> A good intentioned participant will not have too much time to become corrupted.
The operation of the revolving door would seem to imply otherwise. You set up a situation where politicians are not just expected but required to leave office and then need a job in the private sector. Are they then inclined to do things while in office that make it more or less likely that they get a lucrative gig as soon as their term is up?
> A malicious ruler with infinite time to complete their destructive plan.
The assumption is that the ruler is the elected official. What do you do if the malicious ruler is a corporation and the elected official is just a fungible subordinate?
Campaign finance is another piece of the puzzle to avoid revolving doors. Cutting it slows down the initial introduction phase.
Group A invests millions of dollars into your campaign.
You go into politics in a debt to Group A that you feel obligated to repay.
You give favorable treatment to Group A in your political career.
Group A provides a lucrative contract to you after you leave politics so that they have a good reputation with the other politicians they finance.
> Group A invests millions of dollars into your campaign.
The problem is elections aren't just about donations. Suppose you're not a fan of Zuck/Musk/whoever, or pick your least favorite media conglomerate. Is limiting their financial contributions to a campaign going to meaningfully reduce their influence? Of course not, because it mainly comes from controlling the feed or the reporting, so limiting money is primarily to the detriment of their opponents. This is one of the reasons you hear some talk about "campaign finance" from the media industry -- it lets billion dollar media corporations pretend they're defending the little guy when they're really trying to cement an asymmetric advantage in influencing politics because they can de facto donate airtime rather than money. But they have a mixed incentive, because they're also the ones getting money from the ads and don't actually want the spigot closed, which is probably why it's more talk than action.
And then there's this:
> Group A provides a lucrative contract to you after you leave politics so that they have a good reputation with the other politicians they finance.
Which isn't campaign finance at all. It's also kind of a hard problem, because after someone leaves office, it's reasonably expected that they're going to work somewhere, but then how are you supposed to tell if they're getting a fat paycheck because they're currently providing a valuable service or because they were previously providing a valuable service? It's not like they're going to put "deferred bribe" in the memo field of the check.