No.

Right from the beginning it was a handout to groups who built the scanning equipment, who were basically personal friends with people in the admin. We paid absurd prices for niche equipment, a lot of which was never even deployed and just sat in storage.

Several of the hijackers were literally given extended searches by security that day.

A reminder that what actually stopped hijackings (like, nearly entirely) was locking the cabin door, which was always doable, and has not ever been breached. Not only did this stop terrorist hijackings, it stopped more casual hijackings that used to be normal, it could also stop "inside man" style hijackings like that one with a disgruntled FedEx pilot, it was nearly free to implement, always available, harms no one's rights, doesn't turn airport security into a juicy bombing target, doesn't slow down an important part of the economy, doesn't invent a massive bureaucracy and LEO in the arms of a new american agency that has the goal of suppressing domestic problems and has never done anything useful. Keep in mind, shutting the cockpit door is literally how the terrorists themselves protected themselves from being stopped and is the reason Flight 93 couldn't be recovered.

TSA is utterly ineffective. They have never stopped an attack, regularly fail their internal audits, the jobs suck, and they pay poorly and provide minimal training.

> regularly fail their internal audits

Not even. It's that they rarely pass the audits. Many of the audits have a 90-95% "missed suspect item/s" result.

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