The hard nut to crack here is nobody has am empirical test for the subjective experience of consciousness. A machine which actually possesses it, and a machine which merely emulates it and answers questions as if it has that subjective experience cannot be distinguished using any empirical test. That includes people; it's simply a matter of common courtesy and pragmatism that we assume other people have comparable subjective conscious experiences (aka they aren't p-zombies.)
It's a straight forward argument and he presented it fairly clearly so...
Maybe this will help you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
The hard nut to crack here is nobody has am empirical test for the subjective experience of consciousness. A machine which actually possesses it, and a machine which merely emulates it and answers questions as if it has that subjective experience cannot be distinguished using any empirical test. That includes people; it's simply a matter of common courtesy and pragmatism that we assume other people have comparable subjective conscious experiences (aka they aren't p-zombies.)
Well then keep working on it.