One of the most iconic lisp saying is literally about how every other languages are supposedly inferior to lisp, so I don't think it's a particularly good example here.
Not a Rust or even a systems language guy but it’s not “for some reason”. The reason is actually incredibly clear and about removing the single largest surface area of security problems in the entire history of Linux.
Is it the largest though? Based on https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/, it would be part of #6 or #8. While one can always walk and chew gum at the same time (and those rewriting system software are likely not the same people who need to design systems with less flawed access control), replacing stable software is not without risk (e.g. https://lwn.net/Articles/1043103/, which is an instance of #6 caused by rust). Would you trust a rewrite of OpenSSH in rust (absent any information about its authors)?
Owasp deals with web security only. That whole area is biased towards php/ruby/js/python/beam where those issues don't exist outside of native modules.
https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-by-types.php is a bit more clear. It's xss, SQL, then memory. The first two are not possible to enforce a fix on - you can always make a decision to do something bad with no visible annotation. Even then, rich types like in rust make safe interfaces easier to produce. But rust tackles the next class of issues - one that you can verify to be safe or require an explicit "unsafe" around it.
But how many breaches get CVEs (or are caused by them)? Given how much users (and their data) interact via the web vs any other platform, reducing the breaches of services is going to improve users lives more than reducing the number of CVEs (does mongodb defaulting to not have username/password to access have a CVE).
As for preventing XSS and SQL injections, that's what good web frameworks do. If your framework encourages you to write raw unescaped SQL, or doesn't provide sensible defaults around content policies, then no matter what language it's in, there are going to be issues (and maybe if we called these frameworks "unsafe" then we'd get somewhere with fixing them).
In which code though? What counts as a security vulnerability (does the design of the play store such that searching for an app and the top result not being that app count)? I like everyone else want a secure browser, but my secure browser isn't going to prevent my email (or passwords) from appearing on https://haveibeenpwned.com/. I like rust, and want to write more rust, but if I were to port openssh to rust, I guarantee my rust code would have more CVEs than openssh.
My feeling is in the specific instance of using rust in apt, this is most likely a good thing (though I hope existing well tested rust libraries are used rather than NIHing them and introducing new bugs), but so far Ubuntu's rustification has not gone smoothly, so I'm more wary of the changes that e.g. improvements to Firefox via rust.
> though I hope existing well tested rust libraries are used rather than NIHing them and introducing new bugs
I think that's much more likely to introduce bugs.
Think of it that way, a lot of the Rust libraries are rewriting existing copyleft libraries in permissive licenses, so they cannot look at the original code, dooming them to repeat the mistakes that were made in the original code and having to fix them all over again on their own (as both go from "oh this is simple" to "oh another corner case").
I just want to translate code 1:1 to Rust, reusing my existing knowledge, design decisions, and tests. It should behave _exactly_ the same as before, just memory safe.
I don't agree with openssh take but yeah we don't need to migrate everything to rust and yeah a migration not always goes smoothly I am using sudo-rs on my arch install for over a year havent had any issues yet.
There is no guarantee that other bugs do not flurish in the rust echosystem.
There are no publicly known quality code checks of rust programs except a big "trust us"(see firefox with all its CVEs, despite "rust"). And combined with the Cargo echosystem, where every malicious actor can inject malware is a big warning sign.
AFAIK Linux is using rustc directly, without cargo.
And just an anecdote, Asahi Linux devs said that Rust made it very easy (maybe relative to working with C) to write the drivers for the Apple M1 and M2 series, so it seems that the language has his merits, even without the cargo ecosystem.
Also Rust will only minimize certain kinds of bugs, others are impossible, a few years ago (I believe was Microsoft) that said that 70% of the bugs found were memory related [0], it means that Rust would have prevented most of those.
Maybe Rust is not the best answer, but as for now it the most proven answer for this particular problem, who know of Zig or other language will replace both C and Rust in the future.
I might be misunderstanding here but... what you're saying is that Rust programs can still have bugs? Isn't that the same as other programs except Rust prevents the most disastrous and common bugs that lead to most CVEs?
If I got that right, how is "it's still not perfect" an argument?
If perfect isn't needed, we might as well stick with the 20+ years old mature codebase, there's no need to move to another language. I mean the "code to parse .deb, .ar, .tar," is done and whatever memory bugs should've been already fixed .
Use Rust for evergreen projects by all means, just leave mature tested systems alone, please.
One of the most iconic lisp saying is literally about how every other languages are supposedly inferior to lisp, so I don't think it's a particularly good example here.
You mean the one that all languages eventually converge to Lisp? That's a fact though :)
Yes, the blind stumble down hill eventually. But we let them do it in their own time.
Not a Rust or even a systems language guy but it’s not “for some reason”. The reason is actually incredibly clear and about removing the single largest surface area of security problems in the entire history of Linux.
Is it the largest though? Based on https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/, it would be part of #6 or #8. While one can always walk and chew gum at the same time (and those rewriting system software are likely not the same people who need to design systems with less flawed access control), replacing stable software is not without risk (e.g. https://lwn.net/Articles/1043103/, which is an instance of #6 caused by rust). Would you trust a rewrite of OpenSSH in rust (absent any information about its authors)?
