DNSSEC can be trivially used with DANE to protect the entire session. The browser vendors quite consciously decided to NOT do that.
> 2. People actually rely on TLS/HTTPS, and nobody relies on DNSSEC
Sure. But I treat it as a failing of the overall ecosystem rather than just the technical failure of DNSSEC. It's not the _best_ technology, but it's also no worse than many others.
This is the outcome of browser vendors not caring at all about privacy and security. Step back and look at the current TLS infrastructure from the viewpoint of somebody in the 90-s:
You're saying that to provide service for anything over the Web, you have to publish all your DNS names in a globally distributed immutable log that will be preserved for all eternity? And that you can't even have a purely static website anymore because you need to update the TLS cert every 7 days? This is just some crazy talk!
(yes, you technically can get a wildcard cert, but it requires ...drumroll... messing with the DNS)
The amount of just plain brokenness and centralization in TLS is mind-boggling, but we somehow just deal with it without even noticing it anymore. Because browser vendors were able to apply sufficient thrust to that pig.
> DNSSEC can be trivially used with DANE to protect the entire session. The browser vendors quite consciously decided to NOT do that.
100%. The reasons why are explained in some detail here: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/dns-security-dane/. The TL;DR is that by the time DANE was created the WebPKI already existed and was universal and so adding DANE didn't buy you anything because you still were going to have to have a WebPKI certificate more or less in perpetuity.
> This is the outcome of browser vendors not caring at all about privacy and security.
This is false. The browser vendors care a great deal about privacy and security. Source: it was my job at Mozilla to care about this, amongst other things. It may be the case that they have different priorities than you.
> You're saying that to provide service for anything over the Web, you have to publish all your DNS names in a globally distributed immutable log that will be preserved for all eternity?
Well, back when people were taking DNSSEC and DANE more seriously, there was a lot of talk of doing DNSSEC Transparency.
> And that you can't even have a purely static website anymore because you need to update the TLS cert every 7 days? This is just some crazy talk!
This is hyperbole, because nobody is forcing you to update the TLS cert every 7 days. It's true that the lifetimes are going to go down to 45 days eventually and LE offers 6 day certificates, but those are both optional and non-default.
Moreover, the same basic situation applies to DNSSEC, because your zone also needs to be signed frequently, for the same underlying reason: disabling compromised or mississued credentials.