> Similar to how other large military purchases are less about the military hardware and more of a client state subscription to ‘align interests’ such that the US is more likely to act in the donor countries interest.
I have a feeling this is no longer a viable model. If "subscribers" get threatened every other day, they will be looking for alternatives.
So long as not subscribing is worse than subscribing countries will still do it. Even if it not in the interest of the country the decision makers can and do still get kickbacks / speaking engagements.
It’s interesting to read of the ineffectiveness of influence the gulf states thought they had, though I think that speaks more to the relative cost effectiveness of tributes versus blackmail. These states don’t have the security apparatus to both blackmail US politicians and prevent others from blackmailing those same politicians. This second part is essential as it is what maintains the relative advantage.
I do think they will be less enthusiastic subscribers in the future, and perhaps even shop around for more cost effective approaches. Modi in India is intentionally creating an Indian diaspora as one example and I believe he is bribing politicians to help make this happen.
> read of the ineffectiveness of influence the gulf states thought they had
The primary players in the Gulf - Saudi and the UAE - have been aligned with the ongoing Iran strikes.
KSA's Mohammad Bin Salman has been lobbying Trump to strike Iran [0], just like his predecessor King Abdullah was doing [1]. Similarly, the UAE has an ongoing land dispute with Iran [2].
[0] - https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/02/28/trump-ira...
[1] - https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-politics/cut-off-he...
[2] - https://www.uae-embassy.org/foreign-policy/occupied-uae-isla...
So is it your stated position that the reason the US has decided to go to war with Iran is because of Saudi Arabia and the UAE?
Nope. And that is quite a leap in logic.
The larger Gulf States are aligned with the US in striking Iran. And we have an incentive also to prevent another nuclear breakout from happening.
Edit: can't reply
> I do note that a similar reason was given for North Korea which did end up rather peacefully acquiring nuclear weapons
Because we were in Iraq and Afghanistan when North Korea's nuclear breakout happened in the early 2000s.
> the primary reason?
There is no primary reason (there never is), but there are clearly a multiple interests that aligned with striking Iran
1. Iran's eventual nuclear breakout (already mentioned)
2. The operationalization of the Iran-Central Asia-China railway in 2025 [0], which allows China to bypass Malacca
3. Iran's relative weakness following the collapse of the Assad regime, the death of much od Hezbollah's leadership, and the Houthis comparative weakness
4. Continued anger amongst policymakers in the Gulf, Israel, and the US that Iran-backed Hamas launched the 10/7 attack barely 3 weeks after the US+EU launched the IMEC project and were about to loop Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords [1]
[0] - https://caspianpost.com/iran/china-kyrgyz-iran-rail-link-cut...
[1] - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/09/g20-eu-and-us-...
I was hoping to hear the case made as to why Israel was not the primary reason but instead you seem to have chosen to elide it altogether. It seems to be a conspicuous omission especially when both the US and Israeli admin have repeatedly made the case that Israel was the primary reason.
I felt giving a primary reason would add clarity, which is why I asked. So is “prevent another nuclear breakout from happening” the primary reason?
I do note that a similar reason was given for North Korea which did end up rather peacefully acquiring nuclear weapons.
Edit: so to confirm that is your stated primary reason? Any other reasons you can think of?
Primary reason is because Israel and American zionists (mostly evangelical christians) lobby for it. The KSA and friends also lobbying for it is just icing on the cake for American politicians.
> they will be looking for alternatives.
Who do "they" as in Europe go to?
China also views the EU as a junior partner [0], is running an ongoing disinfo campaign against the industrial exports of an EU member state [1], and has doubled down on it's support for Russia [2] in Ukraine in return for Russia backing China's claim on Taiwan [3].
And the EU is uninterested in building domestic capacity for most critical technologies.
Heck, last week [4] the EU excluded AI, Quantum, Semiconductors, and other technologies from the Industrial Accelerator Act (aka the "Made in EU" act) in order to concentrate on automotive and "net-zero" technologies.
Given that Chinese technology imports are already under the radar in the EU due to the Ukraine war, this is basically the EU creating a carveout for the US.
Even the major European Telecom and Space companies like Eutelsat, Deutsche Telekom, and Telefónica bluntly stated that they view the EU's digital sovereignity strategy as dead in the water [5] in it's current form.