Owasp deals with web security only. That whole area is biased towards php/ruby/js/python/beam where those issues don't exist outside of native modules.
https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-by-types.php is a bit more clear. It's xss, SQL, then memory. The first two are not possible to enforce a fix on - you can always make a decision to do something bad with no visible annotation. Even then, rich types like in rust make safe interfaces easier to produce. But rust tackles the next class of issues - one that you can verify to be safe or require an explicit "unsafe" around it.
But how many breaches get CVEs (or are caused by them)? Given how much users (and their data) interact via the web vs any other platform, reducing the breaches of services is going to improve users lives more than reducing the number of CVEs (does mongodb defaulting to not have username/password to access have a CVE).
As for preventing XSS and SQL injections, that's what good web frameworks do. If your framework encourages you to write raw unescaped SQL, or doesn't provide sensible defaults around content policies, then no matter what language it's in, there are going to be issues (and maybe if we called these frameworks "unsafe" then we'd get somewhere with fixing them).
Pretty consistently [1] [2] [3] [4] it comes out that nearly %80 of security vulnerabilities come from memory safety vulnerabilities. I would consider that largest. Especially Microsoft's doc is pretty telling that this ratio was pretty consistent since 2006 so no amount of external tooling and training solves this. [1] https://langui.sh/2019/07/23/apple-memory-safety/ (albeit apple solving this with an another language and a really nice cpu extension) [2] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2019/07/we-need-a-... [3] https://security.googleblog.com/2019/05/queue-hardening-enha... [4] https://x.com/LazyFishBarrel/status/1129000965741404160
In which code though? What counts as a security vulnerability (does the design of the play store such that searching for an app and the top result not being that app count)? I like everyone else want a secure browser, but my secure browser isn't going to prevent my email (or passwords) from appearing on https://haveibeenpwned.com/. I like rust, and want to write more rust, but if I were to port openssh to rust, I guarantee my rust code would have more CVEs than openssh.
My feeling is in the specific instance of using rust in apt, this is most likely a good thing (though I hope existing well tested rust libraries are used rather than NIHing them and introducing new bugs), but so far Ubuntu's rustification has not gone smoothly, so I'm more wary of the changes that e.g. improvements to Firefox via rust.
> though I hope existing well tested rust libraries are used rather than NIHing them and introducing new bugs
I think that's much more likely to introduce bugs.
Think of it that way, a lot of the Rust libraries are rewriting existing copyleft libraries in permissive licenses, so they cannot look at the original code, dooming them to repeat the mistakes that were made in the original code and having to fix them all over again on their own (as both go from "oh this is simple" to "oh another corner case").
I just want to translate code 1:1 to Rust, reusing my existing knowledge, design decisions, and tests. It should behave _exactly_ the same as before, just memory safe.
I don't agree with openssh take but yeah we don't need to migrate everything to rust and yeah a migration not always goes smoothly I am using sudo-rs on my arch install for over a year havent had any issues yet.
> The reason is actually incredibly clear
There is no guarantee that other bugs do not flurish in the rust echosystem. There are no publicly known quality code checks of rust programs except a big "trust us"(see firefox with all its CVEs, despite "rust"). And combined with the Cargo echosystem, where every malicious actor can inject malware is a big warning sign.
AFAIK Linux is using rustc directly, without cargo.
And just an anecdote, Asahi Linux devs said that Rust made it very easy (maybe relative to working with C) to write the drivers for the Apple M1 and M2 series, so it seems that the language has his merits, even without the cargo ecosystem.
Also Rust will only minimize certain kinds of bugs, others are impossible, a few years ago (I believe was Microsoft) that said that 70% of the bugs found were memory related [0], it means that Rust would have prevented most of those.
Maybe Rust is not the best answer, but as for now it the most proven answer for this particular problem, who know of Zig or other language will replace both C and Rust in the future.
[0] https://www.zdnet.com/article/i-ditched-linux-for-windows-11...
I might be misunderstanding here but... what you're saying is that Rust programs can still have bugs? Isn't that the same as other programs except Rust prevents the most disastrous and common bugs that lead to most CVEs?
If I got that right, how is "it's still not perfect" an argument?
Agree with the Cargo objection.
If perfect isn't needed, we might as well stick with the 20+ years old mature codebase, there's no need to move to another language. I mean the "code to parse .deb, .ar, .tar," is done and whatever memory bugs should've been already fixed .
Use Rust for evergreen projects by all means, just leave mature tested systems alone, please.
I don't follow how from "better but not perfect is better than worse" you conclude that.
OK? So, is your position that Debian is only for software that's old enough to vote?
Or maybe Debian should never rely on any software written after 2015?
Firefox is 29% Javascript, 28% C++, 22% HTML, 10% C, 3% Python, 2,6% Kotlin and 5% other
> There is no guarantee that other bugs do not flurish in the rust echosystem.
well, less likely than in C thanks to a advanced type system, e.g. allowing authors of abstractions make their API much more fool proof.
> where every malicious actor can inject malware is a big warning sign.
Very much doubt that is the case...
There are guarantees that many types of bugs won't happen in Rust code. That alone is a great progress.
a bunch of major projects have conclusively shown that moving to memory safe languages without any doubt whatsoever results in more secure software.
Are there guarantees that "other bugs" do not flourish in the C ecosystem?
Firefox is not even close to 100% Rust.
This is a wildly misinformed comment.