Your vocabulary is fine. I think that idealism is necessarily weaker than other ways of viewing the world; it has problems that were repeatedly noted throughout the 20th century in major works by Wittgenstein and Heidegger, among others. (In fact, it can quite fairly be said that most of 20th century philosophy is a reaction to the fuzzy, yet superficially persuasive, idealistic tendencies of the 19th. Analytic philosophy is 100% a reaction to this.)

Per the Wittgenstein, you have, e.g., the "private language" problem: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/

Per Heidegger, well, the entire notion of "being-in-the-world" is a response to idealism. This is the notion that we first encounter a shared world of use, tasks, and significance (hammering, writing, speaking with others,) not private "ideas." So the world as you experience it isn't constructed within your head alone; the outside is always with you. You're embedded in an objective field -- or, at the limit, a consensus field.

As a general rule, you can't make sense of science and the commons as purely private occurrences. One's theories are often false; one is often genuinely surprised.

Besides, even classical idealists need something "beyond" representation (Kant's thing-in-itself; Schopenhauer's subliminal Will) to make sense of why experience has the structure it does. That is, the idealist view silently re-imports something non-mental to ground the mental.

Of course, we could be Boltzmann brains, dreaming clouds of charged gas in the sky, or we could be controlled by Cartesian Demons... and that is where strong idealism eventually leads... but I think that these views should be disfavored even on empirical grounds, for instance in your continued existence.