> How do you verify the common name/subject alt name actually matches when using a client cert.
This seems exactly like a reason to use client certs with public CAs.
You (as in, the server) cannot verify this at all, but a public CA could.
> How do you verify the common name/subject alt name actually matches when using a client cert.
This seems exactly like a reason to use client certs with public CAs.
You (as in, the server) cannot verify this at all, but a public CA could.
A public CA checks it one-time, when it's being issued. Most/all mTLS use-cases don't do any checking of the client cert in any capacity. Worse still, some APIs (mainly for finance companies) require things like OV and EV, but of course they couldn't check the Subject DN if they wanted to.
If it's for auth, issue it yourself and don't rely on a third-party like a public CA.
A federated ecosystem of servers that need to verify each other based on their domain name as the identity is the prime use-case for a public CA to issue domain-verified client certificates. XMPP happens to be this ecosystem.
Rolling out a private PKI for XMPP, with a dedicated Root CA, would be a significant effort, essentially redoing all the hard work of LetsEncrypt, but without the major funding, thus ending up with an insecure solution.
We make use of the public CAs, that have been issuing TLS certificates based on domain validation, for quite a few years now, before the public TLS CAs have been subverted to become public HTTPS-only CAs by Google and the CA/Browser Forum.
> Rolling out a private PKI for XMPP, with a dedicated Root CA, would be a significant effort
Rolling out a change that removes the EKU check would not be that much effort however.
That's exactly what prosody is doing, but it's a weird solution. Essentially, they're just ignoring the missing EKU flag and pretend it would be there, violating the spec.
It seems weird to first remove the flag and then tell everyone to update their servers to ignore the removal. Then why remove it in the first place?
I think you're confusing different actors here. The change was made by the CA/B Forum, the recommendation is just how it is if you want to use a certificate not for the purposes intended.
Yes, this is what is happening. It isn't happening fast enough, so some implementations (especially servers that don't upgrade often enough, or running long-term-support OS flavors) will still be affected. This is the impact that the original article is warning about.
My point was that this is yet another change that makes TLS operations harder for non-Web use cases, with the "benefit" to the WebPKI being the removal of a hypothetical complexity, motivated by examples that indeed should have used a private PKI in the first place.
> A public CA checks it one-time, when it's being issued.
That's the same problem we have with server certs, and the general solution seems to be "shorter cert lifetimes".
> Worse still, some APIs (mainly for finance companies) require things like OV and EV, but of course they couldn't check the Subject DN if they wanted to.
Not an expert there, but isn't the point of EV that the CA verified the "real life entity" that requested the cert? So then it depends on what kind of access model the finance company was specifying for its API. "I don't care who is using my API as long as they are a company" is indeed a very stupid access model, but then I think the problem is deeper than just cert validation.
> That's the same problem we have with server certs, and the general solution seems to be "shorter cert lifetimes".
No it isn't, and that's not the reason why cert lifetimes are getting smaller.
Cert lifetimes being smaller is to combat certs being stolen, not man in the middle attacks.