>right, don't do that. Withdraw to your wallet. Wait several days. Transfer elsewhere in different denominations.
Unfortunately, it doesn't work like that. The EAE attacks only require that the end destination is colluding with the start destination.
Like everything with decoys, privacy is stochastic. So I wouldn't go around making absolute claims about the privacy as many proponents of monero like to do. The developers advise against making these sorts of claims. Monero makes privacy a lot easier, but it's not perfect.
>There are court cases that give the confidence necessary. It is also something to stay abreast of. Always just ask yourself who the transaction is intended to be hidden from.
In the free world, we have the concept of innocent-until-proven-guilty and evidence-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt. Decoy-based approaches give you plausible deniability, but this often isn't enough for more domains where a lower standard of proof is needed.
Fortunately, all this and more will be fixed in FCMP++ upgrade.
Thats good FCMP++ will fix it
Right now it seems Eve just needs to do a dust attack and addresses she’s seen before
And wallets like Featherwallet just need to segregate dust from the pool of outputs, and that kind of attack is totally thwarted
Fortunately Eve doesnt know if an address is part of the same wallet and Featherwallet hides the ability to reuse addresses, although users are lazy and may rely on old addresses being accepted destinations for anyone sending them funds. It would be great if wallets notified of dust, or asked you to recognize transactions in.