> either the return wasn't commensurate to the risk
It's because the markets were frozen up; I was actually alive then and you can't really gaslight me about this
> either the return wasn't commensurate to the risk
It's because the markets were frozen up; I was actually alive then and you can't really gaslight me about this
what does "frozen up" mean?
Corporate bonds were simply not being bought, at any price. Same with commercial paper. Nobody knew what firms were going to still exist in a week so nobody was willing to lend any money at all.
> Nobody knew what firms were going to still exist in a week so nobody was willing to lend any money at all.
Perhaps I'm misunderstanding, but isn't this another way of saying it was too risky for people to invest? That seems to be the same concept as the quote you cited from the parent comment: "either the return wasn't commensurate to the risk".
I guess you could say that but the underlying problem was that the risk was entirely opaque so it couldn't actually be quantified and hedged against. The TARP loan ("shakedown" might be a better term honestly) gave financial firms time to sort out what their actual positions and exposure were; there wasn't time to let the market sort that out over months and at the cost of every major company (even non-financials) failing because of lack of access to credit.
Yeah it seems there's a bit of asymmetry between a normal lender and the federal government here where as a normal lender you might not be able to lend enough to guarantee the debtor survives. Also what the gov decides to do may significantly influence the lender's behavior. If the lender thinks there's a chance the gov will bail them out, they would probably prefer that and not give a loan.
Whereas the federal government can write a check for $633.6 billion and be much more certain the debtors will survive and pay it back.
So the government has negotiated from a position where the average taxpayer could be buying $10 worth of assets for $1 and have a go at managing it properly and creating some wealth, to a position where the taxpayer pays $1, the government buys the $10 in assets and gives it to some wealthy idiot, and there is a nominal return which at that time I imagine went into killing people in Iraq because Muslims, amirite? All those bombs cost a bomb.
And then we see 20 good years of economic prosperity where the US predictably got even wealthier than it previously was and there is great political stability and well-loved presidents like Mr Trump who represent the satisfaction US citizens feel for the economic highs they have reached!
What a fantastic deal for the average taxpayer. Let the confetti fall. Well done government, saved the day there.
Where it went was bailing out the automakers. It was a big story at the time and I'm starting to worry people just don't form long-term memories anymore.
Who are you going to believe, your own memories or present-day propaganda on social media?
> the US predictably got even wealthier than it previously was
If you just look at the economic indicators, then it did. Certainly way better than the "no intervention" counterfactual would have gone. People do not like it when all the ATMs stop working.
There is a lot of discourse to be had as to why people aren't feeling that personally.
> killing people in Iraq because Muslims, amirite? All those bombs cost a bomb.
Sadly there is/was massive bipartisan support for this bullshit. Including from the public. I note from a chronology perspective that most of the money in Iraq was spent/lost/wasted before 2008.
The problem is circular. The risk is that your counterparty goes bust. Therefore nobody wants to make any moves until they can be sure that (mostly) every other player is stable. But because no moves are happening, that in itself is destabilizing.
That is, the big risk is "what if the state doesn't intervene?"
Correspondingly, the state has a special move that only it can play, because "what if the state doesn't intervene" is not a risk to the state itself. The act of intervening makes the risk go away. That's part of the privilege of being the lender of last resort with the option to print currency.
(which is why this was a much more serious problem for Greece and Ireland, which as Eurozone members were constrained in their ability to even contemplate printing their way out of the problem!)