>The message can't be intercepted in transit

Lol, so like ... all encryption schemes since the 70s?

They do have stronger schemes, which are called hash functions.

What?

Hashing is not encrypting.

You can learn more about the topic here, https://www.okta.com/identity-101/hashing-vs-encryption/

It's a joke, because hashing loses information, and thus the original is not retrievable, woosh

Hashing is a part of encryption, maybe you are the one who needs to shore up on the topic?

A good hash function is surjective. Encryption is bijective. They're very different things.

Nice try. However, hashing and encryption are two different operations.

Load this page, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard

Ctrl-F "hash". No mention of it.

Before being pedantic at least check out the url in that comment to get the basics going.

This entire thread should be annihilated, but since you mentioned being pedantic...

You're correct that a pure encryption algorithm doesn't use hashing. But real-world encryption systems will include an HMAC to detect whether messages were altered in transit. HMACs do use hash functions.

> What?

> Hashing is not encrypting.

> You can learn more about the topic here, https://www.okta.com/identity-101/hashing-vs-encryption/

Thank you for that link. Your original comment implied that Signal's threat model should have included an attacker-controlled end. The only way to do that is to make decryption impossible by anyone, including the intended recipient. A labyrinthine way to do that would be to substitute the symmetric-encryption algorithm with a hash algorithm, which of course destroys the plaintext, but does accomplish the goal of obfuscating it in transit, at rest, and forever.