They thought after V8 the performance was going keep improving and reach native speeds, they didn’t understand that the major performance wins were all upfront and it would hit a wall.

> It's very amusing to see Sinofsky of all people all but dumping on .NET and (still?!) not understanding why developers so proactively jumped ship from Win32 & MFC hell to WinForms. Or why the HTML/JS app model in Win8 never really took off.

At the risk of getting my Microsoft history wrong, I'm fairly sure that Steven Sinofsky wasn't working on Windows or even MFC (i.e. what he did as one of you guys) in .NET's early days of 1999-2003. He was leading Office at that time. Office of that era was transitioning from the Windows XP look that still persists in Windows Forms to the early Ribbon, and was then (as now?) using very custom GUI code that didn't correspond to any specific higher-level Windows app framework.

Mac OS Office apps had just separated their codebase again from Windows apps after being unified in the mid-90s to get to feature parity (which annoyed Mac users who felt they now had non-native-feeling apps that were slow and bloated), and the "Office framework" was still quite distinct from any single-platform Windows app as a result of that.

So if Sinofsky did not understand why people went from USER/GDI to WinForms, that may just have been the fact that nobody working for him had felt the need to make that transition.

> What actually happened [re Windows RT, but I think the point applies to UWP in general] was that the users went WTF because none of their native apps - which, contrary to his take, were very much alive and kicking! - worked there, and devs went WTF because they were told that they'd need to rewrite everything yet again in some new thing that was kinda sorta but not quite like WPF, because Windows just hated .NET that much and couldn't accept that the devs liked it over their stuff. So the app store was a barren waste, and without apps there would be no users.

The fact that UWP XAML was its own new thing and not a extension of an existing Microsoft GUI app framework like WPF was not necessarily a "we hate managed code" thing, or even a "we hate those guys who invented managed code and want to screw them because we're Windows" thing. After all, .NET managed code had equal access to UWP through the .NET WinRT projection!

And to me at least (I didn't work on UI-facing stuff in Win8), it was absolutely conceivable that UWP could have just delivered Windows Phone 7 Silverlight's version of XAML to native code apps, with a thin adaptation layer to let even unmodified WP7 app binaries run on the desktop Windows .NET Framework with the WinRT projection and to allow slightly modified WP7 apps to look good in landscape mode on both Windows 8 and WP8. If we had done that instead of making UWP XAML its own thing, and if we had integrated the Windows Store with the Windows Phone Marketplace from the beginning so that Windows and Windows Phone apps could be sold as variants of each other through a single Store/Marketplace product entry on Windows 8 GA day, then I think we could have brought a lot of people forward who were already making good WP7 apps, and the Store wouldn't have been so empty.

Furthermore, IIRC much of the original UWP XAML implementation was done by the original people who built WPF and Silverlight the first time, and they would have known what they were doing in separating UWP XAML from Phone Silverlight. That they didn't go in the direction of extending Phone Silverlight was not necessarily shortsightedness on the part of provincial Windows people. Maybe they thought Phone Silverlight actually demonstrated fundamental limitations of WPF or Silverlight XAML or the Silverlight "coreCLR", or they wanted to make breaking changes as lessons learned from Phone Silverlight, which was put together about as hurriedly. (Windows Mobile 6 -> Windows Phone 7 first previews = 1.5 years; Windows 7 -> Windows 8 first previews = 1.5-2 years, tending toward 1.5 years if you account for the frantic re-planning after iPad came out in early 2010.)

> And then there was Windows RT (not to be confused with WinRT, because Microsoft product naming!). Aka the Windows-on-ARM that ditched decades of backwards compatibility because Sinofsky decided that rebooting the ecosystem is the only way to compete with iPad or whatever.

It's important to remember the specific reasons why Windows RT 8 chose to not support third-party desktop apps. The most important aspect of "iPad compete" that we wanted on Windows for ARM was not "all app UXes look and work well on touchscreen tablets" but "you can't ship malware, not even by rebuilding your x86 malware from source." Thus, every 3rd party app on Windows RT would have to live in the AppContainer sandbox that UWP apps are in by default, and the requirement that you ship through the artist formerly known as the Windows Store would be a second line of defense against malicious apps. And with the forced-enabled Secure Boot, subverting the user-mode controls by secretly installing a bootkit would be hard even with physical access to the PC.

Even within the Microsoft world only, Windows Phone 7 had proven the success of this approach of locked-down apps only available through an app store that checked apps on submission and afterward for security. It was not unreasonable to think that similar lessons might also benefit users of "big" Windows, which is why Windows 10 and 11 have the opt-out "S mode" which defaults to the Windows RT restrictions.

I do wish though that Windows 8 had learned different lessons from WP7 (about which more in another point).