Edit: can't reply
> They/we will go to domestic producers as much as possible, then China, then US, then rest of the world in that order. At least that would make a rational approach since (for now) unique things like f-35 can become an expensive paperweight on a whim of a lonely sick man. You can't build any sort of defense strategy on that, can you
But as I clearly showed, the EU is doing otherwise.
And the EU cannot work with China as long as China backs Russia and undermines European industrial exports.
All the rhetoric about digital sovereignity and domestic capacity has been just that - rhetoric.
[0] - https://fddi.fudan.edu.cn/_t2515/57/f8/c21257a743416/page.ht...
[1] - https://www.defense.gouv.fr/desinformation/nos-analyses-froi...
[2] - https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-01-...
[3] - https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russias-shoigu-chinas-wa...
[4] - https://www.sdxcentral.com/news/eu-axes-ai-chips-and-quantum...
[5] - https://www.sdxcentral.com/news/europes-digital-sovereignty-...
> And the EU cannot work with China as long as China backs Russia and undermines European industrial exports.
I mean, that is not that huge a difference compared to the USA (lifting sanctions against Russia, no tariffs there either, but plenty tariffs for "allies"; threatening NATO members in several ways; taking over Russia's "peace" plans for Ukraine 1:1 and putting the pressure solely on Ukraine; (I could go on for pages)).
I am not sure Americans really understand how much trust is already gone.
> that is not that huge a difference compared to the USA
It is for the EU.
The EU dislikes the current deprioritization of the Ukraine Conflict by the US, but also recognizes that the PRC is directly providing material support and subsidizing Russia's military industrial complex [0]. That is the red line for much of the EU.
Similarly, for the PRC it's continued support of Russia in their war in Ukraine is also a non-negotiatable [1], and the CCP's foreign mouthpieces continue to reiterate that "the mainstay of EU foreign policy — supporting Ukraine in a conflict to defeat Russia — has turned into a quagmire of sunk costs with little hope of success" [2].
> I am not sure Americans really understand how much trust is already gone
We know. And we don't care.
As long as the EU views Ukraine's territorial integrity as non-negotiable and a large portion of EU states view Russia as the primary national security threat, the US will remain the less bad option than the PRC or Russia.
Both the US and China are aligned in that we view the EU as a junior party that can be pressured [3].
If the EU views Russia as a threat, it will have to accept American vassalage becuase the PRC will continue to back Russia [1].
If the EU views America as a threat, it will have to accept Chinese vassalage, give up Ukraine, and accept Russia as the primary European military power.
Based on the carveouts within the Industrial Acceleration Act, the EU has chosen American vassalage.
[0] - https://ecfr.eu/article/funding-war-courting-crisis-why-chin...
[1] - https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/ch...
[2] - https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202603/16/WS69b7f2e2a310d...
[3] - https://www.economist.com/china/2025/11/17/europe-sees-china...
Very bold words. I am not even convinced the USA will stay relevant on the world stage, in the long run. Cutting ties hurts, but the process is underway. Also, "vassalage" is a bold word, if the US cannot make the EU give up Greenland or come running to help them in the Strait of Hormuz (there are also other examples). It is almost as if European politicians are playing it smart.
And my question is - are you fine sacrificing Ukraine in return for a Russian and Chinese military umbrella? This is the hard requirement for China to engage with the EU [0].
The answer in Poland, the Baltics, Czechia, and Finland is NO and that Russia is worse and that Ukraine must be supported, and will back the US no matter how transactional we become.
The answer in Hungary, Slovakia, and Belgium [1] is YES and that sacrificing Ukraine for Russia is acceptable.
[0] - https://scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/china-...
[1] - https://www.ft.com/content/4ce01938-a671-4433-83a7-dada2b3ba...
The question is if the Chinese support for Russia can be broken, by economical incentive or threat.
But anyway, over short or long the EU needs to build its own military to a strength it can at least work as a strong deterrence for aggressors.
They/we will go to domestic producers as much as possible, then China, then US, then rest of the world in that order. At least that would make a rational approach since (for now) unique things like f-35 can become an expensive paperweight on a whim of a lonely sick man. You can't build any sort of defense strategy on that, can you.