> Web browser is a sandbox by default.
So I take this is a security concern. How do you feel about the fact that when you open a webapp in your browser, you re-download that app code every time? That the server can send you a backdoor every single time, made just for you, and nobody else will ever know? And that you can't check the "hash" of the webapp, like you can with an app?
On the other hand, an app is sandboxed, too (on mobile OSes like Android and iOS). When you download it, you can check a hash that you can (if you want to) compare with a friend to see if they got the same app. With an app, there is intermediary (the "app store") that would need to collude with the developers to send a backdoor just for you, and even then you would still have the app binary as proof.
That's always a question I have with "secure" web services: if you use ProtonMail, you trust that Proton doesn't send you a web page that leaks your key. But if you trust Proton for that, what's the point of the end-to-end encryption? When you use the Signal app, the whole idea is that you don't have to trust Signal for the end-to-end encryption, at all.
Apps can download code too, and often do
Well the idea is that the client should be open source, and audited.
If you run a proprietary app, you have to blindly trust it (just like if you access a webapp).
In terms of security, the best is an open source app, IMO.
> And that you can't check the "hash" of the webapp, like you can with an app?
Can someone reading this make an addon for this?
Meta and Cloudflare did something like that for WhatsApp Web, there is a nice blog post about it here: https://blog.cloudflare.com/key-transparency/
Now it only ensures that Cloudflare doesn't tamper with the WhatsApp Web code they serve, you still have to trust Meta.
I feel like reaching the same level as "checking the hash for the app" would be very hard in practice. I.e. the web is not built around doing that. Your extension would have to scan all the files you download when you reach a page, somehow make a hash of it, somehow compare it to... something, but then make the difference between "tampered with" and "just a normal update".
Also you just can't "download the sources, audit them and compile them yourself" with a webapp. If you do that, it's just "an app built with web tech", like Electron, I guess?
>That the server can send you a backdoor every single time, made just for you, and nobody else will ever know?
There is no "backdoor" when the browser is sandboxed. "backdoor" is a specific thing, I think you need to read up on it before you keep using it incorrectly:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)
>On the other hand, an app is sandboxed, too (on mobile OSes like Android and iOS). When you download it, you can check a hash that you can (if you want to) compare with a friend to see if they got the same app.
That isn't what "sandboxed" means, it has nothing to do with checking hashes. And no, mobile apps are not really sandboxed, they have full access to your mobile device once you install it and give it access - and let's be real, most people are just going to blindly click "allow" for anything the app requests after installing an app.
>With an app, there is intermediary (the "app store") that would need to collude with the developers to send a backdoor just for you, and even then you would still have the app binary as proof.
You keep referring to "backdoor", and I don't think you really know what that means.
>That's always a question I have with "secure" web services: if you use ProtonMail, you trust that Proton doesn't send you a web page that leaks your key. But if you trust Proton for that, what's the point of the end-to-end encryption? When you use the Signal app, the whole idea is that you don't have to trust Signal for the end-to-end encryption, at all.
That isn't how any of this works. The main value proposition of Signal is that we do trust its end-to-end encryption. Protonmail sending a "web page" that "leaks your key"? WTF?
It's obvious what GP meant - we can verify that the apps we download are the apps everyone else downloads.
We can't do this with Proton where our mail is supposedly end-to-end encrypted. They can easily view our mail if they can send us a different code when we load their site.
> That isn't what "sandboxed" means, it has nothing to do with checking hashes. And no, mobile apps are not really sandboxed
Apps ARE somewhat sandboxes and GP didn't mean than sandboxing == checking hashes. It was 2 sentences appearing one after the other.
You cannot. An app can update just like a browser tab. In fact, a very many apps are just frickin' webviews.
Well, you can verify that the code that you downloaded is the same that everyone else downloaded. Even if it contains webviews.
Now if it contains webviews, it brings the security issue of... the webapps, of course.
Personally, I want an open source app. You can audit an open source app and even compile it yourself. You can't really do that with a website. And I don't mean just mobile apps, that applies to desktop apps, too. I wouldn't run a web-based terminal, for instance (do people actually do that?).
AlBugdy and the person you are replying to are literally right re: server delivered backdoors. Using E2EE applications in a browser moves the trust back from the client to the server.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47664103
> That isn't how any of this works. The main value proposition of Signal is that we do trust its end-to-end encryption. Protonmail sending a "web page" that "leaks your key"? WTF?
Yes and it's that you also trust the client, with a server that dynamically delivers code you have no way of knowing fully what payload it's sending you. An example of this vulnerability was discussed when it was pointed out that 1P, Bitwarden and others were susceptible to server side backdoors if used from the web in that research study that came out last month that was posted here.
> And no, mobile apps are not really sandboxed, they have full access to your mobile device once you install it and give it access - and let's be real, most people are just going to blindly click "allow" for anything the app requests after installing an app.
This is genuinely just not true, even if you click allow for all permissions on Android and iOS. An application on a non-rooted device doesn't have "full access."
Dude, I was here to talk about security, not to be judged on the quality of my English. What I get from your take is that your English is better than mine, but not your security knowledge.
> That isn't what "sandboxed" means, it has nothing to do with checking hashes.
I didn't say it had anything to do with it. I meant that NOT ONLY it is sandboxed, but ON TOP OF THAT you can check that you received the same code.
> You keep referring to "backdoor", and I don't think you really know what that means.
The only explanation I see for you not understanding what I mean by "backdoor" for the end-to-end encryption is that you have no idea how it works. If you're just being condescending about my language, go for it. Tell me I can't speak your language. But don't tell me I don't understand security, you have absolutely no idea what I know.
> Protonmail sending a "web page" that "leaks your key"? WTF?
You obviously don't understand how it works if this surprises you. I would gladly elaborate with anyone who is not a jerk, but that does not seem to be the case here.