Epistemically speaking, the existence of God is not axiomatic. Your second claims is more accurate, though not entirely. Knowledge of God's existence is derived from observed features of reality. However, these features are very general and not scientific per se; rather, they are presupposed by empirical science. Examples include the reality of change, causality (especially per se vs. what science is generally concerned with, per accidens), or the existence of things. The denial of these general features would undermine not just the possibility of science, but the very intelligibility of the world. You would hang yourself by your own skepticism.
These are also not axiomatically accepted features either (except perhaps in the sense that they are in relation to the empirical sciences, as science presupposes their existence).
> Examples include the reality of change, causality (especially per se vs. what science is generally concerned with, per accidens), or the existence of things.
How do any of these things allow you to derive knowledge of God's existence?
> Knowledge of God's existence is derived from observed features of reality.
If it were so, God's existence would be just another scientific fact.
Did you read my entire post? I already explained to you why this isn't the case. We known that, for example, change is real through general observation, but it is not something belonging to any empirical science per se. Rather, it is presupposed by each of those sciences.
Of course, the classical definition of "science" is more expansive, including what would be the most general science - metaphysics - so in that sense, yes, you can say the existence of God is a "scientific fact". (God here is self-subsisting being, not some ridiculous "sky fairy" straw man of New Atheist imagination.)
That's a straightforwardly circular argument - creating your own definition, then using it as a proof.
Change is not presupposed by science. Various experiences/models of change are described by science, which is not the same thing at all.
There are block universe interpretations of cosmology which do not require change.
> That's a straightforwardly circular argument - creating your own definition, then using it as a proof.
Which definition? That of "God"? I didn't "create" that definition. It is the archetype of classical theism. It is the product of analysis from which we get the famous distinction between existence and essence. Only in God is there no distinction between existence in essence, as the first cause's essence is "to be".
And besides, when do you not define something before proving it? This isn't circular. I don't see where you are noting circularity. In fact, I didn't prove anything at all. Others have.
> Change is not presupposed by science. Various experiences/models of change are described by science, which is not the same thing at all.
Of course change is presupposed. It isn't explicitly stated, just as the presupposition that the world is intelligible isn't explicitly presupposed, but it is tacitly presupposed by the scientific enterprise itself. Science cannot deny such basic presuppositions without upending itself.
If you can't see that w.r.t. change, then consider some of the other presuppositions, like the fact that things exist.
> There are block universe interpretations of cosmology which do not require change.
So much worse for the block universe! It is as self-refuting to deny the reality of change - the very act of denying it involves change - as it is to claim that it is true that there is no truth, or that it is true that we cannot know the truth.
Scientific models - or more likely their interpretations - are not always faithful to reality as such. They can have observational correspondence without fidelity. Interpretations are where people often read in their bad metaphysical presuppositions into bona fide scientific results, forgetting the distinction. For instance, a Platonic interpretation of mathematics might lead some to think that the world represented by their physical model is actually static and eternal, but even though that is bogus, that physical theory can still function predicatively. Evolution suffers from similar problems, where evolutionism is presented by some as a necessary reading of evolutionary theory.
Yes I did, but the rest of the comment hangs on the initial claim I replied to.
If you redefine God to mean "fundamental assumptions of the universe", its existence becomes tautological. But that is not what most people mean (including the author of the article we're commenting on) when they say "God".
> Yes I did, but the rest of the comment hangs on the initial claim I replied to.
It does not, because the crux of the matter isn't observation as such, but that there is a difference between observing particular events or "special facts" (those the special sciences deal with), which carry with them greater uncertainty and error, and general observations and general facts. It is more certain, not less, that change is a feature of the world, that things exist, and so on, than whether the universe is expanding or whether some species has a mating ritual or whatever.
Otherwise, I have no idea what your point is.
> If you redefine God to mean "fundamental assumptions of the universe", its existence becomes tautological. But that is not what most people mean (including the author of the article we're commenting on) when they say "God".
This is confused.
The first thing one must do is distinguish between the epistemic order and the metaphysical order. That is, the order in which we know things is not the same as the causal order of things known. In fact, it is generally the reverse, because we see the effects of things before we come to know their causes. Thus, while God is metaphysically speaking the first cause, epistemically we begin with everyday general observation and through rational demonstration arrive at what must be the first cause, what must be true of of the first cause, etc, in order for general facts under consideration to hold. (And axioms are, strictly speaking, entities belonging to the epistemic order; in the causal order, you can talk about first cause(s).)
What the author means by "God" is exactly what I wrote - self-subsisting being. I know this because he is a Thomist, and this is the archetypal notion of God of classical theism (unlike views like so-called theistic personalism). It is irrelevant what most people (ostensibly) believe "is God", because we're not interested in taking a vote. We're interested in determining what the ultimate cause of everything is, what must be true of this cause, and so on. "God" is the traditional name for this first cause.