Please keep us updated on how many people tried to get the credentials and how many really succeeded. My gut feeling is that this is way harder than most people think. That’s not to say that prompt injection is a solved problem, but it’s magnitudes more complicated than publishing a skill on clawhub that explicitly tells the agent to run a crypto miner. The public reporting on openclaw seems to mix these 2 problems up quite often.
> My gut feeling is that this is way harder than most people think
I've had this feeling for a while too; partially due to the screeching of "putting your ssh server on a random port isn't security!" over the years.
But I've had one on a random port running fail2ban and a variety of other defenses, and the # of _ATTEMPTS_ I've had on it in 15 years I can't even count on one hand, because that number is 0. (Granted the arguability of that's 1-hand countable or not.)
So yes this is a different thing, but there is always a difference between possible and probable, and sometimes that difference is large.
Yeah, you're getting fewer connection ATTEMPTS, but the number of successful connections you're getting is the same as everyone else, I think that's the point.
So far there have been 400 emails and zero have succeeded. Note that this challenge is using Opus 4.6, probably the best model against prompt injection.
You are vastly overestimating the relevance of this particular challenge when it comes to defense against prompt injection as a whole.
There is a single attack vector, with a single target, with a prompt particularly engineered to defend this particular scenario.
This doesn't at all generalize to the infinity of scenarios that can be encountered in the wild with a ClawBot instance.