> It was also when Windows was aggressively pushing their Metro styling on everything in the company, sometimes to ridiculous lengths - e.g. Visual Studio at the time "aligned" with Metro by, I kid you not, making the main menu bar ALL UPPER CASE so that it looked like Metro tabs! You can still see the blog posts announcing this "feature" when it shipped in the first public beta of VS 2012, and the comments on them.

fair. but that struck me as strange even then. if anything, visual studio should have adopted the all-lowercase typography of the original metro-style design language from zune and windows phone 7, not AN ALL-UPPERCASE ONE.

Perhaps that was just another way that Windows 8 Metro-style apps' design and developer platform was like Windows Phone 7's Metro style, yet different in seemingly gratuitous ways. That is something I would attribute to internal Microsoft politics. Steven Sinofsky and Terry Myerson (leader of Windows Phone at that time) never really got along, and in the Microsoft philosophy of that era where engineering divisions were completely locked down from each other by default, that rivalry would have discouraged what little natural collaboration would have happened anyway.

> I was in DevDiv during his great WinRT push and the overall feeling I remember was that the guys in Windows had zero clue as to what the devs actually wanted, but were hell bent on scorching all the ground that wasn't theirs. My team actually did some prototyping for Python/WinRT support, and we had it working to the point of the visual WPF designer in Visual Studio even. Unlike JS, it was full fledged - you could use anything in WinRT same as C#, extend classes etc, while JS limited you to a "consumer" surface of the API. That prototype was killed because Windows (i.e. at the time = Sinofsky) said they didn't think developers cared about anything but JS so they didn't need another high level language.

I think the real mistake there was not so much that a particular projection of the Windows Runtime was stopped, but the more general idea that developers should be forced to consume what became known as the Universal Windows Platform or author custom WinRT components through only Microsoft-made WinRT projections.

In the name of winning over new or inexperienced Windows developers with "simpler, safer" projections, we in the Windows division almost completely failed for about 5 years to document or even explicitly say that WinRT was essentially just "COM: The Good Parts, Version 2012". (Martyn Lovell's Build talks on the origin of WinRT were a notable exception to this.) This discouraged people from using their existing COM skills to develop Metro-style/UWP apps or to gradually adopt features from UWP APIs that were accessible to them in their existing desktop apps. Other people have written that "WinRT=COM" thinking is actually a bad idea because it forces people to deal with COM and its more annoying ideas (separate IDL etc.); I disagree because we should have reached out to people who live in COM world to get a ready developer base.

That mistake was a key part of the still larger mistake you touched on of trying to make the UWP and desktop worlds 2 completely different developer platforms that happen to co-exist on the same desktop edition of the Windows OS. That was the key "we didn't listen to developers" mistake that set up UWP for its market failure. Another example: Even today, you can't adopt the battery-friendly UWP app lifecycle using Windows App SDK, which is supposed to be the UWP successor for desktop app developers. So much for WinAppSDK (or indeed UWP/Metro-style apps in Win8) enabling a true no-compromise user experience.

It took real tours-de-force like Kenny Kerr building C++/WinRT and blogging about it, Raymond Chen blogging about using WinRT APIs through the unprojected "ABI" interfaces, or the VideoLAN organization building a Win8/Win10 UWP version of VLC in C, to get the word out that the UWP world wasn't some alien thing with dark magic that only Microsoft wizards had full access to. And it doesn't help that the wizards really do have a few special powers that they jealously guard even now.

The UI part is exactly what I meant. WinForms was a godsend for professional developers making line-of-business apps, because previously if you used first-party dev tooling, you either had to deal with the considerable limitations of Visual Basic, or you had to deal with MFC that was low-level enough that all the things that were tedious about Win32 remained tedious. In comparison, Borland had Delphi, and there was a good reason why it was so popular back in 90s and early 00s, and why Microsoft ultimately acqui-hired its main designer specifically to work on .NET (and it very much shows in the design of both C#, which owes as much to Component Pascal as to Java, and of WinForms, which is so similar to VCL).

With WinForms, we actually got something that was convenient without shackling you. And the whole cross-language story was great, too, especially around .NET 2.0 - with C++/CLI you could very easily wrap any random native code C or C++ library for consumption from .NET, with end-to-end integration in the build system, IDE etc.

> Windows RT had one other anti-consumer and anti-developer feature: it was locked down like a Chromebook, so you could only use Store apps on it.

That was at least in part due to the aforementioned obsession with iPad and generally mobile. One thing that Sinofsky is not wrong about in his post is that the classic Win32 app model is not conductive to good battery life - there's very little there to properly handle things like automatic background suspension or low-power push notifications. WinRT was designed with that in mind, but that would make no difference if the apps would just ignore it, hence the heavy-handed push for WinRT apps only (AFAIR it wasn't restricted to Store, although you had to jump through some "developer mode" hoops to deploy apps directly).

It's that Nadella doesn't really care about Windows, even though the kernel is the root of Azure. In addition, all the newer gui frameworks abandoned RAD interface. That is what made and still does make Winforms and WPF popular.