Just to make sure I understand:

–Are we treating an arbitrary ontological assertion as if it’s a formal argument that needs to be heroically refuted? Or better: is that metaphysical setup an argument?

If that’s the game, fine. Here we go:

– The claim that one can build a true, perfectly detailed, exact map of reality is… well... ambitious. It sits remarkably far from anything resembling science , since it’s conveniently untouched by that nitpicky empirical thing called evidence. But sure: freed from falsifiability, it can dream big and give birth to its omnicartographic offspring.

– oh, quick follow-up: does that “perfect map” include itself? If so... say hi to Alan Turing. If not... well, greetings to Herr Goedel.

– Also: if the world only shows itself through perception and cognition, how exactly do you map it “as it truly is”? What are you comparing your map to — other observations? Another map?

– How many properties, relations, transformations, and dimensions does the world have? Over time? Across domains? Under multiple perspectives? Go ahead, I’ll wait... (oh, and: hi too.. you know who)

And btw the true detailed map of the world exists.... It’s the world.

It’s just sort of hard to get a copy of it. Not enough material available ... and/or not enough compute....

P.S. Sorry if that came off sharp — bit of a spur-of-the-moment reply. If you want to actually dig into this seriously, I’d be happy to.

> Are we treating an arbitrary ontological assertion as if it’s a formal argument that needs to be heroically refuted?

If you are claiming that human intelligence is not "general", you'd better put a huge disclaimer on your text. You are free to redefine words to mean whatever you want, but if you use something so different from the way the entire world uses it, the onus is on you to make it very clear.

And the alternative is you claiming human intelligence is impossible... what would make your paper wrong.

I don't think that's a redefinition. "general" in common usage refers to something that spans all subtypes. For humans to be generally intelligent there would have to be no type of intelligence that they don't exhibit, that's a bold claim.

I mean, I think it is becoming increasingly obvious humans aren't doing as much as we thought they were. So yes, this seems like an overly ambitious definition of what we would in practice call agi. Can someone eli5 the requirement this paper puts on something to be considered a gi?