average English speaker, but completely useless for a graphic designer.
Philosophically speaking, does each of us experience "520 nm green" the same way?
Is my "520 nm green" actually your "635 nm red"? And vice versa?
Are all of our color embeddings different despite the same g-protein coupled biochemical activation?
My left and right eyes are shifted +cyan and +magenta respectively, so, no, definitely not — but hooray for the resulting semi-tetrachromacy :D
For different brains, the answer has to be no because the images you see are a "neural net" construction and if that neural net differs then the "image" you see is different
this is actually a surprisingly rich area of debate in philosophy of mind. see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/
Consciousness and qualia are a mystery.
I would assume we don’t, simply because nerves are reproduced biologically, but I’m not a neuroscientist.
define "experience the same way"
There's a philosophical school of thought (which I share) that there's no coherent definition.
>the same g-protein coupled b
If my "g-protein" actually your "g-protein"? Is my visual cortex firmware your visual cortex firmware?
> If my "g-protein" actually your "g-protein"? Is my visual cortex firmware your visual cortex firmware?
That path leads down to solipsism which is not very intersting